The opinion of the court was delivered by: CHARLES H. TENNEY
This matter is before the court after a fourteen year journey through the federal judicial system. The case began in 1978 with an action filed by approximately 100 migrant farm workers ("workers") under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq (1988) ("FLSA"), against defendant farm owners ("owners"), who employed the plaintiffs during various growing seasons, and the United States Secretary of Labor. See Soler v. G & U, Inc., et al., 615 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 833 F.2d 1104 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832, 102 L. Ed. 2d 64, 109 S. Ct. 88 (1988). The workers alleged that the owners had violated the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA by improperly deducting from the workers' wages the cost of on-site housing provided to them. See Soler, 615 F. Supp. at 738. According to the workers, the deductions were improper because the housing was primarily for the benefit and convenience of the owners, rather than that of the workers.
In June 1978, the workers petitioned the Wage and Hour Administrator of the United States Department of Labor ("Administrator") to determine the fair value of the housing. See Soler v. G & U, Inc., et al., 477 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The initial period of the litigation, from December 1978 to August 1986, involved both an administrative proceeding and the first application by the parties for judicial review. See id. ; Soler, 615 F. Supp. 736. During this period, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") conducted a twenty-nine day administrative hearing and found that the owners were entitled to deduct the cost of housing from the workers' wages because the housing primarily benefited the workers. See Soler, 615 F. Supp. at 739-40. In November 1983, the Administrator adopted most of the AIJ's findings, but adjusted the rental value of the housing. Soler v. G & U, Inc., et al., 833 F.2d at 1106. Because the rental value determined by the Administrator was less than the amount that was deducted from the workers' wages, the owners were found liable to the workers for the difference between the two. Both parties then sought judicial review of the Administrator's decision pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1988) ("APA"). Soler, 615 F. Supp. at 739-40.
On review, this court set aside the Administrator's determination that the housing was primarily for the benefit of the workers and granted summary judgment in their favor. Id. at 741, 749. Consequently, the owners were found liable for a total amount of $ 110,909.12. See Soler v. G & U, Inc., et al., 628 F. Supp. 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Judgment (April 17, 1986).
On remand, this court substantially affirmed the Administrator's decision.
See Soler v. G & U, Inc., et al., 768 F.Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The workers were accordingly awarded back wages based on the difference between the amount that the owners had originally deducted from their wages and the fair rental value as determined by the Administrator. See id. Judgment was entered in the amount of $ 37,731.74.
Judgment (Sept. 9, 1991).
Subsequent to this court's opinion setting aside the Administrator's decision, but before the Second Circuit's reversal and remand, this court awarded Legal Services $ 123,832.27 in attorney's fees and costs for the work performed from 1978 to 1986. Soler v. G & U, Inc., et al., 658 F. Supp. 1093 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The court determined this amount by dividing the litigation into two phases and using a different hourly rate for each period. Id. at 1102. In addition, the court later awarded Legal Services attorney's fees and costs, pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11, for the time expended on responding to defendant Grippe House's argument in its 1991 motion for summary judgment. Soler v. G & U, Inc., 138 F.R.D. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Legal Services now applies for attorney's fees in the amount of $ 126,485.20 for work performed from October 1989 to April 1992. The work during this time period involved time spent on cross motions for summary judgment while the case was on remand from the Second Circuit, settlement discussions, preparation of wages computations for the new judgments, a 1991 appeal to the Second Circuit that was later withdrawn, and preparation of the instant attorney's fee application.
Legal Services also seeks the $ 123,832.27 in fees awarded in this court's 1987 opinion and a 100 percent enhancement of that award to account for the delay in receiving it. Thus, the total amount of attorney's fees sought by Legal Services is $ 374,149.74. Pl. Brief in Support at 13, 18.
Section 216(b) of the FLSA provides that "the court in [an FLSA] action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
A party must be a prevailing party to recover attorney's fees under the FLSA. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40, 103 S. Ct. 1933 & n.7 (1982). In order to fulfill this requirement, a party need only "succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Id. ; see also Texas State Teachers v. ...