States. However, other passengers presumably did likewise in their own home states. As with the place of hiring of the seaman in Lauritzen (345 U.S. at 588, 73 S. Ct. at 931):
The place of contracting in this instance, as is usual to such contracts, was fortuitous. A seaman takes his employment, like his fun, where he finds it; a ship takes on crew in any port where it needs them. The practical effect of making the lex loci contractus govern all tort claims during the service would be to subject a ship to a multitude of systems of law, to put some of the crew in a more advantageous position than others, and not unlikely in the long run to diminish hirings in ports of countries that take best care of their seamen.
Nevertheless, if contract law were to be considered, it noted the contract's selection of governing law (345 U.S. at 589, 73 S. Ct. at 931):
Except as forbidden by some public policy, the tendency of the law is to apply in contract matters the law which the parties intended to apply. We are aware of no public policy that would prevent the parties to this contract, which contemplates performance in a multitude of territorial jurisdictions and on the high seas, from so settling upon the law of the flag-state as their governing code. This arrangement is so natural and compatible with the policy of the law that even in the absence of an express provision it would probably have been implied. (footnote omitted)
In this case, the tickets specify the law of Italy.
6. Inaccessibility of foreign forum, and
7. The law of forum.
These factors do not operate in this case to bring under American law the governance of the attack upon an Italian vessel in Mediterranean waters. As the Supreme Court stated in Lauritzen (345 U.S. at 591, 73 S. Ct. at 932):
Jurisdiction of maritime cases in all countries is so wide and the nature of its subject matter so far-flung that there would be no justification for altering the law of a controversy just because local jurisdiction of the parties is obtainable.
Given the predominant weight of factors favoring Italian law, and the strong deference accorded the law of the flag, it is clear that Italian rather than U.S. federal law applies to these cases.
Accordingly, the right sought to be enforced is not one "existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States," and the PLO may not be sued in its common name under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(1). The service thus far made upon it is ineffective.
For the foregoing reasons, the Clerk will enter judgment dismissing Hodes v. Palestine Liberation Organization, et al., 88 Civ. 7137 (LLS), and Saire v. Palestine Liberation Organization, et al., 88 Civ. 7281 (LLS), for lack of personal jurisdiction over the PLO at the time those suits were commenced.
All claims asserted against the PLO in Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Lines, et al., 85 Civ. 9303 (LLS), Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, et al., 85 Civ. 9708 (LLS), Meskin v. Achille Lauro Lines, et al., 86 Civ. 4657 (LLS), and Zaire v. Achille Lauro, et al., 86 Civ. 6332 (LLS), are dismissed without prejudice, for lack of personal jurisdiction because of ineffective service of process.
DATED: New York, New York
July 23, 1992
LOUIS L. STANTON
U. S. D. J.
The motions of Crown Travel Service, Inc., Chandris Inc., and Lauro Lines, s.r.l., to dismiss claims and cross-claims or for summary judgment, and the opposition thereto, having been made in reliance upon domestic law only, and the court having in its opinion and order dated July 23, 1992 held that the governing law is that of Italy, the motions are denied without prejudice to renewal upon the same papers (without refiling) by letter to the court accompanied by the parties' submissions with respect to the application of the law of Italy to the subject of the motions and, if applicable, the substance of the law of Italy on the points presented.
Dated: July 23, 1992
New York, New York
LOUIS L. STANTON
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