reflecting a May 8, 1981 conversation is not exculpatory. Indeed, since Agent Pistone testified at trial that that conversation involved a member of the Bonnano family telling Pistone that they were "winners, and that there was one situation that remained to be taken care of, and that the guys on the beach now belonged to [them]," See Trial Transcript at 76-78, that conversation, rather than exculpating petitioner, corroborates Pistone's testimony. The second audiotape cited in the petition, allegedly reflecting a May 14, 1981, conversation does not exist because the batteries from the agent's transmitter were not working at the time that conversation took place. See Trial Transcript at 329-36.
Moreover, the Brady claim is procedurally barred under McCleskey v. Zant, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991), because petitioner is "raising a claim in a subsequent [habeas] petition that he could have raised in his first," id. at 1468, and petitioner has failed to show (1) cause and prejudice for not raising this claim earlier
or (2) that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will result from failure to hear these claims. Id. at 1470.
Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel essentially involves the failure of his attorney to request the two tapes from the government and an allegation that his counsel did not properly cross-examine Agent Pistone, the government's main witness. See Petition at 5. This claim, however, does not satisfy the requirements of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), because petitioner has failed to show "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment," and that prejudice has occurred. Id. at 687. Clearly, the failure to request these two tapes cannot be seen as "serious" error which caused prejudice since one tape is arguably inculpatory and the other does not exist. In addition, counsel's decision on how to cross-examine Agent Pistone falls within the "wide range of reasonable professional assistance" described in Strickland. Id. at 689. Moreover, petitioner previously claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for a variety of reasons in a post-trial motion and in his previous habeas petition, and this Court has rejected those claims. These claims stand on no-better footing. See United States v. D'Ottavio, 87 Cr. 205, Memorandum Opinion and Order (dated January 18, 1989); D'Ottavio v. United States, 91 Civ. 3231, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12781 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1991).
Accordingly, the petitioner's motion to vacate his conviction is denied. The Clerk of the Court is directed to dismiss the petition and close the above-captioned action.
It is SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
July 24, 1992
John E. Sprizzo
United States District Judge