manufacturing or import-export business moved currency internationally; cars filled with cocaine were driven from Florida to New York, where the drugs were exchanged for cash and driven back to Florida (with the money at times smelling so strongly of drugs and drug-processing ingredients that it had to be literally washed before it could be counted); shell corporations in Panama and Colombia electronically transferred money to Europe and elsewhere; huge amounts of cash were flown by plane to Panama, unloaded, and deposited in banks accustomed to such practices; drug dollars were exchanged on the black market in Colombia for Colombian pesos; shipments of manufactured goods from Colombia to Panama were "lost" to cover up dollar transfers; "loans" were made and paid the same day; and many other procedures were used to disguise the true source and nature of the funds.
Extensive corporate and banking records from all over the world were the primary basis for the government's case. Claimants used corporate records, letters rogatory, testimony of those with knowledge of claimants' activities, and still and video pictures purporting to show the operations of their manufacturing plants in Colombia.
The Chief of the Drug Enforcement Administration Financial Intelligence Group, Cheryl Holmes, testified at trial after reviewing the voluminous bank and corporate records seized. She traced the links between numerous Panamanian shell corporations, which sent and received electronic funds transfers, and the Londono enterprise. Certified Public Accountant Aram Kostoglian, another government witness, testified that the cash receipts, corporate records, and bank statements of the claimant corporations were inconsistent with the types of records held by legitimate companies in Colombia and elsewhere. Several former Londono associates who had pled guilty also testified at trial to the illegal nature of the various enterprises utilized by claimants; one, who dealt in gold as a cover-up, described the counting and re-packaging of huge stacks of United States currency.
In connection with the money-laundering scheme, substantial sums of money were electronically transferred into and out of bank accounts in many countries including the United States. See generally Manufacturas International Ltda v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Bank, et al. (Consolidated Bank Cases), 792 F. Supp. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (describing the wire transfers). Officials of several European countries began cooperating in 1989 investigating the suspected drug-money-laundering activities of Jose Santa Cruz Londono. The inquiry began in Luxembourg and culminated in the seizure of funds in New York and abroad during the summer of 1990.
In September 1989, using a wiretap the Luxembourg Surete Publique intercepted a telephone call between Londono in Colombia and Jose Franklin Jurado-Rodriguez, a Londono associate, in Luxembourg. Jurado reported to Londono that he had successfully opened bank accounts using the name of Londono's father-in-law, and that he planned to set up several shell companies to assist in the money-laundering enterprises. The Surete learned through wiretaps and faxtaps that another Londono associate, Edgar Alberto Garcia-Montilla, was opening bank accounts throughout Europe in the names of Londono's parents-in-law, Heriberto Castro-Mesa and Esperanza Rodriguez de Castro.
In June 1990, Jurado, Garcia, and a third associate, Ricardo Mahecha-Bustos, were observed by European law enforcement officers during a ten-day period traveling and depositing large sums of money in accounts in Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands. They were arrested when they returned to Luxembourg. Jurado and Garcia were later convicted in Luxembourg on money-laundering charges after a lengthy trial.
Heavy wire transfer activity followed the three arrests. Using memoranda and bank records seized at the time of the arrests, officials from several countries were able to identify bank accounts around the world connected to the complex drug money-laundering scheme. In July and August 1990 approximately thirty million dollars was seized in Europe and sixteen million dollars was seized in Panama. In the United States, several American banks having correspondent banking relationships with Panamanian and Colombian banks were instructed by the United States Attorney to seize certain funds on deposit and wire transfers. The seized funds, totaling over ten million dollars, were the subject of this All Funds action.
Pursuant to a succession of amended complaints and supplemental warrants the banks were ordered by the United States Attorney to attach the identified accounts and wire transfers and pay the money into court pending the outcome of a plenary trial. In a separate action by claimants against the banks which seized the funds, summary judgment was granted for the defendant banks. See Manufacturas International Ltda v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Bank, et al. (Consolidated Bank Cases), 792 F. Supp. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). Another related action, by claimants against the United States Attorneys who ordered the banks to seize the funds, was dismissed for failure to state a claim. Abuchaibe Hnos. v. Maltz et al., CV 92-528 (oral decision).
Testimony at trial revealed an officially sanctioned parallel unofficial street market in dollars in Colombia. There was testimony that it is common knowledge in the streets and board rooms of Colombia that the source of the millions of American dollars in circulation in this "black" market is largely the drug trade in New York and other American cities.
As the "drug war" has escalated, the number of forfeiture cases in the United States has burgeoned. Taking away the profits of drug crimes through forfeiture is a powerful weapon to cripple drug-trading enterprises. Unfairly wielded it can place commercial enterprises at a terrible disadvantage. It skirts the edge of due process. See, e.g., United States v. $ 8,850 in United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 565-66, 76 L. Ed. 2d 143, 103 S. Ct. 2005 (1983) (balancing test set out in speedy trial context in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972), applies to determine reasonableness of delay in forfeiture proceedings). Even when a claimant is successful in fending off ultimate forfeiture, the loss of use of the seized funds for months or years while the case drags on can cripple a business. See id. at 565 ("Being deprived of this substantial sum of money for a year and a half is undoubtedly a significant burden."). The substantive law, procedures, and allocation of burdens of proof in forfeiture cases differ markedly from other civil proceedings, and give the United States prosecutor a substantial edge. See generally Edward M. Genson & Marc W. Martin, A Guide to Handling Federal Narcotics Forfeiture Cases, 79 Ill. B.J. 180 (1991) (discussing forfeiture procedures).
The government brought these proceedings under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), which provides for the forfeiture of
all moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance . . . [and] all proceeds traceable to such an exchange. . . .
The procedures applied in civil forfeiture proceedings are those "laws relating to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, and condemnation of property for violation of the customs laws." 21 U.S.C. § 881(d); United States v. $ 2,500 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Aponte v. United States, 465 U.S. 1099, 80 L. Ed. 2d 123, 104 S. Ct. 1591 (1984).
Burdens of proof are allocated by 19 U.S.C. § 1615. Under that section, the burden of proof is on the claimant, "provided that probable cause shall be first shown for the institution of such suit or action, to be judged . . . by the court." To begin forfeiture proceedings the government must first demonstrate that there was probable cause to institute the action. It must demonstrate that there are "reasonable grounds" to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture. United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1160 (2d Cir. 1986). "These grounds must rise above the level of mere suspicion but need not amount to . . . 'prima facie proof.'" Id.
The reasonable grounds standard is less stringent than the preponderance of the evidence standard. United States v. 303 W 116th Street, N.Y., N.Y., 901 F.2d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1990). The government need not link the funds to a particular narcotics transaction, but rather must "connect the property with narcotics activity. . . ." Banco Cafetero, 797 F.2d at 1160. In satisfying its burden, the government may demonstrate probable cause that the property itself, apart from the actions of the owner, is connected to narcotics activity. See id. ; see also United States v. One 1978 Chrysler LeBaron, 531 F. Supp. 32, 34 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (innocence of owner does not by itself prevent forfeiture). This reflects the legal fiction that the object itself is the wrongdoer. Manufacturas International Ltda v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Bank, et al. (Consolidated Bank Cases), 792 F. Supp. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v. One Mercedes-Benz 380 SEL VIN # WDBCA33 A1BB10331, 604 F. Supp. 1307, 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("the vehicle itself is guilty of facilitating crime"), aff'd, 762 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1985).
Probable cause is "judged . . . by the court." 19 U.S.C. § 1615; United States v. Sixteen Cases of Silk Ribbons, 27 F. Cas. 1099 (D.C.N.Y. 1870) (question of whether probable cause shown so as to shift burden to claimants is a question for the court); Three Thousand One Hundred and Nine Cases of Champagne, 23 F. Cas. 1168 (D.C.N.Y. 1867) (same). Hearsay is admissible to support the finding of probable cause. United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Road, Livonia, N.Y., 889 F.2d 1258, 1267 (2d Cir. 1989) (hearsay proper, since holding otherwise would undermine Congress's intentional shifting of the burdens in forfeiture cases). As the Second Circuit has explained:
In view of the unusual relative burdens of proof in civil forfeiture proceedings, this court, as well as a number of other circuits, has recognized an exception to the requirements of Rule 56(e) that supporting and opposing affidavits be based upon personal knowledge and admissible evidence, allowing the government to establish probable cause on the basis of hearsay affidavits.
United States v. 15 Black Ledge Drive, Marlborough, Ct., 897 F.2d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1990). Circumstantial evidence may be relied upon to show probable cause. United States v. $ 2,500 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Aponte v. United States, 465 U.S. 1099, 80 L. Ed. 2d 123, 104 S. Ct. 1591 (1984).
In the instant case, first a magistrate judge and then a district judge de novo determined that the government had probable cause to believe the funds were forfeitable. The district court's hearing on probable cause required three trial days in 1991. Post-hearing motions to reconsider the probable cause issue were denied. See United States v. All Funds et al., F. Supp. , 1992 WL 37087 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
Once the government has demonstrated probable cause, "the burden of proof shall lie upon" the claimant. 19 U.S.C. § 1615. Standing is "a threshold issue" for a claimant wishing to contest forfeiture. United States v. One 1982 Porsche 928, Three-Door, License Plate 1986/ NJ Temp/534807, 732 F. Supp. 447, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). If the claimant does not have standing, "the court lacks jurisdiction to consider his challenge of the forfeiture." Id. A claimant need not have actual or constructive ownership to have standing; even a possessory interest in the property is sufficient. United States v. $ 37,590.00, 736 F. Supp. 1272, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
If a claimant has standing, it bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence either 1) that the funds did not have their source in illegal drug transactions and money-laundering, or 2) that it did not know or constructively know -- through conscious avoidance of positive knowledge -- the source and nature of the funds as drug-related (the innocent owner defense). United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Road, Livonia, N.Y., 889 F.2d 1258, 1267 (2d Cir. 1989).
The innocent owner defense is set out in the statute:
No property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have committed or omitted without [his] knowledge. . . .