202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). Since Khatiwala's jurisdictional challenge presents the only obstacle to summary judgment for Key Bank, the remainder of this discussion will focus on whether Khatiwala is subject to the personal jurisdiction of this court.
B. Personal jurisdiction
As the parties are aware, Key Bank, as the plaintiff, has the burden of demonstrating the court's personal jurisdiction over Khatiwala pursuant to Hew York law. See Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1985); Hammond v. Alpha 1 Biomedicals, Inc., No. 91- CV-1477, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2421 *6-7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1992) (McCurn, C.J.) (appeal filed). Key Bank asserts that N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. ("CPLR") 302(a)(1) provides the basis for jurisdiction. That statute subjects a defendant to personal jurisdiction in New York if he or his agent "transacts any business in the state, or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state." § 302(a)(1); see Cutco Indus. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 365 (2d Cir. 1986); Khatiwala contends that he neither transacted business within the state nor contracted to supply goods or services within the state, and therefore is not covered by this statute.
Generally, when a defendant asserts in a summary judgment motion that the court lacks personal jurisdiction, the court must determine whether undisputed facts exist that warrant judgment. Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 L. Ed. 2d 116, 111 S. Ct. 150 (1990). If the defendant contests the plaintiff's factual allegations, then the court must hold a hearing at which plaintiff must prove the existence of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. No such evidentiary hearing is required in the present case, however; the court has before it enough undisputed facts to determine as a matter of law that Khatiwala is subject to the personal jurisdiction of this court.
The absence of a material factual dispute is inherent in Khatiwala's concession that he entered into the guaranty agreement with New York-based Key Bank. See Khatiwala Aff. (6/20/92) at P 6. By making this fatal concession, Khatiwala falls prey to the well-settled rule that "making a guarantee of payment to New York is 'supplying goods or services' in the state" within the meaning of CPLR 302(a)(1). Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp. v. Ace Drilling Co., 720 F. Supp. 48, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting CPLR 302(a)(1)). The rationale behind this rule is simple enough: "CPLR 302(a)(1) contemplates that jurisdiction will be exercised not only over a non-domiciliary who contracts outside of New York and actually ships goods into the state, but also over a nondomiciliary who contracts outside the state and subsequently fails to perform any part of the contract." Weinstein, et al., New York Civil Practice P 302-11(a) at 3-103, quoted in Chemco Int'l Leasing Inc. v. Meridian Eng'g, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 539, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
The rule that a guaranty to make payments to a New York entity constitutes a contract to provide services in New York pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1) is so firmly entrenched in case law that it is hardly worth elucidation. Chase Manhattan Serv. Corp. v. National Bus. Sys., Inc., 766 F. Supp. 203, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The court directs counsel to the numerous published opinions which discuss this axiom. See, e.g., id.; Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp., 720 F. Supp. at 49; Gaines Serv. Leasing Corp. v. Ashkenazy, 635 F. Supp. 805, 807 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Chemco Int'l Leasing, Inc., 590 F. Supp. at 542; Culp and Evans v. White, 524 F. Supp. 81, 82-83 (W.D.N.Y. 1981); Fashion Tanning Co. v. Shutzer Indus., Inc., 108 A.D.2d 485, 489 N.Y.S.2d 791 (3d Dep't 1985)). Rather than discuss each of these cases individually, the court simply points out that many of these cases are notably similar to the present in that the defendant's only contact with New York was through a guaranty that was executed outside of New York State but directed to a New York creditor. The respective courts in these cases were not swayed by the defendant's purported lack of physical contact with the state, and uniformly maintained that the guaranty relationship was in itself sufficient to subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction in New York State. See Gaines Serv. Leasing Corp., 635 F.2d at 806 (defendant "did not come to New York . . . [but] he did sign in California a guarantee of performance for each contract"); Chemco Int'l Leasing, Inc., 590 F. Supp. at 542; Culp and Evans, 524 F. Supp. at 81-82. Similarly, this court concludes that Khatiwala's lack of physical contact with this forum is inconsequential because his execution of the guaranty by itself automatically subjected him to personal jurisdiction in this court pursuant to section 302(a)(1).
The effect of Khatiwala's admitted contract to provide services within New York State, of course, is that he is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York State (and hence in this forum). Consequently, his sole basis for opposing Key Bank's motion for summary judgment is defeated.
Since Khatiwala has proffered no other evidence suggesting the existence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning his obligations under the guaranty, and it is clear that the guaranty requires him to pay Key Bank the amount owing under the note, Key Bank is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Khatiwala's cross-motion for summary judgment for want of personal jurisdiction is denied.
Defendant Khatiwala is subject to personal jurisdiction in this court. Accordingly, his cross-motion for summary judgment for want of personal jurisdiction is denied. Key Bank's motion for summary judgment is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 18, 1992
Syracuse, New York
Neal P. McCurn
Chief, U.S. District Judge