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JIRAK v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP.

October 27, 1992

PATRICIA JIRAK, Plaintiffs, against FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP., Defendants.


The opinion of the court was delivered by: JOHN E. SPRIZZO

 SPRIZZO, D.J.,

 Defendant in the above-captioned sex discrimination action moves for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion is granted.

 BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff was employed by Federal Express Corporation from November 5, 1987 until August 1, 1988 as a part-time courier. See Complaint PP 4, 9. Her job duties included delivery and pick-up routes on a fill-in basis for other couriers who had not reported to work and unloading cargo. Id. at P 9.

 During the first five months of her employment, plaintiff was absent from work three times and was late on numerous occasions, and consequently was issued two warnings stating that if this conduct continued, further disciplinary action may be necessary. See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment ("Def. Memo.") at Exs. C, D. On April 28, 1988, plaintiff was issued a "decision day" letter on account of another absence at which time she did not even inform the company that she would not be in that day. Id. at Ex. F.

 Under the decision day policy of Federal Express, plaintiff was given a day off with pay and was required to present a written personal performance agreement acceptable to the manager, detailing specific actions to correct her attendance problem and stating a personal commitment to abide by that agreement. Id. at Ex. E. Although plaintiff promised to improve, she was late a few more times in the next two months and was issued a second decision day letter on June 17, 1988. *fn1" See Complaint Ex. H. Despite all of these warnings, plaintiff called in sick on August 1, 1988 with back pain and menstrual cramps and did not report for work. *fn2" Her employment was consequently terminated.

 DISCUSSION

 Plaintiff first argues that defendant's reason for termination supports her claim of sex discrimination because menstruation, like pregnancy, is a uniquely female attribute for which an employer may not lawfully discharge an employee. That argument is supported neither by federal statute nor by pertinent case authority. *fn4" While the PDA prohibits discrimination in employment "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), menstrual cramps are not a medical condition related to pregnancy or childbirth.

 Moreover, the decision of an employer to treat a high number of absences regardless of the reason for those absences, as an attendance problem justifying disciplinary action does not violate Title VII so long as that policy is applied equally to all employees. Gilchrist v. Bolger, 733 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1984); see Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc); Grant v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 638 F. Supp. 1528, 1537 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Plaintiff has failed to adduce any evidence that Federal Express' policy of termination for violation of a second decision day letter was not applied equally to male and female employees. Indeed, when plaintiff was asked for names of persons with attendance violations who were treated differently than she was, she identified two male and two female employees. See Deposition of Patricia Jirak ("Jirak Dep.") at 389. The fact that her supervisor had discretion not to fire an employee who, due to exceptional circumstances, violates a second decision day agreement, does not support a rational inference that plaintiff's supervisor fired her for a discriminatory reason. *fn5" This is especially true since plaintiff has not set forth any evidence that Mr. Casale displayed any animus toward her, and in fact, testified at her deposition that he was "supportive" of her.

  Furthermore, Title VII requires only that women shall be "treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 77 L. Ed. 2d 89, 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983), the Court found that petitioner's health plan was discriminatory against men because it gave married male employees a benefit package for their dependents that was less inclusive than the coverage provided to married female employees. Id. at 682-84. Similarly, in the instant case, to allow a female employee to violate a second decision day agreement where a male employee would be fired for that same violation would be discrimination against males on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.

 Plaintiff also attempts to argue that her assignments to unloading duty were discriminatory and led to her eventual termination when she called in sick with back pain allegedly stemming from those assignments. However, there is no evidence in the record to suggest disparate treatment in the assignment of unloading duty, and to the contrary, it is undisputed that this duty was given to the least senior employee, which was concedely plaintiff's status at the time that she was assigned these duties. See Casale Dep. at 14-16. Moreover, any claim that plaintiff was improperly discharged because she was rendered unfit for work by an on-the-job injury is not cognizable under Title VII, although it might be a basis for a workers' compensation claim.

 Plaintiff's claim under the Equal Pay Act must also be dismissed since there is no evidence that plaintiff was paid less than similarly situated males. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). It is undisputed that defendant's wage scales are determined solely by seniority, so long as the courier received an overall evaluation score of at least "4," see Affidavit of Peter A. Casale P 4, and that plaintiff attained an overall evaluation score of over "4" at all times and received all requisite ...


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