and with the EOAA. Plaintiff contends that, despite this knowledge, Columbia did nothing about the problem. Plaintiff further contends that Columbia knew about the difficulty in April 1989 when she described it to Spivack of PMI. Plaintiff contends that again Columbia failed to perform its duty to take remedial action.
The information which certain Columbia employees learned in September 1988 was obtained in the course of consultations which were intended to be completely confidential. It cannot be said that this was "knowledge" on the part of Columbia of the kind that gave Columbia the duty to inquire and take remedial action. Plaintiff chose these confidential procedures instead of availing herself of the right, offered by the University, to file a grievance and initiate an investigation leading to a possible remedy against Urban. Columbia could hardly be expected to act against Urban as a result of the confidential consultations of September 1988.
In connection with plaintiff's claim that Columbia should have taken action in April 1989, the essential fact is that plaintiff spoke to an employee of a separate company, PMI, and did not speak to anyone at Columbia. Despite an extensive deposition record, there is absolutely no evidence that any PMI employee notified Borden or anyone else at Columbia of what plaintiff said.
Plaintiff contends that notice to PMI was the equivalent of notice to Columbia, and that PMI's knowledge should be taken to be the knowledge of Columbia. The court rejects this theory. PMI was a small company performing a service as an independent contractor to Columbia. It was not responsible for policing the problems arising between one Columbia University employee and another. If PMI had reported the matter, it would have involved going over Urban's head to someone such as Borden, and relaying a complaint about Urban. Perhaps this would have been a worthy thing to do, but PMI had no legal duty to do so, and indeed had economic reasons for minding its own business.
But overriding all of this is the salient fact that plaintiff had the ability in April 1989 or at any time to go directly to Columbia with her complaint. She did not have to rely on the uncertain, indirect channel of PMI. Under all the circumstances, the court rules that notice to PMI was not notice to Columbia and that PMI's knowledge was not the knowledge of Columbia. The events of April 1989 did not impose on Columbia any duty to take remedial action against Urban.
The first time that plaintiff made a complaint of such a nature as to require action on the part of Columbia was in late January 1990. When this occurred Columbia took prompt and effective remedial action. Within a reasonable time plaintiff was removed from Urban's supervision. Shortly thereafter Urban's employment was terminated.
The court rules that Columbia had no duty to investigate, or to take remedial action, until plaintiff made her complaint in late January 1990. Columbia's response to that complaint was prompt and effective. Columbia has demonstrated that it is not liable under Title VII and that there is no triable issue of fact on this claim.
Brief note must be made of a retaliation claim of plaintiff. It appears that plaintiff was terminated in August 1990 along with all other employees working on the Telefund operation. Plaintiff makes a conclusory, totally unsupported allegation that this was in retaliation for her sexual harassment complaint. Columbia has produced conclusive evidence that the Telefund program was cancelled for independent business reasons. The evaluation of the Telefund operation had been going on since the summer of 1989 and in the summer of 1990 a UDAR employee named Veronica Chappelle recommended that the Telefund operation be ended.
In late 1990 Columbia accepted the offer of a different company than PMI to make Columbia a demonstration site for computerized telephone fund raising. This project was developed at no cost to Columbia. Plaintiff admits that she reviewed certain published public listings of job openings for this project, but did not apply.
Columbia is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the Title VII claim.
The only basis for jurisdiction over the other claims against Columbia is the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. All the claims against Borden and Urban are before the court solely on the basis of pendent jurisdiction.
Since the Title VII claim against Columbia is dismissed, there is no basis for asserting jurisdiction over the remaining claims.
The action is dismissed in its entirety.
Dated: New York, New York
February 2, 1993
THOMAS P. GRIESA
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