contends - a literal allegation of participation -, then the defendants could escape trial only by a method analogous to civil summary judgment. On the contrary, if the allegation in paragraph 33 is, as the defendants assert, merely a definition of the conspiracy's duration, then dismissal is proper under Fed.R.Crim.P. 12. Consequently, the court's decision turns on its interpretation of the substance of paragraph 33.
C. It has long been held that the criminal analog to civil summary judgment motions, referred to in the colloquialism of the past as "speaking motions," are not allowed by Fed.R.Crim.P.12(b). United States v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1048 (11th Cir. 1987) ("Rule 12 is not intended to authorize 'speaking motions' through which the truth of allegations in an indictment are challenged."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 969, 98 L. Ed. 2d 404, 108 S. Ct. 465 (1987); United States v. Greater Syracuse Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 887, 889 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (same); United States v. Antonucci, 663 F. Supp. 245, 246 (N.D.Ill. 1987)("Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b) was not intended to convert motions to dismiss into a criminal case analogy of the civil practice motion for summary judgment."); See e.g. 1 C.Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d, § 194 at 714 (1982). Rather, as this court has recognized previously, on Rule 12(b) motions the court must accept all factual allegations in the Indictment as true. T. at 60. The purpose of this rule of practice as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 100 L. Ed. 397, 76 S. Ct. 406 (1956), is to protect the sanctity of the grand jury and to avoid a trial before the trial. Id. at 363. The latter policy reason, of course, is to provide for the expedited administration of justice. Thus, where a grand jury has determined that there is probable cause to believe that a fact constituting an element of a crime has occurred, and where this fact is alleged in an indictment, a defendant may not challenge this factual assertion short of a trial on the merits.
A literal reading of paragraph 33 indicates that the Grand Jury found probable cause to believe that both Stone and Monachello participated in the conspiracy throughout its duration. While logic and context may contra-indicate such a conclusion, the defendants have shown this court no authority which allows it to look behind the intent of the grand jury or to contextually construe allegations of an indictment. Consequently, the court must conclude that paragraph 33 stands for its literal proposition. See United States v. Tallant, 407 F. Supp. 878, 887 (N.D.Ga. 1975) (holding that "on or about" language contained within indictment was sufficient factual allegation to defeat Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b) motion based upon statute of limitations). That being so, the allegations that defendants Stone and Monachello (as well as the other named defendants) participated in the crimes charged in the indictment from "in or about June 1983 through in or about September 1988" (See Indictment, pp. 10 [count 1], 18 [counts 2-13], and 20 [counts 14-25]) are sufficient to defeat the statute of limitation defenses and therefore a trial on the merits must be held. United States v. Tolub, 187 F. Supp. 705, 709 (S.D.N.Y 1960) ("Since, for purposes of a pre-trial motion, the factual allegations in the indictment are treated as correct, the government's allegation of a conspiracy continuing until the date of the filing of the indictment must be accepted."); United States v. Metropolitan Leather & Findings Assn., 82 F. Supp. 449, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) ("If any of the defendants withdrew from the conspiracy long enough ago for the statute of limitations to bar prosecution now, they may show that upon the trial."); United States v. Stone, 444 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (E.D.Wis. 1978), aff'd without op., 588 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1978) ("Affirmative defense of withdrawal from the alleged scheme and conspiracy is not one which is capable of determination without a trial of the general issue in this case. . . ."); United States v. Handler, 1978 WL 5690 (C.D.Cal. 1978) (conspiracy allegations and the aiding and abetting charges prevents pre-trial adjudication of withdrawal/statute of limitations defense); United States v. Kearney, 436 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (declining to resolve statute of limitations defense pre-trial where doing so would require adjudication of factual allegations of the indictment); United States v. Andreas, 374 F. Supp. 402 (D. Minn. 1974) (same).
However, the court must state that the result reached today, while procedurally mandated, seems to defeat, at least in the instant case, the very regard for the efficient and orderly administration of justice which directed the Court in Costello, supra and Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 90 S. Ct. 858, 25 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1970). The practical effect of this ruling is that a cursory statement by a grand jury, empaneled for over two years and asked to review documents totalling over 22,000 pages, will bring to trial two defendants who have laid bare affirmative defenses which show almost unequivocally that they withdrew from the purported conspiracy more than five years before the indictment. Thus, as so strongly renounced by the Court in Toussie, these defendants will be required to defend against stale charges of criminality, charges which in all practicality could have been resolved pre-trial. In doing so they must endure the financial and emotional strain of trial predicted to last over two months. Unless the prosecution can show more than it has on the instant motion, a contingency for which the defense must prepare nonetheless, the defendants' motion will in all likelihood be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 29 after the close of the government's proof. When stripped of its glowing rhetoric, the functional effect of the government's position is that it has used its favorite net of "conspiracy" to ensnare two defendants who, by Congress' own determination, should have gone free because of the government's dalliance.
Wherefore, for the reasons discussed herein, it is hereby
ORDERED that the court's December 14, 1992 order dismissing indictment 92-CR-261 as to defendants CHARLES MONACHELLO and THEODORE STONE is VACATED; and that indictment 92-CR-261, as to defendants CHARLES MONACHELLO and THEODORE STONE, is re-instated as originally handed down by the Grand Jury and filed before this court on November 6, 1992.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated at Binghamton, New York
March 10, 1993
Thomas J. McAvoy
United States District Judge