manipulating the financial figures pertaining to various franchise opportunities.
Defendants simultaneously move to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Rule 8 mandates that a pleading contain a "short and plain statement" of the grounds for relief because one of the principal purposes of pleading under the federal rules is to provide fair notice of the claims to relief so that the defendant may prepare a defense. Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Consequently "the statement [in the pleading] should be short because unnecessary prolixity in a pleading places an unjustified burden on the court and the party who must respond to it because they a forced to select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage."Id. (quotation omitted). Where a pleading fails to comply with Rule 8, it is well settled that the district court has the discretion to dismiss the pleading. Id. But where the deficiency of the pleading is that it contains too much detail, the court should generally strike redundant or immaterial matter rather than dismiss the complaint. Id. at 43 (dictum). Accordingly, defendants ask this Court to strike all irrelevant material from the pleadings. Defs.' Mem. of Law at 45-46. However, their request to strike is denied because defendants have not shown that any "portion of the pleading . . . has 'no bearing on the subject matter of the litigation and that its inclusion will prejudice them . . . .'" Bornfreund, 668 F. Supp. at 133 (quoting FRA S. p. A. v. Surg-O-Flex of America, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 421, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)).
2. Rule 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be dismissed upon motion for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A court may only dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), if after accepting the material facts alleged in the complaint as true, Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 12 L. Ed. 2d 1030, 84 S. Ct. 1733 (1964)), cert. denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 1943 (1992), it still appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957). Since it is clear that plaintiffs -- while unfortunately proceeding under an abundance of caution -- have adequately pleaded a cause of action under RICO, defendants' motion must be denied.
The RICO statute provides for a private civil cause of action for "any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of [ 18 U.S.C. § 1962] . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Section 1962 contains three substantive subsections. Section 1962(a) prohibits any person from investing income derived from racketeering activity in the establishment or operation of an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce. Section 1962(b) prohibits any person, through a pattern of racketeering activity, from acquiring or maintaining an interest in an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce. Section 1962(c) forbids any person to conduct or participate in conducting an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity.
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim because plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead a RICO enterprise, which is an essential element of a civil RICO action. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583, 69 L. Ed. 2d 246, 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981). The RICO statute broadly defines enterprise to include, inter alia, "any . . . group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). Thus, the existence of an enterprise "is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit." Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583. In light of Turkette, this Circuit has held that an association-in-fact enterprise may be based on a common, illicit purpose as evidenced by the alleged racketeering acts without proof of a formalistic, organizational structure. United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1559-60, 1562 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Kelly v. United States, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 1486 (1992); United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 55-56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983); United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1304, 103 S. Ct. 2124 (1983).
In this case, plaintiffs have alleged that defendants EYI and Nicotra, together with an EYI affiliate, R&S Ventures, Inc. ("R&S") and shareholders, directors and employees of EYI and R&S engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity to defraud prospective franchisees. Complaint P 26. The common purpose of the alleged "enterprise" was and is to earn illicit income from defrauded franchisees. Accordingly, plaintiffs have adequately alleged the existence of a RICO enterprise.
Defendants initially argued that a corporation and its employees cannot constitute an association-in-fact enterprise because the corporation cannot, simultaneously, be the "person" engaging in the proscribed activity as well as the enterprise which is used to further that activity under Bennett v. United States Trust Co. of New York, 770 F.2d 308, 314-15 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058, 88 L. Ed. 2d 776, 106 S. Ct. 800 (1986). However, defendants now concede that a corporation and its employees, officers or directors may constitute a RICO enterprise. Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 2-3. See, e.g., Kuczynski v. Ragen Corp., 732 F. Supp. 378, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Richardson Greenshields Secur. Inc. v. Mui-Hin Lau, 693 F. Supp. 1445, 1449 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Greenfield v. Professional Care, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 110, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Metzner v. D.H. Blair & Co., 663 F. Supp. 716, 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Cf. Center Cadillac v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 808 F. Supp. 213, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (complaint sufficiently pleaded existence of RICO enterprise comprised of corporation, its present employees, and former employees who were allegedly working in tandem with the corporation). But see Official Publications, Inc. v. Kable News Co., 775 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (corporation and its principal officers cannot constitute RICO enterprise; citing decisions of other Circuits). Moreover, since plaintiffs have alleged that the enterprise includes another corporation, R&S, which allegedly participated in the scheme to defraud, it is quite clear that plaintiffs have adequately pleaded a RICO enterprise. See, e.g., Fustok v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1074, 1075-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (corporation and its subsidiary may form an association-in-fact enterprise) (citing United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393-94 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927, 63 L. Ed. 2d 759, 100 S. Ct. 1312 (1980)).
Defendants also contend that plaintiffs must show that the enterprise consisting of EYI, R&S and their employees and officers was engaged in activity separate and apart from normal corporate endeavors, citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583, 69 L. Ed. 2d 246, 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981) ("The 'enterprise' . . . is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages."). While plaintiff bears the burden to prove at trial that the members of the alleged enterprise participated in some conduct other than the business of EYI, that is not a basis for dismissal of the complaint at this time. Greenfield, 677 F. Supp. at 116. Moreover, if defendants can demonstrate after some discovery has taken place that defendant Nicotra was simply acting in his capacity as an officer of EYI, then a summary judgment of dismissal as to EYI may be appropriate. See id.
Finally, this Court notes that defendants do not argue that plaintiff has failed to plead the other elements of a RICO claim: that EYI is engaged in interstate commerce and that the alleged predicate acts, if proved at trial, would constitute a "pattern" of racketeering activity under H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239-40, 106 L. Ed. 2d 195, 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989), because they are related and have the requisite continuity or pose a threat of continued fraudulent activity in the future. Id. at 239-42; see also United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1381-82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 107 L. Ed. 2d 24, 110 S. Ct. 56 (1989). Racketeering predicates are related if they involve "the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." H.J. Inc. at 240. In this case, plaintiffs allege that the same participants, i.e., defendants, defrauded plaintiffs and other EY franchisees for the common purpose of earning illicit franchising fees, and that defendants' fraud involved similar victims in the sense that all of the alleged victims were engaged in obtaining franchises from EYI. See, e.g., Banks v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418, 424-25 (3d Cir. 1990) (victims are considered "similar" if they are defrauded while engaging in similar business dealings with defendants). Thus, the relatedness prong is satisfied in this case.
Likewise, defendants' fraudulent conduct satisfies the continuity aspect of a RICO pattern. "'Continuity' is both a closed- and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition." H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241. In this case, it is alleged that defendants' acts of mail and wire fraud extended over a two year period from 1987 to 1989 which satisfies the continuity prong. Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 369 (2d Cir. 1992) (predicate acts spanning two year period satisfy continuity prong). In addition, "the threat of continuity may be established by showing that the predicate acts or offenses are part of an ongoing entity's regular way of doing business. " H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242. Since plaintiffs allege that defendants' normal course of conducting its legitimate business was to defraud franchisees, they have sufficiently pleaded a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO.
3. Section 1962(a)
Defendants move to dismiss the investment of racketeering proceeds claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) on the ground that plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they sustained a distinct injury through the alleged investment of racketeering proceeds. It is axiomatic that a plaintiff only has standing to sue under the RICO provisions if "he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation." Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 87 L. Ed. 2d 346, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Moss v. Newman, 465 U.S. 1025, 79 L. Ed. 2d 684, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984). To state a claim under § 1962(a), plaintiffs must have sustained an injury through the investment of the racketeering proceeds in an enterprise, Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 1990), and there must be a "causal connection" between the injury sustained and the prohibited conduct. Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir. 1992).
Plaintiffs argue that they were injured through defendants continued investment of illicit proceeds in the enterprise because this, they claim, increased the value of the franchises to be sold, forcing plaintiffs to pay a higher price for their unsuccessful franchise. Pls.' Mem. of Law at 15-16. However, this argument is not persuasive. It is illogical that EYI would hope to increase the cost of EY franchises by reinvesting the proceeds that it earned through defrauding other franchisees. Any increase in the value of a future EY franchise would be more than offset by the injury to EYI's reputation when prior franchises would fail. Nor can plaintiffs recover under this claim simply because defendants reinvested their illicit gains to continue defrauding other prospective franchisees. See, e.g., Vista Co. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1286, 1299-1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Galerie Furstenberg v. Coffaro, 697 F. Supp. 1282, 1288-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Here, plaintiffs claim is solely predicated on the injuries that they sustained through defendants' racketeering activity, not through the investment of proceeds derived from prior racketeering activity. See, e.g., In Re Gas Reclamation, Inc. Sec. Litig., 659 F. Supp. 493, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Accordingly, this claim is dismissed.
4. Section 1962(d)
Defendants argue that the conspiracy claim should be dismissed because plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that they sustained an injury related to the conspiracy. However, this argument is summarily rejected in light of Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, 897 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1990). In Hecht, the court held that a civil plaintiff has standing to recover damages on a RICO conspiracy claim if he sustained injury to his business or property through an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy which would constitute a racketeering predicate act under § 1961. Id. at 25. Here, it is clear that plaintiffs claim that they lost money due to defendants' overt acts of mail fraud and wire fraud in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.
Defendants next argue for dismissal of the conspiracy count on the ground that the complaint does not sufficiently plead a RICO conspiracy to violate § 1962(c). Section 1962(d) prohibits any person from conspiring to violate any of the substantive provisions of § 1962(a)-(c). To state a claim under § 1962(d), a plaintiff must allege "facts implying an agreement involving each of the defendants to commit two [or more] predicate acts." Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, 897 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1990); Center Cadillac v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 808 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984)). To sufficiently plead a RICO conspiracy, a plaintiff need only provide some factual basis in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, except to the extent that the conspiracy claim relies on underlying allegations of mail fraud or wire fraud. Hecht, 897 F.2d at 26 n.4.
In this case, plaintiffs have failed to provide a factual basis to support their conspiracy claim. They broadly allege that the two defendants in this action, EYI and Richard Nicotra, conspired with other employees and officers of EYI and R&S to commit fraud. Complaint PP 351-359. Yet, the complaint -- wordy as it is -- does not supply any facts to buttress its "barebones" allegation that EYI, Richard Nicotra or any other person agreed to commit any predicate acts of mail fraud or wire fraud. The complaint is practically silent as to any alleged co-conspirator's role -- other than defendants EYI and Richard Nicotra. At most, plaintiffs have alleged that some of the co-conspirators, who are not named as defendants, may have deposited certain letters in the United States mails or made certain telephone calls. But that is insufficient to create a factual basis to believe that they ever intended to agree to commit any fraudulent acts. Center Cadillac, 808 F. Supp. at 230, 237. Accordingly, the conspiracy claim is dismissed without prejudice.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss is denied as to the § 1962(c) claim (Count I) and is granted in part in that the § 1962(d) claim (Count II) is dismissed without prejudice and the § 1962(a) claim (Count III) is dismissed with prejudice.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
I. Leo Glasser, U.S. D. J.