The opinion of the court was delivered by: THOMAS J. MCAVOY
Chief U.S. District Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION & ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION
In an Amended Memorandum-Decision & Order dated January 26, 1993 the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on counts two, four, five and six of the complaint, and granted Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment on counts one and three of the complaint.
On January 26, 1993 the Clerk entered judgment dismissing the action. However, the judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' action was in error because the action was not dismissed, but rather summary judgment was granted in part to Plaintiffs and in part to Defendants. Consequently, on January 28, 1993, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), the Court directed the Clerk to enter an amended judgment which, rather than dismissing Plaintiffs' action, granted partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs and partial summary judgment to Defendants. An amended judgment was entered by the Clerk on January 28, 1993.
On February 9, 1993 Defendants applied for an order to show cause for reargument of the Court's January 26, 1993 Amended Memorandum-Decision & Order and for a stay pending reargument. On that date, Defendants filed their memorandum of law in support of the motion with the Court. After reviewing Defendants' memorandum of law, the Court denied Defendants' application for an order to show cause and instead directed them to notice their motion for a regularly scheduled motion date. That very same day Defendants served the Notice of Motion, supporting affidavits and memorandum of law on Plaintiffs' Washington, D.C. counsel via Airborne Express, and on Plaintiffs' local counsel via regular first class mail. The following day, February 10, 1993, Defendants filed their Notice of Motion for relief pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), 62(b) and 62(c) and supporting affidavits with the Court.
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be "served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Plaintiffs argue that the present motion is untimely because it was not served within the ten day period. They first contend that the time within which to file the motion began when the first judgment was entered - that is, on January 26, 1993 - and not when the amended judgment was entered two days later. However, regardless of whether the time should run anew from the amended judgment, the Court finds that the motion was timely with respect to either the January 28, 1993 amended judgment, or the January 26, 1993 judgment.
If the operative date is January 26, 1993, Defendants had until February 9, 1993 to serve their motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). There is no dispute that Defendants' motion papers were served via regular first class mail on Plaintiffs' local counsel on February 9, 1993. Therefore, assuming that Plaintiffs' position is correct and the time period must be measured from the January 26, 1993 judgment, the instant motion was timely under Rule 59(e).
Plaintiffs also argue that the motion is not timely under Northern District of New York Local Rule 10(M) which provides that motions for reargument must be "filed and served" within the ten day period. However, it is clear that Defendants' memorandum of law in support of their motion was filed with the Court on February 9, 1993. While the actual Notice of Motion and supporting affidavits were not filed on February 9, 1993, the Court finds that the filing of the memorandum of law and the application for the order to show cause sufficiently presented the motion to the Court on that date for the purposes of Local Rule 10(M). Therefore, Plaintiffs' argument regarding the timeliness of the instant motion under Local Rule 10(M) must also fail.
Not only did the parties submit voluminous documentation on the cross-motions for summary judgment, but they have submitted more than ample documentation in support of, and in opposition to, the instant motion for reargument. On reconsideration Defendants argue that the Court erred in granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs on counts two, four, five and six of the complaint. In the first instance, Defendants contend that they, rather than Plaintiffs, are entitled to summary judgment on all counts in the complaint; however in the alternative, Defendants assert that there are questions of fact remaining on counts two, four, five and six which preclude the granting of summary judgment. In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that the case was properly decided. They further argue that Defendants have not met the standard for a motion under Rule 59(e).
As this Court has stated previously, a motion for reconsideration "will be granted 'only where the Court has overlooked matters or controlling decisions which might have materially influenced the earlier decision.' Park South Tenants Corp. v. 200 Central Part South Associates, L.P., 754 F. Supp. 352, 354 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 941 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1991); see also New York News Inc. v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union of New York, 139 F.R.D. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)." Inmates of New York with Human Imunodeficiency Virus v. Cuomo, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18797, *2, 1992 WL 373516, slip op. at 2 (N.D.N.Y. 1992)(McAvoy, J.). The decision to grant or deny such a motion is within the sound discretion of the Court. See McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 1983). When considering a motion such as this, the Court is mindful that there is a strong interest in the finality of judgments. However, where the motion is timely and properly supported, the Court must carefully consider whether any manifest errors were made in the first instance. If so, the Court should take a second look at its original decision and reconsider it in light of the matters raised by the movant.