The opinion of the court was delivered by: LEONARD D. WEXLER
Josephine Counihan ("Plaintiff" or "Counihan") brings this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, against Allstate Insurance Company ("Defendant" or "Allstate") seeking money allegedly owed to Counihan as a result of Allstate's breach of contract and bad faith refusal to pay Plaintiff's claim for property damage arising under an Allstate homeowner's policy. Now before the Court are motions by both Plaintiff and Defendant for summary judgement pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons discussed below, Allstate's motion is granted and Counihan's motion is denied.
Counihan owned a fifty percent interest in a house located at 890 Noyac Road, Noyac, New York ("the property"). On December 9, 1988, she purchased an Allstate insurance policy ("the policy"), whereby Allstate agreed to insure Plaintiff against all risks of loss or damage to her premises and property. The insurance on the property was for an amount not to exceed $ 98,000.
In February 1989, the United States seized the property and sought its forfeiture, pursuant to the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 881,
in a case captioned United States v. Certain Real Property & Premises Known as 890 Noyac Road ("Noyac Road I"). The illegal drug activity giving rise to the forfeiture under § 881 occurred on July 22, 1988. On July 2, 1990, a judgement in favor of the United States was entered in this Court. On October 3, 1991, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the judgement of Noyac Road I and remanded the case back to this Court. United States v. Certain Real Property and Premises known as 890 Noyac Road, 945 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1991). On May 27, 1992, on retrial, a judgement in favor of the United States was again entered ("Noyac Road II"). Finally, on February 4, 1993, the Second Circuit affirmed the forfeiture in Noyac Road II.2
On November 1, 1990, there was a fire on the property, resulting in the total loss of the residence located there. The Allstate insurance policy was in effect on that date and Counihan has made a claim for coverage under the policy.
In this case of first impression, the question the Court must decide is as follows: where, under 21 U.S.C. § 881, insured property is forfeited to the government retroactive to a time prior to the purchase of the insurance policy, does such retroactive forfeiture also act to render the policy void through retroactive divestiture of the insurable interest in the property?
Were there no relation back provision in the forfeiture statute, that is, were the forfeiture deemed effective only as of the date of final judgement, there would seem to be no question that Counihan, who had purchased her policy and whose loss had occurred well before May 27, 1992, the date judgement was entered in Noyac Road II, could have recovered under the policy.
However, § 881(h) provides that "all right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this section shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section." Therefore, Counihan was divested of her interest in the property as of the date of the crime, July 22, 1988.
It is the purpose of § 881 to put teeth into the government's ability to combat the drug trade. See United States v. A Parcel of Land, Buildings, Appurtenances, and Improvements, Known as 92 Buena Vista Ave., Rumson, N.J., 122 L. Ed. 2d 469, 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1145 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (purpose of forfeiture under § 881 is "the desire to lessen the economic power of . . . drug enterprises"). Were this Court to hold that, despite the retroactive operation of § 881 as to the property itself, insurance proceeds could be obtained where the property subject to forfeiture was destroyed, drug traffickers would have an incentive to commit arson in an attempt to avoid the effect of the forfeiture laws.
Counihan, however, views this action as a typical defeasible title case. Relying on Deck v. Chautauqua County Patrons' Fire Relief Ass'n, 73 Misc. 2d 1048, 343 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1973), she argues that "the proper theory in . . . cases of defeasible title is that the insured's claim to property is to be viewed as one of substance and provided it is not tainted with fraud should be protected regardless of its ultimate validity."
Id. at 871. In Deck, a written instrument purporting to be a contract for the sale and purchase of real property had been executed and delivered by the parties. The purchasers paid a substantial down payment, entered into possession, and were considered by all concerned to be vendees under a contract to purchase the property. They obtained a policy of fire insurance to protect their interest therein, and a major fire loss was thereafter sustained. It was subsequently determined, in independent litigation between the purchasers and the sellers, that the purported contract was not a binding agreement. The defendant insurance company then refused to honor the fire claim, and the insureds brought suit. The court held that the plaintiffs possessed an insurable interest, despite the prior judicial determination that the underlying contract was unenforceable. Counihan argues that her own insurable interest likewise be recognized, despite the ultimate defeasement of her title to the insured property.
The Court first notes that Deck's formulation of "the proper theory in . . . cases of defeasible title" is not binding on this Court.
Moreover, Deck is clearly distinguishable. Although Counihan, like the plaintiffs in Deck, obtained her policy at a time when she appeared to be the owner of the property, no relation back doctrine was operative in Deck.
Defeasible title cases generally deal with the situation created when parties enter into a transaction flawed by some technical irregularity.
At the time of the transaction, the parties believe title has passed. Because of the technical flaw, however, the possibility exists that the transaction will be annulled at some time in the future. The defeasibility of the title is not due to any wrongdoing by the insured;
rather, it is the result of imperfect lawyering. Moreover, the rationale behind the requirement of an insurable interest that wagering contracts are contrary to public policy, see Nelson v. ...