The opinion of the court was delivered by: THOMAS J. MCAVOY
MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER
On April 24, 1993 this court issued a Memorandum-Decision and Order addressing claimant's Eighth Amendment defense to the instant forfeiture. See United States v. Real Property: 835 Seventh Street Rensselaer, 820 F. Supp. 688 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). Therein, the court treated claimant's defense as a cross-motion for summary judgment and, applying the test enunciated in United States v. Certain Real Property and Premises Known as 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom., Levin v. United States, 121 L. Ed. 2d 24, 113 S. Ct. 55, 61 U.S.L.W. 3256 (Oct. 5, 1992) ("Whalers Cove"), found that the putative forfeiture violated the Eighth Amendment and therefore granted summary judgment in claimant's favor. See generally Real Property: 835 Seventh Street, 820 F. Supp. 688. The United States ("the government") now moves for reconsideration arguing four points. The first point is a procedural challenge to the court's decision to grant claimant summary judgment, asserting that the court improperly converted claimant's defense to a cross-motion for summary judgment and, in doing so, denied the government the opportunity to defend against the cross-motion. The second point is a substantive one, arguing that a recent Supreme Court decision alters the applicable standard used by this court in applying the Eighth Amendment. The third point challenges this court's prior ruling with regard to an essential element of Second Circuit's Eighth Amendment analysis. And the fourth point addresses alternative relief, asserting that the court should have considered the option of mitigation or remission with regard to forfeiture.
Based upon the arguments submitted and upon an intervening decision of the Supreme Court on pertinent issues, the court grants reconsideration in part but finds that the government's arguments are without merit or authority. The reasons for this conclusion are discussed seriatim below. Familiarity is assumed and the facts of the case will not be repeated.
A. Treatment of Defense as Cross-Motion
The government first argues that while the court was well within its discretion to treat claimant's constitutional defense as a cross-motion for summary judgment (see Govt's Brief, at 2), it did so in an improper fashion. In this regard, the government asserts that the court should have provided the government with prior notice of its decision to treat the claimant's defense as a cross-motion thus allowing the government to supplement the record to show that more illicit activity than it had previously established was occurring or had occurred at the defendant location. The government argues that this evidence, especially when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, would have changed the proportionality analysis such to allow it to overcome the Eighth Amendment challenge. The court strongly disagrees.
To begin with, the court notes with emphasis that the government was the original moving party, thus requiring it to produce evidence which, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, would have entitled it to summary judgment of forfeiture. Even though the motion for summary judgment of forfeiture as originally made required a significantly lower threshold of proof than after the Eighth Amendment defense was asserted,
the Eighth Amendment defense was asserted long before the court sua sponte treated the defense as a cross-motion.
Hence, once the defense was asserted, it should have been clear to the government that it could not succeed on the "run-of-the-mill" forfeiture/evidentiary showing. See footnote 1, supra. Rather, the imposition of the Eighth Amendment defense required the government to show not only that there was no genuine issue of material fact with regard to the probable cause/nexus element of forfeiture, but also that the putative forfeiture was not so disproportionate as to violate the claimant's Eighth Amendment right.
Therefore, even as a movant the government had an obligation to come forward with evidence to rebut the defense asserted by the claimant.
Yet, throughout the extended course of this litigation, the government failed to amend or supplement its factual argument, instead waiting until after the court ruled against it to attempt to do so.
This new "lack of notice" argument falls on deaf ears as the court finds that there was adequate notice to the government that the court was considering the defense as a potentially dispositive mechanism in the case. Indeed, following oral argument held on October 13, 1992 wherein the court addressed the substantiality element of the Whalers Cove decision, the court asked claimant's counsel if she intended to make a cross-motion for summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment issue. In this regard, the court indicated that such a procedural posture could potentially dispose of the case short of a trial. While this discussion was not captured on the record, it is the court's memory that the attorney representing the government agreed with the court that a cross-motion would be most beneficial to resolution of the matter. Of course, no such motion was made by the claimant and the court can only speculate as to counsel's decision to ignore such a pointed suggestion.
But the colloquy between the court and the claimant's counsel did, at the very least, put the government on notice that the court was considering the Eighth Amendment defense as a potentially dispositive mechanism in the case.
Still further, plaintiff was given adequate opportunity to address the court on the issues relating to the proportionality analysis of Whalers Cove. On October 13, 1992, the court ordered "further briefing" on the proportionality issue. Order from the bench, 10/13/92 (see footnote 5, supra). When the court reviewed these briefs and found that they did not address an important issue in the Whalers Cove proportionality analysis, the court again ordered further briefing. See 11/17/92 Order. To now argue that it did not have notice or the opportunity to fully supplement the record is disingenuous. In a manner of speaking, the government attempts to close the barnyard door after the horse has escaped.
Yet, even assuming that the government had not presented its strongest argument, the court finds that the now-proffered evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, does not alter the final determination. First, it is clear from the April 24, 1993 decision that the court viewed the facts in the record in the light most favorable to the government. See Real Property: 835 Seventh Street, 820 F. Supp. at 691-92.
Second, the substance of the information the government now seeks to introduce was before the court prior to the summary judgment motion.
In fact, the Verified Compliant for Forfeiture In Rem contained at exhibit 1 an affidavit of Detective/Sergeant Smith attesting to the very facts the government now seeks to "introduce." Further, the evidence had been alluded to by the government in answers to interrogatories, in opposition to claimants' motions for judgment on the pleadings,
and in opposition to the claimant's suppression motion. Consequently, the court was well aware that this information existed and that it formed the basis of the government's investigation and eventual arrest of the claimant. Yet, the court did not believe then, nor does it believe now, that such information is of probative value within the Whalers Cove proportionality analysis.
And third, the court finds that the proffered evidence does not change the outcome of the Whalers Cove proportionality analysis. Indeed, the information the government now seeks to introduce amounts to, at most, speculative and conjectural allegations as to what occurred at the defendant residence prior to a criminal investigation. While such evidence could support a finding of summary judgment of forfeiture (a legal conclusion the court assumed in order to reach the Eighth Amendment analysis), it does little to further the fact-specific Eighth Amendment analysis of Whalers Cove. No fact-finder could use such information to proportion the amount of drugs against the value of the defendant property on summary judgment or otherwise.
There is no evidence which establishes that more drugs were involved at the defendant location than the court calculated in its April 24, 1993 decision.
To use the proffered information as evidence of the amount of drugs involved at the defendant property would render the Whalers Cove decision an exercise in futility. No Eighth Amendment protection would ever attach if the government is permitted to support its position through mere innuendo. The practical effect would be to denigrate the fact-finding determination of Whalers ...