of a "B felony sale of narcotics" and he learned further that there had been other drug arrests involving the defendant in the city. When Barrus learned of this information, he determined to summon the Sheriff's Department Canine Unit to search for drugs. Within minutes, Sergeant Thomas E. McShea arrived with his narcotics dog Mark. The original stop had occurred at 2:00 a.m. on the morning of January 20th. Barrus testified that he requested the canine unit at 2:25 a.m., and both he and McShea testified that McShea arrived at 2:35 a.m.
Barrus set out to find a licensed driver to care for the maroon Cadillac. Upon inquiry, the passenger in the maroon Cadillac admitted that he was unlicensed. Barrus then turned to the Toyota, which was parked in front of the Cadillac. The individual who drove the Chevette to the Sugarcreek parking lot was, by that time, in the passenger seat of the Toyota. He identified himself as Louis Barber, the cousin of the defendant. Louis Barber also was an unlicensed driver. Barrus found that the driver of the Toyota was licensed but he could not drive the Cadillac because he had to care for the Toyota. Meanwhile, the two New York State Troopers who arrived on the scene were directed by Barrus to examine the Chevette and obtain information using the license plate and registration as source materials. When they did so, the troopers observed a shotgun on the front seat. The troopers seized it, finding a round in the chamber and the safety in the "off" position. This was the car that Barrus observed defendant's unlicensed cousin driving before the cousin walked over to the Toyota.
When asked why he detained the defendant to facilitate the canine search, Barrus testified that there were many factors which led to his decision, but when pressed could only identify the facts of the prior conviction together with the discovery of the loaded weapon in the Chevette as justifying the detention. Barrus acknowledged that he did not see anything in the Cadillac to suggest criminal activity, and that the defendant did not say anything to him which aroused any further suspicion of criminal behavior. The only infraction observed was the traffic infraction and the discovery that defendant was unlicensed. Barrus conceded that no weapons were found in the Cadillac itself, that defendant posed no particular threat to him at the time, and that defendant was cooperative. But Barrus could not find anyone licensed to drive the Cadillac.
Sergeant McShea testified that, upon arrival at the scene, he went to the maroon Cadillac and addressed the defendant. McShea thought that he might have received some briefing from Deputies Barrus and Hine, but he could not remember what he was told. In accordance with what he described at the hearing as his usual practice, McShea intended to solicit the consent of the driver for a canine search, and he asked defendant to exit the vehicle for the purpose of eliciting the consent. When defendant complied, McShea immediately observed significant bulges in both of defendant's pants pockets. McShea "patted him down for safety" and felt what he perceived to be paper in defendant's pockets. Reaching into the pockets, McShea retrieved "wads" of currency totalling $ 2288.
McShea placed defendant in Deputy Carpenter's patrol car (the testimony did not reveal when Carpenter arrived), and then secured the money in his own vehicle.
After securing the money, McShea went back to Deputy Carpenter's patrol car to obtain the consent of the defendant to a search of the maroon Cadillac. McShea asked defendant, "Would you not mind if I search your car with my canine dog Mark." Defendant replied that it was "alright, there is nothing in the car." McShea then began the canine search with his dog Mark. Mark, who is state certified and trained in many narcotics, did not smell drugs in the interior of the vehicle. He only showed "some interest" in the armrest of the vehicle. When the dog searched the exterior of the vehicle, however, Mark showed interest in the trunk area. McShea, who by then had the keys to the car, opened the trunk. Mark jumped into the trunk and fully "alerted" on a blue or teal gym bag and its zipper seams. McShea took the dog back to his patrol car while other deputies opened the gym bag. When McShea returned to the Cadillac, he observed a MAC 11-type weapon with another clip containing ammunition. The deputies found that the gun was loaded.
Defendant was taken to the stationhouse, where at about 6:25 a.m. he was advised of his rights by Monroe County Sheriff's Investigator Douglas Hinchey. Hinchey testified that he read the Miranda rights to defendant from a form which was admitted as Exhibit #2. Defendant waived his rights, signed the form, and Hinchey began to talk with the defendant. Hinchey asked the defendant about the maroon Cadillac. Defendant replied that it was his aunt's car, that he paid the bills on it, and that he had made the modification to the windows. Asked why he allowed a search of the Cadillac, defendant said, "I forgot the gun was in the car." Defendant admitted that he had spent a year in prison and that he had finished parole time with respect to a prior offense. When Hinchey explained to defendant that carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle was a crime and that a felon in possession of such a weapon was a separate crime, defendant invoked his right to silence by indicating that he didn't want to talk with Hinchey anymore. Hinchey testified that the defendant could well have been handcuffed during the interview, although he was not sure.
B. Seizure of the Gun
Analysis of whether the warrantless seizure of the gun from the trunk of the Cadillac is tainted by defendant's detention until the canine unit arrived on the scene begins with consideration of United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973) and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 94 S. Ct. 488, 38 L. Ed. 2d 456 (1973). Both these cases held that a full search of a defendant stopped for a traffic violation is permissible if a custodial arrest for the traffic violation was otherwise authorized and effected by the officer. Both cases involved arrests for unlicensed driving (in Robinson the license was revoked). The Court expressly reserved the issue whether there are traffic offense arrest situations in which it would not be "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment to make a full custodial arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236 n.6, 94 S. Ct. at 477 n.6; Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. at 265-67, 94 S. Ct. at 492 (Stewart, J. concurring). The matter still seems to be open for the Supreme Court to resolve. Cummins v. United States, 116 L. Ed. 2d 448, 112 S. Ct. 428, 429 (1991) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (in which the defendants claimed that the decision to effect a full custodial arrest for a traffic stop was unreasonable "because no reasonable police officer would have made such traffic stops and hence the stops were pretexts to investigate other crimes for which there were not grounds to stop").
Since Robinson and Gustafson, the circuits have split on the issue, usually in cases involving a claim that the traffic stop and arrest was a pretext for a search for narcotics.
As Judge Posner observed,
If the only reasonable basis for stopping . . . [the defendant] had been his commission of minor traffic offenses, and the real reason for the arrest had been a pure hunch that he was carrying drugs, then we would have a true case of pretext, and several courts would hold the stop and ensuing arrest illegal. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515-18 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986). But this court would not, having rejected the concept of unlawful-because-pretextual searches in Trigg.
United States v. Cardona-Rivera, 904 F.2d 1149, 1153-54 (7th Cir. 1990) (referring to United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989), after remand, 925 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 428 (1991)). In Trigg, the court rejected a pretext inquiry and stated: "The Supreme Court has never indicated that discretionary exercise of the arrest powers is constitutionally significant; instead the court has stated, 'it is sufficient that the officer had probable cause to arrest and that he lawfully effected the arrest and placed the petitioner in custody.'" United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d at 1065 (quoting id. 878 F.2d at 1041). Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit explained its Trigg ruling as "eschewing . . . the subjective motive examination . . . and "articulating a two pronged objective inquiry into the lawfulness of the allegedly pretextual stop or arrest: we ask first whether law enforcement authorities had reasonable suspicion to make the stop or probable cause to make the arrest, and second, whether the officers involved were authorized under state or municipal law to effect the stop or arrest in question." United States v. Fiala, 929 F.2d 285, 287 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1041). The Tenth and Eleventh Circuit cases cited by Judge Posner for the alternative rule, see also, United States v. Valdez, 931 F.2d 1448 (11th Cir. 1991), all uphold the arrest, "not if an officer legally could have stopped the car in question because of a suspected traffic violation, but rather if 'a reasonable officer would have made the seizure in the absence of illegitimate motivation.'" United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 876 (4th Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original) (declining to make a choice between the two rules because, on the facts, both tests were satisfied), cert. denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 266, 113 S. Ct. 351 (1992). Compare id. 966 F.2d at 885-89 (Luttig, J., concurring) (scholarly discussion of the cases and concluding that the Trigg objective approach is constitutionally mandated).
Cases agreeing with the Trigg formulation include United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500-01 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 428 (1991) and United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc). See also, United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 435 n.3 (5th Cir. 1993) (collecting cases and "noting too that most circuits agree with Causey " [and therefore the identical analysis in Trigg ]). Justice White placed the Second Circuit in with the other circuits agreeing with Trigg. Cummins v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 429 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), and upon an analysis of the case he cited, United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1316-17 (2d Cir. 1987) (observing that "courts have frequently discounted the subjective intent or motivations of searching officers" and supporting this objective approach by reference to a pretext case), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 958, 98 L. Ed. 2d 382, 108 S. Ct. 357 (1987), this court does also, although recognizing that Nersesian is not precisely on point because it did not involve a traffic stop of a vehicle. The Nersesian holding is more general, however, and recognizes controlling Supreme Court precedent requiring district courts to decide the cases objectively. Id. 824 F.2d at 1316 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S. Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L. Ed. 2d 168 (1978); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S. Ct. 2778, 2783, 86 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1985)). See also, United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d at 887 n.5 (Luttig, J., concurring) (placing Nersesian in the objective approach category). The objective approach has always been the law in this circuit. United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Tramontana, 460 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1972) (objective standard "is no less necessary when a mistake on the part of a police officer is arguably beneficial to the accused").
Accordingly, I apply here the purely objective approach, which focuses on whether there was probable cause for the stop and arrest, and whether the officers had lawful authority to make the custodial arrest. Cf. id. 824 F.2d at 1316 ("pretextual basis" offered by one investigating officer "does not alter the validity of the initial detention or the sequence of events following in its wake"). See also, United States v. Glover, 957 F.2d 1004, 1010 (2d Cir. 1992) (validity of Terry stop "not dependent on the intentions or motivations of the particular detaining officers").
The issue here, unlike most of the pretext cases since Robinson and Gustafson, involves a consent search of defendant's car incident to the arrest and the claimed invalidity of the detention pending arrival of the canine unit when defendant's consent to search was solicited, not a full search of defendant's person incident to the arrest. But the same rationale applies, because if defendant could lawfully be placed under a full custodial arrest, his detention at the scene may not be circumscribed by any temporal limitation applicable to Terry investigative stops. United States v. Fiala, 929 F.2d at 288 ("the 1 1/2 hour roadside detention of Fiala while the troopers awaited the arrival of a drug-sniffing dog was not unreasonable . . . [because] even if Fiala wasn't detained at the roadside pending the dog's arrival, he would have been detained anyway in McLean County Jail as a result of his arrest for driving without a valid license"). Cf. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985) ("difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a de facto arrest"); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d at 435-38 (applying Terry v. Ohio, to a motorist stop and considering whether "a detention has exceeded its lawful duration," id. 993 F.2d at 436, and had become "tantamount to a de facto arrest, a more intrusive custodial state which must be based upon probable cause rather than mere suspicion[,]" id. 993 F.2d at 437); United States v. Glover, 957 F.2d at 1011-12. The focus here is upon the justification for the detention prior to defendant's consent, because New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981) only authorizes a search of the passenger compartment of the car and its containers as incident to an arrest. E.g., in the same context, United States v. Fiala, 929 F.2d at 288 (Belton obviates consent analysis because drugs found in passenger compartment). Here, the gun was found in the trunk concealed in a bag after the dog showed only "some interest." There was no canine alert supplying probable cause, United States v. Glover, 957 F.2d at 1013, until the trunk was opened and the dog jumped in. The opening of the trunk, therefore, depended upon defendant's consent for lawful justification, and that consent in turn depended upon the legality of defendant's 35-40 minute detention before the consent was given. With these principles in mind, I turn to the lawful basis of defendant's custodial arrest.
Defendant does not seriously question, after the hearing testimony was adduced, Barrus' right to stop the Cadillac. Barrus reasonably believed that he had probable cause to stop the driver of the car for violating N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 375(12)(b)(4) (as amended by L. 1991 ch. 155) (excessively tinted windows so as to obstruct "a clear and full view of the road and condition of traffic behind such vehicle") (formerly § 375(12)(b)(3)). See also, id. § 375(30) (prohibiting operation of vehicle "with any object placed or hung upon . . . in such manner as to obstruct or interfere with the view of the operator through the windshield, or to prevent him from having a clear and full view of the road and condition of traffic behind such vehicle.") Barrus testified that he observed an excessively tinted rear window with two inch lettering on the rear window of the Cadillac. This was sufficient to provide probable cause to believe that a traffic infraction was occurring, and to justify Barrus in stopping the car. E.g., People v. Osborne, 158 A.D.2d 740, 741-42, 551 N.Y.S.2d 336 (3rd Dept. 1990).
Furthermore, and quite without regard to whether, as defendant contends, Barrus never verified the existence of the view obstruction, Barrus encountered another violation of the law when defendant failed to produce his driver's license or other identification. Under New York law, a simple failure to carry a valid license while operating a car is "presumptive evidence that he [the driver] is not duly licensed," N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 507(2), and defendant's failure to do so "justified a police officer's immediate arrest of the unlicensed operator." People v. Watson, 177 A.D.2d 676, 576 N.Y.S.2d 370 (2d Dept. 1991) (citing N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 509, and adding that, because defendant was the only occupant of the vehicle, it's impoundment and inventory search was reasonable); People v. Miller, 149 A.D.2d 538, 541 (2d Dept. 1989) (in dicta, stating that a full custodial arrest was authorized upon defendant's failure to produce a driver's license). Indeed, defendant had no identification documents with him, and therefore "once it became evident that defendant could not be issued a summons on the spot because of his inability to produce any identification, the officers were warranted in arresting him to remove him to the police station," People v. Ellis, 62 N.Y.2d 393, 396, 477 N.Y.S.2d 106, 465 N.E.2d 826 (1984), and in "searching . . . defendant's person incident thereto . . . " People v. Copeland, 39 N.Y.2d 986, 987, 387 N.Y.S.2d 234, 355 N.E.2d 288 (1976). In a helpful case, the Court of Appeals observed, "there is, perhaps, an area of traffic violation 'arrest' where a full-blown search is not justified, but it might seem to be confined to a situation where an arrest was not necessary because an alternative summons was available or because the arrest was a suspect pretext." People v. Troiano, 35 N.Y.2d 476, 478, 363 N.Y.S.2d 943, 323 N.E.2d 183 (1974). The court explained that, if the right to search "is to be restricted, the cure must be by limiting the right to arrest or to take into custody[,]" not by limiting the right to a full search incident to a lawful arrest. Id. 35 N.Y.2d at 478. But no such limitation appears in the New York State statutes,
or in the cases, and in any event Ellis and Coleman fully establish the right to make a full custodial arrest under New York law when the defendant fails to produce a driver's license.
Accordingly, defendant could have been arrested and searched immediately after he failed to produce his license under the rationale of Robinson and Gustafson, as interpreted in the line of cases including Trigg, and the fact that it was McShea who made the arrest some time thereafter, by asking defendant to step out of the car when he again failed to produce identification documents and by placing him in a patrol car,
does not affect the constitutional analysis. United States v. Tramontana, 460 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1972) (defendant cannot benefit simply because officer mistaken as to when probable cause arose). Cf. United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57, 73 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Riggs, 474 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.).
Defendant raises no substantial issue regarding the consensual nature of his authorization to McShea. The exchange was innocuous enough and defendant later explained to the investigator that he had simply forgotten that the gun was in the trunk when he gave his consent to search. Accordingly, I find that the consent was voluntary. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973). Furthermore, the scope of the consent with respect to the car was unlimited and therefore included the trunk. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1804, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1991) ("did not place any explicit limitation on the scope of this search"); United States v. Davis, 967 F.2d 84, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 356 (1992); United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 1991). Therefore, the opening of the trunk was justified. The dog search provided probable cause to believe that the gym bag contained narcotics, United States v. Glover, 957 F.2d 1004 at 1013, and even if defendant's unrestricted consent might be said to have not included the gym bag in the trunk, but see United States v. Rich, 992 F.2d 502, 507 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1993), the probable cause then existing justified the search of the bag without a warrant. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991) ("police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.") It is my Report and Recommendation that the motion to suppress the gun be denied.
C. Defendant's Statements to the Police
As I understand the government's position, it seeks to use the interchange between McShea and the defendant concerning the consent to search the car, and a statement made to investigator Hinchey some four hours later at the stationhouse, in its evidence-in-chief. First, with respect to defendant's statement to McShea that it was alright to search the car and that there was nothing there, it is undisputed that no Miranda warnings were given to defendant. By the time McShea asked defendant for the consent, the investigative detention of defendant pursuant to the traffic stop had developed into a custodial situation even though defendant was not yet formally arrested. In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984), the Supreme Court held that "the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called 'Terry stop' see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 439, 104 S. Ct. at 3150. See also, United States v. Wong Ching Hing, 867 F.2d 754, 756 (2d Cir. 1989). The Court recognized, however, that, "if a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him 'in custody' for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 440, 104 S. Ct. at 3150.
An example offered by the court to suggest a situation in which custody might have occurred was the case of Commonwealth v. Meyer, 488 Pa. 297, 412 A.2d 517 (1980) in which the "driver who was detained for over 1/2 hour, part of the time in a patrol car, [and was therefore] held to have been in custody for the purposes of Miranda by the time he was questioned concerning the circumstances of an accident." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 441 n.34, 104 S. Ct. at 3151 n.34. Of course, that is the situation in this case, because McShea asked defendant after at least a 1/2 hour detention to step out of his car, whereupon McShea frisked him and placed him in a patrol car before requesting the consent. In Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 109 S. Ct. 205, 102 L. Ed. 2d 172 (1988), the Court confirmed that "Meyer involved facts which we implied might properly remove its result from Berkemer's application to ordinary traffic stops; specifically, the motorist in Meyer could be found to have been placed in custody for purposes of Miranda safeguards because he was detained for over 1/2 hour, and subjected to questioning while in the patrol car." Id. 488 U.S. at 11 n.2, 109 S. Ct. at 207 n.2. Although not an explicit holding on the topic, I consider this to be rather a clear signal, and accordingly hold that the defendant in this case was in custody for purposes of Miranda when McShea asked him for consent to search the car.
Finding that he was in custody for Miranda purposes, however, is not determinative of the issue. The issue further remains whether the simple request to search the car was a question designed, or which the officer reasonably should suspect, would result in an incriminating answer. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980) (interrogation within the meaning of Miranda is "words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect"). McShea simply asked the defendant whether he would mind if the car was subjected to a canine search. A request to search is ordinarily not considered interrogation unless it goes beyond a simple request to search by, for example, inquiring of the car's ownership. United States v. Glenna, 878 F.2d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases); United States v. Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1974). Compare United States v. Henley, 984 F.2d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 1993) (inquiry concerning ownership is interrogation); United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338, 342 (7th Cir. 1989) (same), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1075, 104 L. Ed. 2d 650, 109 S. Ct. 2087 (1989). Accordingly, defendant's additional response to McShea's request for consent, which indicated that nothing was in the car, is admissible because it was not the product of interrogation within the meaning of Miranda, and it is my Report and Recommendation that the motion to suppress defendant's statements to McShea at the scene be denied.
Defendant raises no substantial issue concerning the stationhouse statement. It is clear that he was adequately advised of his Miranda rights and that he waived the same. See Hearing Exhibit #2 (the waiver form showing the rights read to defendant and defendant's waiver). Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2880, 106 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1989) ("initial warnings . . . touched all the bases required by Miranda"); United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 1991) (defendant "had his Miranda rights brought home to him in an intelligible fashion"). No circumstances were adduced at the hearing which would tend to show that the statement was otherwise involuntary. Indeed, defendant promptly invoked his right to silence once confronted with the possible charges that could be lodged against him. Therefore, the statements made to Investigator Hinchey at the stationhouse are admissible and it is my Report and Recommendation that the motion to suppress these statements be denied.
The parties should be on notice that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 30(a)(3), any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of the Court within ten (10) days of receipt thereof. Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal a District Court Order adopting this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 6(a) and 6(e); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435, 106 S. Ct. 466 (1985); Frank v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 298, 300 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 696, 113 S. Ct. 825 (1992); Small v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989); Wesolek v. Canadair Limited, 838 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1988).
The parties are reminded that, pursuant to Rule 30(a)(3) of the Local Rules for the Western District of New York, "written objections shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made and the basis for such objection and shall be supported by legal authority." Failure to comply with the provisions of Rule 30(a)(3), or with the similar provisions of Rule 30(a)(2) (concerning objections to a Magistrate Judge's Decision and Order), may result in the District Court's refusal to consider the objection.
KENNETH R. FISHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated: Rochester, New York
September 10, 1993