The opinion of the court was delivered by: VINCENT L. BRODERICK
VINCENT L. BRODERICK, U.S.D.J.
Marcos Mosqueda has filed a petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 USC 2254 challenging a state court conviction for criminal possession of controlled substances. On December 3, 1986 petitioner was convicted of such crimes; he was sentenced to imprisonment for 9 years to life. Petitioner challenges his conviction on three grounds and questions the logical justification for his sentence. For the reasons set forth below, I deny the petition.
Petitioner alleges that his arrest was not supported by articulated facts and hence the fruits of search and seizure incident to the arrest should have been suppressed and the indictment dismissed.
Suppression of evidence is not required by the text of the Fourth Amendment, which seeks to protect the public against unreasonable searches and seizures. Suppressing the fruits of illegal searches or seizures is, rather, a judicially created remedy adopted to compensate for inadequacies in other means of insuring compliance with the Fourth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961). The suppression remedy was imposed in order to deter police misconduct contrary to the Fourth Amendment, not to protect the guilty from truthful evidence relevant to factfinding. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-40, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601, 85 S. Ct. 1731 (1965).
Against this background, where state remedies for alleged illegal searches and seizures are available (whether or not pursued), post-conviction federal habeas corpus relief is not, because to provide it would do little to insure compliance with the Amendment while adding significantly to post-conviction litigation irrelevant to actual guilt or innocence. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
Petitioner's objection to the grounds for his arrest, apart from the search and seizure, cannot form an independent basis for challenging his conviction. The conviction stands on its own, based on proof adduced and a verdict rendered. No arrest is, indeed, prerequisite to an indictment or conviction. Errors, if any, at the arrest stage (apart from any illegal search or seizure) are irrelevant to the conviction or sentence. See generally United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 89 L. Ed. 2d 50, 106 S. Ct. 938 (1986); John v. People, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15113, 1992 WL 261282 (91 Civ 7634, SDNY Sept 29, 1992); Brown v. Doe, 803 F. Supp. 932 (SDNY 1992), later decision 811 F. Supp. 156 (SDNY 1993).
Petitioner argues that the state court failed to instruct the jury on principles of agency law and that there was no evidence he was a drug dealer. Evidence was offered, however, that petitioner provided samples of cocaine (Tr. 43) and bragged that he did not "do" amounts of less than a gram of cocaine (Tr. 49). The jury could properly find petitioner a principal in sale of narcotics without considering issues of agency.
Petitioner argues that he was denied a fair trial because a codefendant who had pleaded guilty was not called as a witness by defense counsel. The codefendant was interviewed by petitioner's attorney ...