The opinion of the court was delivered by: EUGENE H. NICKERSON
NICKERSON, District Judge:
Plaintiff moves to vacate a stipulation of dismissal and restore his action to calendar.
This is another case in which a pro se plaintiff has attempted to navigate the complicated procedures of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (the Act), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (F.D.I.C.) has taken advantage of the plaintiff's lack of knowledge and sophistication. See, e.g., Wilson v. FDIC, 827 F. Supp. 120 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
Plaintiff brought this pro se action on August 5, 1991 in the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County. His two-sentence complaint alleges,
Due to false & misleading information, plaintiff purchased 1000 Sahres [sic] of Crossland Saving Pfreffered [sic] "B" stock.
Now it seems that the stock has becaome [sic] worhtless [sic].
Defendants answered on August 25, 1991. On January 24, 1992 the Office of Thrift Supervision found that defendant Crossland Savings Bank, FSB (Crossland) was operating in an unsound condition, closed Crossland, and appointed the F.D.I.C. as receiver. In February of 1992 the F.D.I.C. removed the case to this court.
The court referred all pre-trial proceedings to then-Magistrate Judge Zachary Carter. He held a status conference on December 18, 1992 and recommended that the parties voluntarily dismiss the action and that defendants permit plaintiff to file a claim with the F.D.I.C. The parties stipulated to dismissal without prejudice.
Plaintiff filed his claim with the F.D.I.C. on February 3, 1993. The F.D.I.C. denied his claim by letter dated July 8, 1993. The letter explained that the F.D.I.C. denied the claim because it had no supporting documentation, and it informed plaintiff that he had "sixty (60) days from the date of this letter to bring an action against" the F.D.I.C. in district court. The letter miscites the applicable statute. Plaintiff submits a copy of an envelope with a certified mail stamp showing that the denial letter was mailed on July 20, 1993. He claims to have received the letter on July 24, 1993.
Plaintiff submits a copy of a letter he sent to the F.D.I.C. on July 28, 1993 in response to the denial. The letter encloses supporting documentation for his claim. Apparently plaintiff never received a response to this letter. Plaintiff then called the F.D.I.C. on September 15, 1993 and spoke to an unnamed person who reviewed his file. That person informed him that he had 60 days from receipt of the letter to file his claim in district court. Plaintiff then brought this motion pursuant to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to vacate the stipulation of dismissal and restore the case to calendar. He signed his papers on September 18, 1993 and filed them on September 22, 1993.
Defendants oppose the motion on the bases that Rule 60 does not provide the relief plaintiff seeks and that plaintiff's motion is time-barred by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A) because it was ...