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April 1, 1994

GORDON GRANT, Plaintiff,
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, JAMES McGOWAN (Shield No. 37132), JOHN DICARLANTONIO (Shield No. 11556) and "JANE DOE" (intended to be agents or employees of THE CITY OF NEW YORK involved in the arrest, continued detainment and imprisonment of plaintiff GORDON GRANT on June 29, 1990) and PIA JOHANSON, Defendants.


The opinion of the court was delivered by: ROBERT L. CARTER

CARTER, District Judge

 Plaintiff Gordon Grant originally brought this action against municipal defendants *fn1" the City of New York, and Police Officers James McGowan and John DiCarlantonio alleging false arrest and false imprisonment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants now move for summary judgment under Rule 56, F.R.Civ.P., dismissing these claims, or in the alternative summary judgment based on the doctrine of qualified immunity.


 The complainant Johanson, on the other hand, gave a different account of the events leading up to her accusation. At her deposition, Johanson testified that she accompanied the police to her apartment from the 10th precinct where she had personally registered a complaint of theft with the desk sergeant. She did not advise the desk sergeant that she had been raped. Johanson also testified that she was then brought back to her apartment in a patrol car by two police officers whom she could not identify. The police officers accompanied Johanson up to her apartment where they were met by Winston Grant. Winston Grant advised the police officers that there was nothing to be concerned about because he and Johanson were having a domestic dispute. When one of the police officers suggested they work things out themselves, Johanson told them that she had been raped by plaintiff. At no time did the officers conduct an investigation inside her apartment.

 In any event, defendant McGowan testified that after his discussion with Johanson he went down to the lobby where he conferred with his supervisor Sergeant Yaverbaum about Johanson's allegation. Yaverbaum did not enter the apartment to investigate the alleged crime scene. Sergeant Yaverbaum subsequently interviewed Johanson "for a minute" who told him that she had been raped by plaintiff. Yaverbaum did not notice anything particularly unusual about Johanson's demeanor, but did notice that a button was missing from her blouse. Another police officer, Eileen Doherty, also interviewed Johanson, and was also told by her that she had been raped. After talking to the officers, Johanson agreed to undergo a Vitullo rape kit test, and was taken by ambulance to Bellevue Hospital. Subsequently, without first interviewing him, Sergeant Yaverbaum authorized plaintiff's arrest for rape.

 At 2:26 a.m. plaintiff, who had been waiting outside the building unsupervised, was arrested and removed to the precinct. Prior to being placed under arrest, plaintiff advised defendant McGowan that he was a police officer with the Spokane Police Department and was required to advise his employer of his arrest. When he arrived at the precinct a short time later, he telephoned his employer to discuss with him what had happened. Plaintiff remained at the station until 5:17 a.m., when he was transported to Manhattan Central Booking. He arrived at Central Booking at 5:30 a.m. where he was placed in a separate holding cell as a safety measure until his release at 8:50 p.m.

 As arresting officer, defendant McGowan was assigned to Manhattan Criminal Court to process the arrest. He arrived at the Manhattan District Attorney's Office at approximately 8:30 a.m. on June 29, 1990.

 Sometime during the afternoon of the 29th, Andrew Heffner, the Assistant District Attorney ("A.D.A.") assigned to review the case, interviewed Johanson by telephone. During the course of their conversation, Johanson retracted her allegations against plaintiff. However, plaintiff suggests that the retraction occurred earlier that morning. *fn3" By 5:40 p.m. a Declined Prosecution form was typed; but it was not signed by the A.D.A. until later that evening. At 8:50 p.m. defendant McGowan secured the release of plaintiff.


 Rule 56(c), F.R.Civ.P., provides that summary judgment may be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The party moving for summary judgment must initially demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, which can be done by pointing out that the non-moving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). The substantive law governing the case will identify those facts which are material, and "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). To defeat summary judgment, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

 Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claims of false arrest and false imprisonment because the facts of the case establish that defendants arrested and detained plaintiff based on the objectively reasonable belief that plaintiff had committed the crime of rape. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that summary judgment is not appropriate because there are "major factual contentions" in dispute as to the issue of whether defendants' arrest of plaintiff was reasonable and supported by probable cause.

 A claim of false arrest, whether framed as an unconstitutional deprivation of civil rights or as tortious conduct under New York State law, may be established upon a showing that there was no probable cause to support a plaintiff's arrest and detention. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288, 87 S. Ct. 1213 (1967); Zanghi v. Old Brookville, 752 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1985). "Probable cause to arrest exists when the authorities have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested." Calamia v. New York, 879 F.2d 1025, 1032 (2d Cir. 1989). New York State law dictates that a police officer may not arrest a person without a warrant unless the officer has "reasonable cause" to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person in question has committed that crime. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. § 140.10(1)(b) (McKinney 1993). The "reasonable cause" standard ...

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