The opinion of the court was delivered by: ROBERT W. SWEET
On October 10, 1991 the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL") consolidated and transferred to this Court a number of actions arising out of the demise of partnerships affiliated with Integrated Resources, Inc. ("Integrated"), which has filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq. in 1990. See In re Integrated Resources, 135 Bankr. 746, 748 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, In re Integrated Resources, Inc., 147 Bankr. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
On December 22, 1993 this Court issued its second Opinion concerning the legal sufficiency of the federal RICO claims ("Global III") and the application of such RICO and federal securities law claims to certain later filed actions ("Global IV"). See In re Integrated Resources Real Estate Ltd. Partnerships Sec. Litig., 815 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Global III and IV " or the "Opinion"). Plaintiffs in three of the consolidated actions, RAM/Pate, Clovine/Ellingson, and Barron/Miami Towers, now seek reargument of that Opinion, pursuant to Local Rule 3(j).
For the reasons set forth below, the motions to reargue the Opinion are denied.
The RAM/Pate Plaintiffs are investors in Resources Accrued Mortgage Investors L.P. Series 86 ("RAM 86") which invested mortgage loans in 16 of Integrated's affiliates. Plaintiffs invested in RAM 86 between January 1986 and May 1, 1987.
The Clovine/Ellingson Plaintiffs invested in a Connecticut limited partnership organized to acquire two parcels of land, several office buildings, and to conduct various site improvements thereupon in Cincinnati, Ohio.
The Miami Towers Plaintiffs invested in the Miami Executive Towers Associates Limited Partnerships which owned two neighboring office buildings, and leased the underlying ground, in Miami, Florida known as Airport Executive Towers I and II. The Bleistine Plaintiffs purchased their securities between May and June, 1985, but were not added to the action until January 30, 1990.
Prior Proceedings and Facts
The parties, prior proceedings and facts have been thoroughly set forth in the previous opinions of this Court, familiarity with which are presumed. See In re Integrated Resources Sec. Litig., 815 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Global I " and/or "Global II"); In re Integrated Resources Sec. Litig., F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Global III " and/or "Global IV").
Briefly, Global I addressed the statutes of limitations governing the Plaintiffs' federal securities claims; Global II addressed the legal sufficiency of the Plaintiffs' federal securities claims; Global III addressed the legal sufficiency of the Plaintiffs' federal RICO claims; and Global IV applied the prior three global Opinions to one of the surviving Later Filed Actions.
The motions to reargue were considered fully submitted as of January 24, 1994.
I. The Legal Standards of Local Rule 3(j)
The standards controlling a motion for reargument pursuant to Local Rule 3(j) and a motion to amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), Fed. R. Civ. P., are the same. See Morser v. AT & T Info. Sys., 715 F. Supp. 516, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Lotze v. Hoke, 654 F. Supp. 605, 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
Local Rule 3(j) provides in pertinent part:
There shall be served with the notice of motion a memorandum setting forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked. No oral argument shall be heard unless the court grants the motion and specially directs that the matter shall be reargued orally. No affidavits shall be filed by any party unless directed by the court.
Thus, to be entitled to reargument under Local Rule 3(j), the Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the Court overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before the Court on the underlying motion. See Ameritrust Co. Nat'l Ass'n v. Dew, 151 F.R.D. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Fulani v. Brady, 149 F.R.D. 501, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); East Coast Novelty Co. v. City of New York, 141 F.R.D. 245, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); B.N.E. Swedbank, S.A. v. Banker, 791 F. Supp. 1002, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Novak v. National Broadcasting Co., 760 F. Supp. 47, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Ashley Meadows Farm Inc. v. American Horse Shows Ass'n, 624 F. Supp. 856, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Local Rule 3(j) is to be narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the court. See Caleb & Co. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 624 F. Supp. 747, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). In deciding a Local Rule 3(j) motion, the court must not allow a party to use the motion to reargue as a substitute for appealing from a final judgment. See Morser, 715 F. Supp. at 517; Korwek v. Hunt, 649 F. Supp. 1547, 1548 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). As such, a party in its motion for reargument "may not advance new facts, issues or arguments not ...