documents, and drawing reasonably inferences there from, this set of facts can not support a finding of a continuing Title VII violation or circumstances which warrant equitable tolling of the limitations period. Accordingly, plaintiff's charge of discrimination is time-barred and is hereby dismissed.
II. Jurisdiction over Claim of Retaliation
Defendant OTB argues that plaintiff's claim of retaliation should be dismissed since this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear it. The claim of retaliation was not included in the EEOC charge. Also, the claim could not be deemed reasonably related to the time-barred EEOC charge. Plaintiff contends that her retaliation claim should not be dismissed since not only was it reasonably related to her EEOC discrimination charge but it was set forth therein.
"A district court only has jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims that either are included in an EEOC charge or are based on conduct subsequent to the EEOC charge which is 'reasonably related' to that alleged in the EEOC charge." Butts, 990 F.2d at 1401 (citations omitted). Plaintiff contends that her charge of retaliation was set forth in her May 26, 1992, EEOC charge. In her EEOC charge, plaintiff alleged harassment by defendant Nesbeth, the OTB employee who was promoted over plaintiff. See Decl. of Nitza Carrasco at Ex. B. However, plaintiff did not allege that she was harassed in retaliation for her complaints concerning her nonpromotion. Instead, plaintiff specifically alleged that such harassment resulted from Nesbeth's resentment toward plaintiff because plaintiff was more experienced at Nesbeth's new position. Id. Therefore, this Court finds that plaintiff did not allege retaliation in her EEOC charge.
Plaintiff contends that even if the claim of retaliation were not raised in the EEOC charge, which is the case, this Court has jurisdiction to hear the claim since it is "reasonably related" to the discrimination claim brought before the EEOC. Since this Court has determined that the May 26, 1992 charge was untimely, the EEOC charge "thus cannot serve as [a] predicate for allegations in the complaint said to be reasonably related." Butts, 990 F.2d at 1403. See Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 1994).
Since plaintiff's charges of retaliation were not presented to the EEOC and can not be reasonably related to a time-barred allegation, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim of retaliation is hereby dismissed.
III. Jurisdiction over Pendent State Claims
Defendant asserts that, with the federal claims dismissed, plaintiff's pendent state claims also must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367, enacted Dec. 1, 1990, codified the law with regard to pendent party, pendent claim, and ancillary jurisdiction by granting federal district courts "supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that are so related to claims in the action within [the Court's] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." Id. In general, in order to invoke supplemental jurisdiction, there must be an underlying cognizable federal claim. In this case, both of plaintiff's federal claims have been dismissed. When the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over ancillary claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). "'In the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.'" Morse v. University of Vermont, 973 F.2d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 98 L. Ed. 2d 720, 108 S. Ct. 614 (1988)). Thus, this Court declines to assert jurisdiction over plaintiff's ancillary claims. Accordingly, plaintiff's pendent state law claims are hereby dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court dismisses plaintiff's Title VII claims of discrimination and retaliation, and plaintiff's pendent state law claims. Accordingly, plaintiff's Amended Complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
New York, New York
June 30, 1994
Peter K. Leisure