that such a beating ever occurred. The officers contend that at no time while the Plaintiff was in their custody on January 30, 1988, was he ever struck or injured. Dep. of Lavin at 3. Dep. of LaRosa at 2-3.
The record clearly does not substantiate the Plaintiff's claims of abuse. For instance, the Plaintiff does not reveal why he failed to seek medical help for the injuries he alleges he sustained as a result of this beating when he reached the correctional facility at Rikers Island. The Plaintiff's transcript reveals that, upon admission to Rikers, he sought medical treatment for high blood pressure and for headache pain. Each of these ailments were pre-existing, affecting Plaintiff for at least two years prior to his arrest. No records were introduced to substantiate the contention that these injuries indeed exist.
At no time was Plaintiff treated for injuries sustained in the alleged beating. The Plaintiff saw his regular doctor approximately one month after his January 30, 1988 arrest. He testified that he went to see Dr. Marshall, his general physician, about a month after the arrest and that Dr. Marshall treated him for injuries he sustained in the beating. Notwithstanding, the Plaintiff cannot recall the exact nature of the visit or the doctor's prescriptions for his pain, and Dr. Marshall refuses to produce any of his patient's medical records.
The Plaintiff has failed to establish sufficient evidence that he sustained serious and permanent physical injuries. His mere allegations of negligent abuse "provide no indication that any evidence exists that would permit the trier of fact to draw a reasonable inference [in his favor]." Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998, (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 88 L. Ed. 2d 74, 106 S. Ct. 91 (1985).
In his memorandum of law in opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiff contends that he was also emotionally injured by the alleged January 30, 1988 beating. Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 7-8. Again, he offers no proof to substantiate this claim. Psychological records from Arnold D. Laschewer, Ph.D., the Pl.'s psychologist, are replete with inaccuracies. The Plaintiff told Dr. Laschewer a different account of the circumstances surrounding his arrest.
More importantly, he failed to inform Dr. Laschewer about the severe blow to the head that forced him into an early retirement four years ago. Dep. of Pl. at 206-207. The Plaintiff testified that he was hit in the head by a piece of hammer during a work-related accident. This injury, in addition to forcing him into retirement, caused the Plaintiff financial problems and problems "with life in general." Dep. of Pl. at 28. The psychological report offers several analyses of Plaintiff's emotional problems and his alleged post-traumatic stress disorder, but in light of the fact that the psychologist examined the Plaintiff under colorable circumstances, the facts do not support Plaintiff's allegation of emotional injuries.
The Plaintiff offers no witnesses or other corroboration for his story. Nor has he produced concrete medical proof. Since the Plaintiff's story rests upon mere unsubstantiated allegations, he has failed to meet the burden of proof required of him in Rule 56. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could not rule in his favor.
II. DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM TO RECOUP DAMAGES FOR THE IMPOUNDING OF HIS CAR
A claim for deprivation of property is not cognizable in federal court if the state courts provide a remedy for deprivation of that property. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 542-43, 68 L. Ed. 2d 420, 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986). New York provides such a remedy in § 9 of the New York Court of Claims Act. Since New York State provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy, Plaintiff is able to pursue his remedy and he was, therefore, not deprived of property without due process of law. Love v. Coughlin, 714 F.2d 207, 208-09 (2d Cir. 1983).
Pursuant to Rule 18(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiff permissibly joined his state claim for damages to recover the cost of retrieving his car to the federal claim arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The claims were closely related to the same set of facts -- the circumstances surrounding the Plaintiff's January 30, 1988 arrest. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966) (ruling that a federal claim and a state claim may be joined in one action where the claims derive from a "common nucleus of operative facts.") However, now that the federal claim has been dismissed, this Court exercises its constitutional discretion in dismissing the Plaintiff's state claim as well. Id.
This circuit adopted the law in Gibbs, stating that "if the federal claims are subject to disposal of on a motion for summary judgment, the court should refrain from exercising pendent jurisdiction absent exceptional circumstances." Kavit v. A. L. Stamm & Co., 491 F.2d 1176, 1180 (2d Cir. 1974). None of the recognized special circumstances -- judicial economy, overriding federal policy question in the state claim, or fairness to the litigants -- warrants this Court retaining jurisdiction over this state matter. Plaintiff's sixth cause of action is hereby dismissed for lack of an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction.
The Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence to dispute the Defendant's version of the material facts. For the reasons maintained herein, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is hereby GRANTED.
Sterling Johnson, Jr.
Brooklyn, New York
July 14, 1994