has satisfied the continuing violation doctrine requirement that the last act of discrimination in a series of acts takes place during the limitations period.
Additionally, plaintiff has also successfully alleged that a continuing discriminatory system existed at the University during the limitations period. She alleges that at the time of her dismissal, 12 faculty members were recommended for tenure. Seven of those were women. Initially, none of the seven women were granted tenure, while four out of five male faculty members were granted tenure.
Moreover, plaintiff has also alleged that male faculty members were granted tenure although they had fewer publications than plaintiff.
Plaintiff's allegations demonstrate a continuing system of discrimination against female faculty by defendant sufficient to defeat defendant's motion to dismiss. See Egelston v. State University College at Geneseo, 535 F.2d 752, 755 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding continuing violation where female professor alleged that her termination was part of the college's "continuing policy to deny women access to its upper echelon"). See also Pfau v. Coopers & Lybrand, 776 F. Supp. 744, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Accordingly, under this arm of the continuing violation doctrine, plaintiff's EEOC charge is timely and her complaint not barred.
Defendant makes the same arguments against plaintiff's cause of action brought under the New York State Human Rights Law. Under New York law, a complaint of discrimination must be filed with the New York State Division of Human Rights "within one year after the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice." N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(5). A charge filed with the EEOC is deemed filed with the State Division. Absent a timely charge, a claim under the Human Rights Law must be dismissed.
Suffice it to say, that like the federal courts, New York courts recognize the continuing violation doctrine. See McClary v. Marine Midland Bank, 87 A.D.2d 982, 450 N.Y.S.2d 109, 110 (4th Dep't 1982). In fact, the New York doctrine is apparently broader than the federal one inasmuch as it focuses on "whether the discriminatory practice had a continuing impact on the complainant." Id. Thus, like the Title VII claim, this Court finds that the state Human Rights claim is not barred by the statute of limitations.
Finally, defendant also argues that plaintiff's cause of action for retaliation must be dismissed. In order to state a claim for retaliation, plaintiff must allege that: (1) plaintiff opposed an employment practice that she believed to be unlawful or otherwise engaged in protected activity; (2) defendant knew of her opposition; (3) adverse employment action followed; and (4) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc., 983 F.2d 1204, 1213 (2d Cir. 1993).
A fair reading of the complaint reveals that plaintiff has alleged all the elements necessary to support a retaliation claim. She alleges that she filed a formal grievance, that there was a faculty protest with respect to defendant's tenure decisions and that in retaliation for that activity Jones terminated plaintiff and one other woman faculty member. Additionally, plaintiff also alleges that Jones made false and defamatory statements regarding plaintiff's scholarship in retaliation for her complaints and to cover up his discriminatory conduct. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss the retaliation claim is denied.
For the above-stated reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss the Title VII claims and the New York State Human Rights Law claims, including the retaliation claims, is denied. With plaintiff's consent, however, the claim brought under the New York City Human Rights Law is hereby dismissed.
LEONARD D. WEXLER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: Hauppauge, New York
September 2, 1994