Adriaanse. Mr. Adriaanse was employed by Holland America Line for forty-two years before retiring in 1990; Holland America owns and operates approximately six cruise ships. T.277-78, 283, 314. Beginning in 1974, Mr. Adriaanse was responsible for the maintenance of the ships, including cabin security and the consideration of which security devices should be placed on cabin doors. T.279-282, 284. In his opinion, a passkey system such as the one used by defendants is inadequate to protect the security and privacy of passengers unless there is an additional device which cannot be activated from the outside, such as a security chain or deadbolt independent from the key-actuated lock. T.292, 301, 302, 307. Although his testimony is somewhat unclear, it appears that five of Holland America's cruise ships utilize a deadbolt system in which locked cabin doors cannot be opened from the outside except with an "emergency passkey." T.304-05, 319-20. Only six crew members have emergency passkeys: the captain, chief mate, staff captain, chief engineer, hotel manager, and chief housekeeper. T.319-20. These members keep their emergency keys locked in separate safes. T.323. The sixth ship has double cylinder locks on the inside of the cabin doors which can never be opened from the outside, even with an emergency key. T.316, 317. Mr. Adriaanse did not testify about any other ships except those six operated by Holland Line.
In response, defendants called Captain Domenic A. Calicchio as their expert witness in cabin security. Before retiring in 1986, Capt. Calicchio served almost thirty years in the United States Coast Guard; his positions included officer in charge of marine inspection at the Miami Coast Guard district, executive officer of the marine safety office in New Orleans, and hearing officer responsible for adjudicating Coast Guard violations. T.523-26. During his tenure Capt. Calicchio made more than 500 inspections of 60 to 65 passenger ships. T.529-30. These included cruise ships owned by Carnival Cruise Line, Holland America Line and Commodore Cruise Line. T.531. While his duties did not specifically include inspection of locking mechanisms on cabin doors, he routinely inspected passenger cabins for other requirements such as emergency notices and life jackets. T.535, 536-37. In addition, in preparation for the instant trial, he recently boarded six cruise ships. T.530. He testified that there are no Coast Guard requirements concerning locks and keys for passenger cabin doors, and that he has never seen a security chain system on any cruise ship. T.526, 540. In fact, in his opinion, having locking devices on cabin doors that cannot be opened from the outside would be highly dangerous in an emergency situation. T.541. For example, if the only occupant of the cabin has a heart attack or other incapacitating illness, or if there is a fire and a passenger is overcome by smoke, or if the ship is sinking and a passenger is trapped in the cabin, rescue attempts could be frustrated. T.541-42.
In light of the foregoing testimony, we are not persuaded that having locking devices on passenger doors that cannot be opened from the outside is standard procedure; rather, it appears that Holland America's ships represent the exception. More importantly, we agree with defendants that in balancing the security risks against the safety risks, it is more reasonable not to install such devices. Plaintiffs argue that cruise ships are "floating hotels" and that most hotels have independent deadbolt locks or security chains inside the guest rooms. Plaintiffs ignore the fact that the security and safety risks on a ship are simply not the same as the security and safety risks in a hotel. When a ship is at sea - in fact, even when it is in port - people are not wandering in off the street and walking through the ship's corridors. By contrast, hotels and motels have little control over who comes and goes through their doors and along their hallways. Moreover, as pointed out by Capt. Calicchio, most hotel rooms have windows; hence in an emergency situation rescuers can enter a locked hotel room through the window. There may not be such access to the passenger cabins on a cruise ship, and there obviously is not to windowless inside cabins such as those occupied by the plaintiffs in this case. Finally, when there is an emergency at a hotel such as a fire, rescue squads are within minutes away; on a ship there is not the equivalent manpower and equipment.
In short, while the balance may weigh in favor of security at a hotel, we find that it weighs in favor of safety on a cruise ship.
Because we find that defendants were not negligent with respect to their choice of locking devices, it is unnecessary for us to make any factual findings concerning whether the alleged rape or verbal harassment occurred and the identity of the perpetrator. It is also unnecessary for us to address plaintiffs' claims that defendants breached warranties that plaintiffs would be safe on CARIBE I, because "some negligence must be shown before a passenger can sue for breach of contract." Jaffess, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3481 at *17 (citing Haffel v. United States Lines Co., 114 F. Supp. 443, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)).
Finally, plaintiffs claim that defendants were negligent in handling plaintiffs' complaints and the subsequent investigation, and that such conduct also constituted the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs argue that (1) contrary to what ship personnel told plaintiffs, the authorities in St. Thomas were never notified of plaintiffs' complaints; (2) while ship personnel assured plaintiffs that the authorities were notified in Miami, the only authorities who met the vessel at Miami were the cruise line's attorney, corporate officials, and a doctor hired by the cruise line; (3) the examining doctor in Miami misrepresented that he was qualified to examine Mrs. York when in fact he was hired by defendants; (4) the evidence handled by ship personnel was collected in a "haphazard" way; and (5) defendants' attorney misrepresented applicable law. Defendants contend that they cooperated with the F.B.I.,
preserved evidence, made themselves available for interviews, and that Mr. Neish voluntarily gave a blood specimen.
With regard to plaintiffs' claim that this conduct constituted negligence, we agree with Jaffess, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *19, that there is "no authority for extending a ship owner's duty to aiding a passenger in investigating an assault after it occurs." As explained in Jaffess, a ship owner does owe a duty to aid a passenger in peril. Id. (citing Prosser on the Law of Torts § 56, at 376 (5th ed. 1984)). However, this duty revolves around protecting the passenger's personal safety. As in Jaffess, the instant plaintiffs do not claim that defendants' "alleged failure to aid [them] in investigating the assault in any way put [them] in danger." Id.
There is no maritime law concerning plaintiffs' claim that defendants' conduct surrounding the subsequent investigation constituted the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
We need not decide which state law to apply, however, because both New York, the forum state, and Florida, the state with the predominant contacts,
have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) on the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Howell v. New York Post Co., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 612 N.E.2d 699, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 353 (1993); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1985). Section 46 reads in pertinent part:
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.