arrival, "the firemen were told by a man in the rear second floor apartment that he was taking care of the leak." See Verified Complaint P 17.
Nevertheless, at 7:00 p.m., the "leaks" turned into what Osipova describes as a "water-fall of black foamy water," and Osipova once again called 911. See Verified Complaint P 18. The Fire Department returned and this time turned off the water; subsequently, however, a tenant who lived in the basement ("Ralph Roe") turned the water back on. See Verified Complaint P 18. On November 21, 1992, at 5:00 a.m., Osipova called 911 again, the Fire Department again turned off the water and Ralph Roe again turned it on. See Verified Complaint P 19. Osipova called 911 for a fourth time and asked that the police arrest Ralph Roe. See Verified Complaint P 20. They did not do so. See Verified Complaint P 20.
Thereafter, Osipova filled a bucket with water from the leak and poured it into a hole leading to Ralph Roe's apartment. See Affirmation of Nonna Osipova dated December 7, 1993 ("Osipova Aff."), P 13. Osipova alleges that only then did he immediately turn off the water. See Osipova Aff. P 13.
On November 23, 1992, Juliette Clarke ("Clarke"), the landlord and a co-defendant in this action, knocked on plaintiff's door and demanded access to Osipova's apartment so that a plumber could fix the leak and restore water and heat to the building. See Osipova Aff. P 7. When plaintiff refused to open the door, Clarke called the police. See Osipova Aff. P 9. When Police Officer Elmer Martinez ("Martinez") arrived, Clarke informed him that water from Osipova's apartment had leaked into the boiler room resulting in a lack of heat and hot water for the whole building. See Osipova Aff. P 5; Martinez Dep. at 14, 17, 18, 20, 23. Martinez knocked on Osipova's door and identified himself as a police officer but was also denied entry. See Osipova Aff. P 7; Martinez Dep. at 19, 35. After summoning a sergeant, Martinez again asked Osipova to open her door, but she refused. See Verified Complaint P 24; Martinez Dep. at 23.
Plaintiff then claims that Martinez used force to open the door and enter the apartment "under [a] pretense to provide access to a 'plumber' for a search of leaks though there was no evidence or suspicions that there was a leak in [her] apartment [sic]." See Verified Complaint P 29. Osipova was frightened by this situation and requested that Martinez remain with her in the apartment until the plumber was finished. See Verified Complaint P 24. After Martinez refused to do so, Osipova fled from her apartment, to which she claims she has not since returned. See Verified Complaint PP 25, 26. Shortly after this episode, Osipova also called the A.S.P.C.A. to request that it remove her cats from her apartment but they refused. See Verified Complaint P 46.
Osipova then brought this action against David Dinkins, Lee Brown, Raymond Kelly, the City of New York, Elmer Martinez, the Officers of the 30th Precinct ("City Defendants"), Juliette Clarke, Ralph Roe, Jane Roe and the A.S.P.C.A. pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state statutes alleging violations of her civil rights. By Order dated September 14, 1993, the Court dismissed all claims against the A.S.P.C.A. and the City Defendants, except the Fourth Amendment claim against Martinez for entering into the plaintiff's apartment without permission. Defendant Martinez now moves for summary judgment dismissing the Fourth Amendment claim on the ground that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity has long shielded government officials performing discretionary functions "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982). In the oft-quoted words of Justice Scalia in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987), "whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action . . . assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time it was taken." Id. at 639 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819); accord Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 368 (2d Cir. 1989); Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 920-21 (2d Cir. 1987).
Furthermore, the facts and circumstances of each case must be examined to determine whether 'the contours of the right . . . [were] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he [was] doing violated that right . . . In the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent." Anderson, supra, 483 U.S. at 640.
Specifically, with respect to an alleged Fourth Amendment warrant clause violation, the relevant inquiry focuses on "the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the] . . . warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed." Anderson, supra, 483 U.S. at 641.
The law is "clear" that absent exigent circumstances or consent, the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against "unreasonable" searches and seizures, see U.S. Const., Amend IV, requires that the police obtain a search warrant before entering a private residence. See Soldal v. Cook County, Illinois, U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 538, 543, 121 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1992) (in absence of exigency or consent, landlord's removal of a mobile home before eviction with aid of sheriff held to be "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment). The essential question in determining whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless entry is "whether law enforcement agents were confronted by an 'urgent need' to render aid or take action." See United States v. Gordils, 982 F.2d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 769 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1119, 111 S. Ct. 1071, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1177 (1991)). See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2797, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990) (consent); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151, 69 L. Ed. 543, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925) (exigency); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 90 S. Ct. 1975 (1970) (exigency). An officer attempting to determine whether exigent circumstances exist, however, need not be accurate about all the facts of the situation at hand, but only reasonable in his perception:
"Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability."