extraditing jurisdiction does not deny access to the courts; access may then be had to the courts of the requesting state.
Here, plaintiff had a right to access to the courts of New York to request whatever relief those courts under their procedures provided. This does not mean that New York was required to afford an opportunity to litigate the merits of an extradition request absent an application for and grant of a stay, provided that the plaintiff was able to contest the propriety of his imprisonment in the requesting jurisdiction.
Moreover, where, as here, an extraditee has not shown that his extradition was improper, any denial of a particular forum would be harmless and hence no grounds for subsequent relief. United States v. Olano, 113 S Ct 1770, 123 L Ed 2d 508 (1993); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S Ct 1710, 123 L Ed 2d 353 (1993); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 61; 28 USC § 2111.
Petitioner has provided no evidence that he applied for a stay of his extradition or that he was prevented from making such an application. His claim that he was denied his right to challenge extradition in the courts of New York is accordingly without merit.
The only claim which has survived summary judgment is plaintiff's allegation that prior to arrest he had suffered a fracture of the fourth metatarsal bone in his right foot, but that he did not receive medical attention until 28 hours after arrest. (Report and Recommendation of March 24, 1994, p.18). The proper disposition of that claim remains open for further examination.
I direct plaintiff to provide sufficient evidence to establish that there is a genuine material issue with respect to the existence of facts suggesting that claim. I direct defendants to furnish any information relevant to that issue, including the material which Magistrate Judge Buchwald has indicated was lacking in the defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Report and Recommendation of March 24, 1994, p.18). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US 317, 326, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986); Jacobson v. Cohen, 151 FRD 526 (SDNY 1993).
In providing this information, the parties should take into consideration that prisoners have a constitutional right to appropriate medical attention, and that deliberate or reckless disregard of such a right constitutes a violation of 42 USC 1983. See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S Ct 1970, 128 L Ed 2d 811 (1994); Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1993).
As pointed out by the Magistrate Judge, numerous problems existed at the time plaintiff was arrested affecting the facilities at which plaintiff was held. Depending on the circumstances, the existence of these problems may or may not support inferences that any of the defendants did or did not disregard constitutional rights of the plaintiff.
Defendants' actions may or may not have been reasonable under the circumstances. There is no automatic violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights merely because plaintiff was not given medical attention immediately after the injury. For example, defendants may have lacked information necessary to act; they may have done the best they could under difficult circumstances; they may have confronted an emergency situation making it impossible to do everything that could and should have been done in other circumstances. They may have believed (correctly or otherwise) that the particular injury involved required attention but not on an emergency basis. New York v. Quarles, 467 US 649, 657-58, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984); Howard v. Garvin, 844 F Supp 173 (SDNY 1994).
Depending on the circumstances surrounding the defendants' actions, there may or may not be a genuine issue of material fact as tested under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
The presence, absence, or extent of harm caused to plaintiff by the delay at issue may or may not be relevant to these questions.
Victims of crimes constituting intentional torts are entitled to sue for damages. Restatement Second of Torts § 870 (1989). Plaintiff's recovery, if any, in this federal civil rights suit might be subject to claims by the victims of plaintiff's crimes.
Based on the plaintiff's lack of obvious assets, it is unlikely that in normal course the victims of the plaintiff's crimes would have incurred the cost of bringing an action against him only to have the judgment go unsatisfied. Such victims could, or course, obtain a judgment against him and continuously renew it until the plaintiff has money to satisfy it. It is unlikely, however, that the victims would take such action unless they knew of plaintiff's potential to improve his financial condition.
It would be incongruous to permit a person who perpetrated a crime to obtain money as a result of events connected with that person's arrest, without having to pay for any harm caused to those injured by reason of the crime or other tortious acts committed by the perpetrator. Such a one-sided result would run counter to the "sober second thought of the community, which is the firm base on which all law must ultimately rest," Stone, "The Common Law in the United States", 50 Harv.L.Rev. 4, 25 (Nov. 1936). In such a situation "the law itself is on trial, quite as much as the case to be decided," Id. at 10.
Defendants here, acting as representatives of the People, as they do in New York as indicated by the caption of state criminal cases, are directed to notify any locatable victims of crimes allegedly committed by plaintiff (in any jurisdiction) of this lawsuit, so as to allow them to bring a civil action to recover any losses incurred as a result of plaintiff's criminal conduct.
Should such victims be unidentifiable or impossible to locate, the defendants here may wish to consider asserting a claim on behalf of these victims.
Claims by those defendants who represent the People, including crime victims, on behalf of such victims may properly be regarded as in the nature of counterclaims. Any claim by defendants on behalf of plaintiff's victims would be an offset to plaintiff's claims against the People and could be asserted as of right.
See United States v. Shaw, 309 US 495, 84 L. Ed. 888, 60 S. Ct. 659 (1940); United States v. Medlin, 767 F.2d 1104, 1107 (5th Cir 1985); United States v. Longo, 464 F.2d 913 (8th Cir 1972); FLSIC v. Quinn, 419 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir 1969); Fed.R.Civ.P. 13.
Dated: White Plains, New York
November 8, 1994
VINCENT L. BRODERICK, U.S.D.J.