A criterion for a finding of employment discrimination under Title VII is that invidious discrimination of one of the types prohibited by the statute took place. Taggart v. Time, Inc., 924 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1991); Montana v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 869 F.d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 1989); Oey, supra. Where a claim is "implausible . . . [the party opposing summary judgment] must come forward with more persuasive evidence . . . than would otherwise be necessary" to defeat a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986). Where a defense to a claim is implausible, the party offering that defense "must come forward with more persuasive evidence . . . than would otherwise be necessary" to sustain a motion under Rule 56.
Inadequacy of an employer's explanation for a challenged adverse personnel decision does not by itself constitute evidence of illegal discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993). Paperwork support for each employer action is not required by the antidiscrimination laws. See Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust Co, 487 U.S. 977, 101 L. Ed. 2d 827, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988); Oey, supra; Christiana v. Metropolitan Life, 839 F. Supp. 248 (SDNY 1993).
Where an explanation for an adverse employment action is sufficiently implausible under general principles, an adverse inference as to the existence of prohibited discrimination may be drawn. See United States v. Di Stefano, 555 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1977); Chorbajian v. Goldhirsch Group, 814 F. Supp. 333 (SDNY 1993).
If information primarily available to the employer which would shed light on the case is not provided, an adverse inference may also be drawn.
It is implausible that an employee with eleven (11) years of service without negative reports would be discharged because of a single incident of unauthorized absence. In this case the employer did not establish any reason for urgency in terminating plaintiff's employment. The employer has likewise failed to submit sufficient evidence of treatment of others similarly situated to indicate lack of discrimination against plaintiff.
Under these circumstances, the otherwise extremely thin support for a finding of discrimination set forth by plaintiff - the unreasonableness of her treatment together with more favorable treatment of employees with other ethnicity - succeeds in justifying denial of the employer's motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's Title VII claim.
No significant evidence of any deliberate intention to cause emotional distress to plaintiff has been presented. See Martin v. Citibank, 762 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1985); Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 402 N.Y.S.2d 991, 373 N.E.2d 1215 (1978). Accordingly this claim cannot survive IBM's motion for summary judgment.
The employer here, a solvent institutional entity, is fully responsible for any violations which might be found upon the trial of this case, and is fully able to provide any relief which might be granted to plaintiff. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 1 as amended in 1993, the courts are instructed that all procedural rules must be "administered" as well as "construed" to promote the "just, speedy and inexpensive" determination of every action. No valid reason has been suggested for incurring additional confusion, expense and delay by retaining unnecessary natural person defendants in this case. See Chambers v. Capital Cities, 851 F. Supp. 543, 546 (SDNY 1994); Lederman v. Marriott, 834 F. Supp. 112, 115 (SDNY 1993); Archer v. Motorists Supply Co, 833 F. Supp. 211 (SDNY 1993).
The parties are directed to inform the court within fifteen (15) working days of the date of this memorandum order whether or not they wish assistance in regard to settlement.
Dated: White Plains, N.Y.
November 9, 1994
VINCENT L. BRODERICK, U.S.D.J.