The opinion of the court was delivered by: HAROLD BAER, JR.
HAROLD BAER, JR., District Judge, S.D.N.Y.
Andrew F. Karacsonyi, pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Bill Radloff, a former manager of the Delaware Unit of the Ray Brook Federal Correctional Institution, alleging that Radloff violated his constitutional rights by penalizing him for not participating in the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program ("IFRP"). Radloff requests the Court to (1) reconsider the August 9, 1993 Report-Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Gustave J. Di Bianco, which granted Radloff's motion for summary judgment as to all claims except Karacsonyi's claims regarding the IFRP; or (2) entertain this motion as a supplemental motion for dismissal, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
For the reasons that follow, Radloff's motion, considered as a supplemental motion to dismiss, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiff Karacsonyi was convicted in the United States District Court, District of Vermont, of interstate transportation of explosive materials. On December 17, 1991, Judge Franklin S. Billings, Jr. sentenced him to incarceration for sixty-three months and ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $ 3,628.61.
While in federal prison, Karacsonyi refused to execute Form BP-455, the Inmate Financial Responsibility Withdrawal Request, wherein an inmate authorizes, or refuses to authorize, the correctional institution to withdraw funds directly from an inmate's prison account in order to make financial obligation payments under the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (the "IFRP"). As a penalty for refusing to participate in the IFRP, Karacsonyi was placed in the lowest housing status (a four-man cell), denied the opportunity to work in the Federal Prison Industries ("Unicor"), and denied the opportunity for a furlough.
Karacsonyi brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that his failure to sign Form BP-455 did not constitute a refusal to participate in the IFRP, and that even if it did constitute a refusal, he was exempt from participating in the program. In the alternative, Karacsonyi contends that the penalties he received for non-participation violated his constitutional rights.
Conversely, Radloff contends that Karacsonyi's refusal to sign Form BP-455 was tantamount to a refusal to participate in the IFRP, from which Karacsonyi was not exempt, and that the penalties for non-participation are constitutional.
Because the record does not indicate that the parties had an opportunity to take discovery on certain issues presented here, the Court will consider defendant's motion as a supplemental motion for dismissal. When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draws inferences from these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974); Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911, 112 S. Ct. 1943, 118 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1992). Dismissal is warranted only if, under any set of facts that the plaintiff can prove consistent with the allegations, it is clear that no relief can be granted. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 81 L. Ed. 2d 59, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984); Frasier v. General Elec. Co., 930 F.2d 1004, 1007 (2d Cir. 1991). "The issue on a motion to dismiss is not whether the plaintiff will prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236.