that everyone who was covered by the CSPA would qualify automatically for a status adjustment -- regardless of any additional restrictions imposed by § 245 -- it would not have been necessary for the legislators to add a provision to the CSPA stating that § 245(c) did not apply to covered PRC nationals. Lin v. Meissner, 855 F. Supp. 4, 7-8 (D.D.C. 1994). Put differently, because the CSPA specifically states that covered PRC nationals can apply for a status adjustment despite the limitations imposed by § 245(c), the Act should be read as leaving in place § 245(a)'s requirement that applicants for a status adjustment have been inspected and either admitted or paroled. Id. Thus the CSPA is not inconsistent with 8 C.F.R. § 245.9(b)(6) and did not require the INS to overlook plaintiff's lack of inspection when considering his status adjustment application.
The Act's legislative history does not suggest a different conclusion. Congress enacted the CSPA in response to the suppression of demonstrators in Tiananmen Square. The legislators were guided by a 1990 Executive Order which temporarily halted the deportation of PRC nationals, but did not confer lawful immigration status on those who never had such status. See 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1356, 1356-57 (quoting in full Exec. Order No. 12711). The final version of the Act was the product of "difficult hours of thoughtful debate," 138 Cong. Rec. S7,150 (daily ed. May 21, 1992) (statement of Sen. Gorton), during which legislators balanced the concerns of immigration officials and students from the PRC. The most that can honestly be said is that the CSPA, as enacted, may have been interpreted differently by different legislators. See Meissner, 855 F. Supp. at 8 & n.6.
The text and legislative history of the CSPA thus provide little support for plaintiff's interpretation of the statute; and, to the extent that Congress' intent in adopting the CSPA remains unclear, the INS' construction of the statute in § 245.9(b)(6), and the agency's reliance on that regulation when denying plaintiff's status adjustment application, are reasonable and merit judicial deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781-83, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984); Meissner, 855 F. Supp. at 8. Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment is denied, and the action is dismissed with prejudice.
Dated: New York, New York
March 8, 1995
JOHN S. MARTIN, JR., U.S.D.J.