I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following represents the Court's best effort to understand Beyah's allegations of fact. On September 7, 1985, Onondaga County prison officials notified Beyah of disciplinary charges against him for calling Nurse Lester a "bitch." After Beyah's disciplinary hearing, Sergeant Bigham found Beyah guilty, confined him to his cell, and denied him personal phone privileges for seven days.
On September 8, 1985, at 7:30 a.m., Sergeant Chambers served Beyah with Inmate Infraction Notice J-2124-85 for a violation of Rule 8 (sanitation) of the Onondaga County Sheriff's Department Inmate Rules Booklet, and disobeying an order. Sergeant Chamber's also notified Beyah of the second disciplinary hearing which would be held at 11:45 p.m. that night.
At 11:45 p.m. that night, a deputy guard took Beyah to the second disciplinary hearing. At this hearing, Beyah testified that prison officials never told him to remove his clothes from the bars. Beyah also refused to sign a waiver of his right to twenty-four hours notice of the hearing. Furthermore, Beyah alleges Sergeant Putman denied him the right to confront the deputy who wrote the infraction notice. Sergeant Putman found Beyah guilty of the infractions. However, the punishment description on Disciplinary Report J-2124-85, is illegible and the record contains no other account of Beyah's punishment.
At 1:00 a.m. that same night, Sergeant Putman allegedly kept Beyah out of his cell in an attempt to force Beyah to sign the hearing results. Beyah refused and Deputies Block and Burns brought him into a consultation booth. Once there, the deputies allegedly assaulted Beyah and Sergeant Putman sprayed mace in Beyah's face and eyes. The guards purportedly left Beyah in shackles on the floor without washing the mace from his face and eyes. Beyah states that approximately one hour later Sergeant Chambers wiped the mace from Beyah's face.
On September 9, 1985, Sergeant Matts served Beyah with Inmate Infraction Notice J-2132-85 that charged Beyah with an assault on officers Block and Burns. On September 10, 1985, Lt. Molta and "Sergeant John Doe" took Beyah to a third disciplinary hearing. Beyah claims he requested a paralegal to represent him, but prison officials denied his request. Beyah further claims that he could not adequately prepare a defense. Sergeant Matts told Beyah that he had five statements by guards claiming that Beyah had assaulted them. Sergeant Matts found Beyah guilty of the charges and confined Beyah to his cell twenty-four hours a day from September 10 to October 10, 1985.
Beyah further asserts that on September 18, he asked Chief Pirro for a copy of the disciplinary reports. Beyah states that Chief Pirro denied his request.
A. Standard for Summary Judgment Motions
Federal Rule 56(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires me to grant summary judgment if the evidence demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [that] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). "Summary judgment is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to 'secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). In determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences against the moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176, 82 S. Ct. 993 (1962) (per curiam); Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 834 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1987). However, the mere existence of disputed factual issues is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Knight v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932, 94 L. Ed. 2d 762, 107 S. Ct. 1570 (1987). The disputed issues of fact must be "material to the outcome of the litigation," id. at 11, and must be backed by evidence that would allow "a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986). The non-movant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. With respect to materiality,
substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.