OPINION AND ORDER
LEISURE, District Judge:
This is an action brought by AD/SAT, a division of Skylight, Inc. ("AD/SAT") against the Associated Press ("AP"), the Newspaper Association of America ("NAA"), the National Newspaper Network ("NNN"), and a number of individual newspapers, including The Lexington Herald-Leader (the "Herald-Leader" or "defendant"). AD/SAT asserts that defendants have conspired to monopolize the alleged market of transmitting advertising copy and graphics to newspapers, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) ("Sherman Act § 2"), and that they have conspired together to boycott plaintiff, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) ("Sherman Act § 1").
Defendant now moves this Court for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Alternatively, defendant moves for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 56. For the reasons stated below, defendant's motions are each granted in part.
AD/SAT has been engaged in the satellite and electronic delivery of newspaper advertising since 1987. Electronic delivery of newspaper advertising involves the transmission of copy from advertisers to newspapers via satellite as well as by other electronic means of delivery. During 1993, AD/SAT delivered advertisements worth approximately $ 400 million in advertising revenue for the newspapers served. Advertisers pay AD/SAT a transmission fee based on volume, and newspapers pay a fee for the equipment necessary to receive the electronic advertisements and for each advertisement received.
AP is a cooperative association engaged in the collection, assembly and distribution to newspapers of news and photographs. AP also provides satellite uplink and downlink services used to transmit data to its member newspapers. Prior to the events giving rise to the instant action, plaintiff had paid AP, for a number of years, to use AP's satellite network for the transmission of advertising to AP member newspapers.
NNN is an unincorporated subdivision of NAA, a trade association of newspapers, and is a joint venture among NAA members to offer advertising packages to advertisers. Herald-Leader, along with the other newspaper defendants, are newspapers that have stopped or have tried to stop doing business with AD/SAT.
The Herald-Leader is a general-interest broadsheet newspaper published seven days a week in Lexington, Kentucky. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion of Defendant Lexington Herald-Leader for Judgment on the Pleadings or for Summary Judgment ("Defendant Mem.") at 4. A portion of Herald-Leader's advertisers are national or regional companies located outside of the Lexington area, and some of these advertisers have available to them as a means of delivering their advertisements to the Herald-Leader the AD/SAT network. Id. at 5. The Herald-Leader started doing business with AD/SAT in 1987, at which time the two entered into a five-year contract. Id. at 6. The AD/SAT network is only one method, among many, available to the Herald-Leader's advertisers, and apparently it has been utilized by only a few of them.
The AdSEND program is a program through which AP has entered the electronic newspaper advertising transmission business. AP's service enables advertisers to transmit advertising copy to United States newspapers in a digital, computer-usable format, and it competes directly with AD/SAT.
Plaintiff appeared before this Court on September 14, 1994 seeking a temporary restraining order preventing AP from initiating its AdSEND program. The Court neither granted nor denied the TRO, and the parties next appeared before this Court on September 23, 1994, at which time plaintiff's application for a preliminary injunction barring AP and those in active concert with it from initiating, providing, supplying, engaging in, contributing to or participating in the AdSEND program was denied.
I. Judgment on the Pleadings
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides for judgment on the pleadings. "In deciding a Rule 12(c) motion, [the Court] appl[ies] the same standard as that applicable to a motion under Rule 12(b)(6)." Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 1994). Therefore, in reviewing a motion for a judgment on the pleadings, a court must assume the facts alleged by the plaintiff to be true and must liberally construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011, 1014 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911, 118 L. Ed. 2d 548, 112 S. Ct. 1943 (1992). A motion to dismiss on the pleadings may be granted only if it appears certain that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 81 L. Ed. 2d 59, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984). "The court should not dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim 'unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority, 941 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957)). "The court's task on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to rule on the merits of plaintiffs' claims, but to decide whether, presuming all factual allegations of the complaint to be true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, the plaintiff could prove any set of facts which would entitle him to relief." Weiss v. Wittcoff, 966 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that a complaint must only satisfy the minimum requirements of "notice pleading." See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1983); Wade v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 693 F.2d 19, 21 (2d Cir. 1982). Moreover, "dismissals on the pleadings are especially disfavored in antitrust cases." Schwartz v. Jamesway Corp., 660 F. Supp. 138, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
This Court finds that plaintiff has met the minimum notice requirements dictated by the Rules as regards its Sherman Act § 1 claim but not its Sherman Act § 2 claim.
B. The Amended Complaint
As an initial matter, the Herald-Leader notes that AD/SAT's First Amended Complaint (the "Complaint") lists the Herald-Leader as a defendant in the caption, but that other then the caption, the Herald-Leader's name nowhere appears. Outside the caption, the Herald-Leader is never mentioned by name, and the Complaint does not even identify the Herald-Leader as one of the parties in its introductory paragraphs. Defendant contends that such an omission constitutes a failure to provide a factual basis to require a party to participate in a lawsuit and requires dismissal. Defendant observes that this Court has repeatedly held that, where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant, and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for the appearance of its name in the caption, the complaint against that defendant must be dismissed. See, e.g., Thomas v. Beth Israel Hosp., Inc., 710 F. Supp. 935, 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Sweet, J.); Kirkland v. Bianco, 595 F. Supp. 797, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Lasker, J.); Morabito v. Blum, 528 F. Supp. 252, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Ward, J.).
This Court notes that while it is true that the Herald-Leader is identified by name only in the caption of the Complaint, it is identified as a defendant, and the Complaint sets out numerous acts by the "defendants," "defendant newspapers," and "newspaper defendants" in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Consequently, this Court finds that on the facts of the instant action, the Complaint should not be dismissed summarily as to the Herald-Leader solely on the grounds that it is not specifically named outside of the caption. The Court must determine whether, viewing the claims alleged against "defendants," "newspaper defendants," and "defendant newspapers" as specifically alleging claims against defendant Herald-Leader, plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of notice pleading.
C. Sherman Act § 1
In order to recover under Sherman Act § 1, AD/SAT must plead and establish that defendants (1) entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy, which was (2) an unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce, and (3) that injury to competition resulted from the unreasonable restraint. The Complaint states:
The conduct of defendants hereinabove constitutes a per se unlawful group boycott and concerted refusal to deal with AD/SAT, and is further a contract, combination, and conspiracy unreasonably to restrain trade and commerce in the market for transmission of newspaper advertising, and in the submarket thereof for the electronic transmission of newspaper advertising, by reason of which violation AD/SAT has been injured in its business and property.
Amended Complaint P 33.
(c) In order to further the establishment and entrenchment of its AP AdSEND program, Associated Press has entered into a contract, combination and conspiracy with its member newspapers, including at least the other defendant newspapers named herein, the NAA, and the NNN to discontinue using independent suppliers of advertising transmissions and to designate Associated Press as the exclusive provider of these services. . . The chairman of the NAA . . . states that the members of the NAA should 'work with the Associated Press and help our cooperative perfect its ability to transmit ads digitally from the advertisers' computer to our computer' . . . [The Chairman] also exhorted the NAA member newspapers to work 'collectively' with the Associated Press on its electronic advertising transmission service. These statements constitute an invitation to enter into a group boycott or collective refusal to deal, targeted directly at AD/SAT.