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YERDON v. TEAMSTERS LOCAL 1149

May 12, 1995

PATRICIA A. YERDON, Plaintiff,
v.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 1149, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN and HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO; INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN and HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO; ROBERT L. HENRY, Individually, as Secretary-Treasurer and Principal Executive Officer of Local 1149 and as a Member of the Executive Board of Local 1149; DAVID W. STEWART, Individually, as Secretary-Treasurer of Local 1149 and as a Member of the Executive Board of Local 1149; JOSEPH ZAINCHOWSKI, Individually, as Vice-President of Local 1149 and as a Member of the Executive Board of Local 1149; ROBERT CALABRIA, Individually, as Trustee of Local 1149 and as a Member of the Executive Board of Local 1149; JOSEPH DAVIS, Individually, as Trustee of Local 1149 and as a Member of the Executive Board of Local 1149; JOHN CASE, Individually, as a Trustee of Local 1149 and as a Member of Local 1149 Executive Board; THOMAS HALSTEAD, Individually, as Vice-President of Local 1149 and as a Member of the Local 1149 Executive Board; STEPHEN W. RICHMOND, Individually, as President and Business Agent of Local 1149 and as a Member of the Local 1149 Executive Board; HOWARD ORMSBY, Individually as Recording Secretary of Local 1149 and as a member of the Local 1149 Executive Board; LOUIS KNAPP, JR., Individually, as Trustee of Local 1149 and as a Member of the Local 1149 Executive Board; LEONARD MARTIN, Individually, as Trustee of Local 1149 and as a Member of the Local 1149 Executive Board; and ANNA SWANK-WORTH, Individually, as Recording Secretary of Local 1149 and as a Member of the Local 1149 Executive Board; Defendants.


FREDERICK J. SCULLIN, JR., U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE


The opinion of the court was delivered by: FREDERICK J. SCULLIN, JR.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 Currently before the court is Teamsters Local 1149's ("Local 1149) and the individual defendants' motion for failure to state a claim or alternatively for summary judgment. This is the third time this action is before the court.

 Plaintiff originally brought this action alleging violations of:

 
. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.;
 
. New York Executive Law, § 290 et seq.; and
 
. The Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 411, 412 and 529.

 In September 1994, the court considered motions for summary judgment made by the individual defendants, Local 1149 and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO's ("International Union"). At that time the court:

 
. granted Local 1149's and the individual defendants' motion on the Title VII and New York Executive Law claims because Local 1149 had too few employees to be considered an employer under either of those statutes;
 
. reserved decision on Local 1149's and the individual defendants' liability on the LMRDA claims;
 
. granted the International Union's motion for summary judgment on all claims holding that plaintiff failed to show that the International Union participated in or ratified the actions of Local 1149; and
 
. granted plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to state specifically claims (1) under Title VII against Local 1149 and the individual defendants' as a labor organization (not as an employer), (2) under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, for breach of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Constitution, and (3) for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

 On November 18, 1994, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint and realleged claims against Local 1149 and the individual defendants for violations of

 
. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and New York Executive Law, § 290 et seq.;
 
. The Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 411, 412 and 529; and added
 
. a claim for breach of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Constitution (the "International Constitution" or "Constitution") in violation of § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185. *fn1"

 Local 1149 and the individual defendants now move to dismiss those causes of action for failure to state a claim or alternatively for summary judgment.

 BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff Patricia A. Yerdon was hired in 1984 as a secretary to Local 1149, and was required to become a member of the union at that time as well. Plaintiff apparently was able to work from 1984 through 1989 without incident. In October 1989, plaintiff's supporters on Local 1149's Executive Board were unseated. Plaintiff alleges that the newly nominated officers -- the individual defendants here -- began discrediting her in an effort to force her resignation. The discrediting allegedly consisted of the "dissemination of falsehoods concerning plaintiff and plaintiff's terms and conditions of employment and [an] ongoing campaign of sexual harassment including . . . disparaging sexual remarks to plaintiff, continual and repeated staring or glaring at plaintiff's chest and unwelcome touching." Am. Compl. P 25.

 In October 1990, plaintiff filed union charges against the individual defendants claiming that they sexually harassed her in violation of the International Constitution and by-laws. After conducting a hearing on the charges, the Teamsters Joint Council (the regional level union comprised of local delegates) found that the individual defendants had sexually harassed and retaliated against the plaintiff and ordered the individual defendants to cease and desist their discriminatory behavior and to restore a pay cut imposed on plaintiff. The individual defendants appealed the decision to the General Executive Board of the International Union, which, after a de novo review, affirmed the Joint Council's decision and ordered Local 1149 to restore plaintiff's pay.

 Plaintiff admits that Local 1149 has restored her pay in accord with the General Executive Board's decision, but she contends that the harassment did not cease. For example, plaintiff alleges that members of Local 1149's Executive Board "attempted to give defendant Robert Henry the power to remove plaintiff from her position as Secretary for the Union office." Am. Compl. P 41. Consequently, on December 10, 1992, plaintiff re-instituted charges with the Joint Council against the individual defendants alleging continued harassment.

 Also in December 1992, plaintiff left her job as secretary because of disability and has not returned to work. She allegedly suffers from emotional distress caused by the individual defendants' harassment. Because plaintiff was indefinitely unavailable for work, her employment was terminated effective February 1993. On April 13, 1993, plaintiff filed claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") charging sexual discrimination. *fn2" Also on April 13, 1993 the Joint Council postponed hearings on the charges without explanation and has not rescheduled them. Thereafter, on May 17, 1993, defendant Robert Henry filed internal union charges against plaintiff and plaintiff's former boss claiming that plaintiff was overpaid. Plaintiff contends that those charges were filed in retaliation for her EEOC complaints. In July 1993, in accord with union by-laws, after six months of separation from employment with the union plaintiff was honorably withdrawn from the union. Under honorable withdrawal, plaintiff is entitled to attend and speak at meetings, but she cannot vote nor run for union office.

 DISCUSSION

 I. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 Even though defendants' motion is styled as alternatively based on failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and summary judgment, both parties submitted affidavits and other matters outside the pleadings for the court's consideration. Thus the court will treat defendants' motion as one for summary judgment.

 Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact exists as a matter of law. See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). An unresolved factual issue is one that a reasonable fact-finder could decide in favor of either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

 II. TITLE VII DISCRIMINATION *fn3" ...


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