to state discrimination claim brought under Executive Law § 296); accord Hilow v. Rome City School Dist., No. 91 Civ. 567, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8953 at *26, 1994 WL 328625, * 8 ("claims under § 296 do not constitute torts subject to the notice of claim provisions of Education Law § 3813(2) and General Municipal Law §§ 50-e and 50-i incorporated therein."). Since there is no requirement that Plaintiff file a notice of claim for her claims brought under Executive Law § 296, her failure to do so does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction.
II. Mt. Sinai's Status as a Party Defendant
Defendants contend that Plaintiff's claims against Mt. Sinai should be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiff failed to name Sinai in her original EEOC charge and the Notice of Right to Sue does not mention Sinai (Defendant's Memorandum of Law, dated January 14, 1994 ["Defs. Memo"], at 15-19; Defendants Reply, dated February 18, 1994 ["Defs. Reply"], at 1-7; Defs. Ex. DD); and, (2) Sinai is not Plaintiff's employer within the meaning of Title VII or the New York State Human Rights Law such that it may be held liable for Plaintiff's discrimination claims. (Defs. Memo at 20-24; Reply at 8-9.) Plaintiff counters that: (1) there is a sufficient identity of interest between Sinai and the parties named in the EEOC Complaint to vest the Court with jurisdiction (Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, dated February 11, 1994, ["Pl. Memo"], at 13-24); and (2) Sinai may be viewed as Plaintiff's employer since it controlled the means and manner by which Plaintiff's work was accomplished, or alternatively, because Sinai and HHC are an integrated enterprise. (Pl. Memo at 54-61).
A. Failure to Name Mt. Sinai in the EEOC Charge
Title VII provides that "a civil action may be brought [in district court] against the respondent named in [the EEOC] charge . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). "The purpose of this requirement is to notify the charged party of the alleged violation and to bring him before the EEOC, thereby permitting 'effectuation of the Act's primary goal, the securing of voluntary compliance with the law.'" Dirschel v. Speck, No. 94 Civ. 0502 (LMM), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9257 at *9, 1994 WL 330262, *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 1994) (quoting Giuntoli v. Garvin Guybutler Corp., 726 F. Supp. 494, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 554 F. Supp. 285, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). A prerequisite to maintaining a Title VII action against a defendant, therefore, is the filing of a charge with the EEOC or authorized state agency, naming the defendant. See Johnson v. Palma, 931 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1991); Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 822 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Gilmore v. Local 295, 798 F. Supp. 1030, 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 23 F.3d 396 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 130 L. Ed. 2d 293, U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 335 (1994).
Although a plaintiff is required to name the defendant in the administrative charge, courts have interpreted Title VII's procedural requirements flexibly and created several exceptions to this rule. See Johnson, 931 F.2d at 209; Bridges, 822 F. Supp. at 1025 n.6. One such exception allows a Title VII action to be maintained against a party not named in the EEOC charge where that party has an "identity of interest" with a defendant named in the charge. See Johnson, 931 F.2d at 209. "Courts have allowed this 'identity of interest' exception because it is important to maintain 'the availability of complete redress of legitimate grievances without undue encumbrance by procedural requirements . . .'" Goyette v. DCA Advertising Inc., 830 F. Supp. 737, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (quoting Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Glus I ")).
In determining whether the identity of interest exception applies, the court must consider the following factors:
(1) whether the role of the unnamed party could have been ascertained by the plaintiff at the time she filed her EEOC complaint; (2) whether, under the circumstances, the interests of a named party are so similar as the unnamed party's that for the purpose of obtaining voluntary conciliation and compliance it would be unnecessary to include the unnamed party in the EEOC proceedings; (3) whether its absence from the EEOC proceedings resulted in actual prejudice to the interests of the unnamed party; and, (4) whether the unnamed party has in some way represented to the complainant that its relationship with the complainant is to be through the named party.