exhibits rather than separately to their notice of motion. Plaintiff has ignored the rule.
"It is the burden of the non-movant, through the Rule 3(g) statement, to identify not only the facts that it alleges are disputed, but to direct the court to that part of the record, be it an affidavit or a portion of deposition testimony or any other competent evidence, that supports its view of the facts." United States v. Pilot Petroleum Assocs., Inc., 122 F.R.D. 422, 423 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). Because of plaintiff's failure to do so, the Court is empowered under Rule 3(g) to deem admitted all of the material facts set forth in defendants' Rule 3(g) statement.
Plaintiff's abject failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 56(e) and Local Rule 3(g) would normally require the Court to grant the defendants' summary judgment motion. The Court, however, is mindful that pro se litigants should be given special latitude in responding to such a motion. See Graham v. Lewinski, 848 F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 1988) ("special solicitude should be afforded pro se litigants generally, when confronted with motions for summary judgment"); Ruotolo v. Internal Revenue Serv., 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994) ("The failure of a district court to apprise pro se litigants of the consequences of failing to respond to a motion for summary judgment is ordinarily grounds for reversal"); Delgado v. Koehler, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8405, 1993 WL 227715 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 1993) ("it would be premature to accept all of the facts contained in defendant's Rule 3(g) statement simply because of [pro se] plaintiff's initial failure to file a response").
Accordingly, plaintiff may submit affidavits and additional material in accordance with Rule 56(e), together with a counter Rule 3(g) statement, on or before August 7, 1995. Defendants may submit reply papers by August 21, 1995. The motion is scheduled for oral argument before the Court on September 8, 1995, at 11:30 a.m.
In preparing his additional submissions, plaintiff should be mindful that "purely conclusory allegations of discrimination, absent any concrete particulars" will be insufficient to withstand defendants' summary judgment motion. See Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 88 L. Ed. 2d 74, 106 S. Ct. 91 (1985). Plaintiff is also reminded that, as required by Rule 56(e), he may only submit affidavits based on the affiant's personal knowledge. In this regard, conclusory allegations that defendants did not treat similarly absent and tardy co-workers in a manner consistent with his termination would not survive the summary judgment motion in the absence of concrete, factual support -- not mere conjecture.
Furthermore, in light of plaintiff's pro se status, the Court, on its own initiative, recommends that he familiarize himself with cases which set forth the evidentiary burden which a plaintiff must sustain to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge or discriminatory treatment, see, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-253, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981); Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994); Meiri, 759 F.2d at 994-98; Hunter v. Citibank, N.A., 862 F. Supp. 902, 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), as well as the spate of recent Second Circuit decisions addressing summary judgment in the context of age discrimination cases, which are conceptually comparable to Title VII claims. See, e.g., Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 1995); Viola v. Philips Medical Sys. of North America, 42 F.3d 712 (2d Cir. 1994); Woroski v. Nashua Corp., 31 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 1994).
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
June 29, 1995
United States District Judge
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