year and deferring an upcoming wage increase. Pltf. Mem. Exh. A, pp. 164-70, Exh. O, p. 208. Plaintiffs contend that the trustees received no consideration from Chapter in return for this extension and wage freeze. IBEW counters that the concessions were proffered to effectuate a market recovery and to settle an unrelated lawsuit between Chapter and Local 501.
On January 20, 1992, after further negotiations with Chapter, the trustees submitted a revised collective bargaining agreement (the "revised CBA") to President Barry. In addition to the wage deferral and extension amendments negotiated on July 24, 1991, the revised CBA contained a newly negotiated Small Work Agreement. Pltf. Mem. Exh. 3. On March 20, 1992, Barry approved the revised CBA, except for the Small Work Agreement contained therein, which he stamped "NOT APPROVED." Id. Plaintiffs contend that the trustees implemented the revised CBA prior to Barry's approval in violation of the IBEW constitution and the original 1989-92 CBA.
Plaintiffs also set forth claims against Dynatram, an individual electrical contractor. These claims are apparently based on the fact that although not a member of Chapter, Dynatram adopted the terms of the 1989-92 CBA for the purpose of conducting work at the Mamaroneck Water Waste Treatment Plant in Westchester County. By the end of 1991, plaintiff Richard Mekeel's association with the Kozera faction was apparent at Local 501 union meetings. Pltf. Mem. Exh. D, p. 111, Exh. E, p. 83. During August and September 1991, for example, Mekeel and others circulated a petition decrying the governance of the IBEW trustees. Id. Exh. 18. In January 1992, Timothy Broder, a supervisor at Dynatram and the recording secretary of Local 501, laid off Mekeel from his employment at Dynatram. Id. Exh. D, p. 76, Exh. I, pp. 5, 142, 146, 166-67. Plaintiffs therefore claim, inter alia, that Dynatram terminated Mekeel in violation of the 1989-92 CBA.
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). It is well-established that a fact is material when its resolution would "affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and a dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). On the other hand, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
I. CLAIMS AGAINST IBEW
A. Title III Claims
Plaintiffs contend that IBEW established and maintained a trusteeship for the impermissible purpose of suppressing the Kozera faction in violation of Title III of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. § 461, et seq.4 Under Title III, a labor union may establish and administer a trusteeship only for valid purposes which include "correcting corruption or financial malpractice, assuring the performance of collective bargaining agreements or other duties of a bargaining representative, restoring democratic procedures, or otherwise carrying out legitimate objects of such labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 462. Where, as here, a labor organization establishes a trusteeship in accordance with its constitution and by-laws, and conducts the statutorily required fair hearing, the trusteeship
shall be presumed valid for a period of eighteen months from the date of its establishment and shall not be subject to attack during such period except upon clear and convincing proof that the trusteeship was not established or maintained in good faith for a purpose allowable under section 302 [ 29 U.S.C.S. § 462].
29 U.S.C. § 464(c); see also Executive Bd. Local 1302 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 477 F.2d 612, 615 (2d Cir. 1973) (union's actions toward self preservation protected by § 462) (quoting Nat'l Association of Letter Carriers v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915, 923 (2d Cir. 1971)).
Notwithstanding this presumption of validity, IBEW is not entitled to summary judgment on the facts of this case. In recommending the imposition of trusteeship, Hill alluded to Local 501's failure to ratify the 1986-89 Small Work Agreement and the ensuing litigation. Hayes Aff. Exh. 16. Shortly after the imposition of the trusteeship, the trustees negotiated a wage freeze without ratification by the Local 501 membership and arguably without adequate consideration. Moreover, the trustees negotiated and allegedly implemented the revised CBA, which contained a Small Work Agreement similar to that opposed by the Kozera faction, and which the IBEW President had stamped as "not approved." Whether that action was designed to suppress the Kozera faction or to promote valid union objectives is an issue as to which conflicting rational inferences could be drawn based upon the aforesaid facts. It follows that summary judgment as to the Title III claims must be denied.
B. Title I Claims
Plaintiffs also claim that IBEW established and maintained the trusteeship as a means of restricting their right to sue, to free speech and to free association in violation of Title I of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 411, et seq., which provides:
every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings.