contradicted by Dr. Kessler's own treatment notes.
Further, while Coleman's psychiatrist acknowledged that Coleman was suffering from major depression, he also indicated that she was responding well to treatment and was in remission. In addition, when asked his medical opinion about Coleman's ability to do work related mental activities, Dr. Lacy identified no significant limitations. (Admin. Tr. at 237.) These findings were confirmed in examinations by Social Security consults. Thus, while the record indicates that Coleman has had numerous and varied ailments, they are insufficient to support her claim of disability given the medical evidence in the record. As the ALJ noted, "a need for continued treatment and a potential for decomposition, do not mean that the person is excluded from the possibility of work. . . ." (Admin. Tr. at 23.)
Moreover, "without any real medical substantiation, [such as] laboratory or other diagnostic testing," to support Coleman's claim of disability, the ALJ could not conclude that Coleman's ailments equalled any of the disabling impairments in the Regulations. (Admin. Tr. at 23.) Consequently, this Court does not find that the ALJ's determination that Coleman's symptoms did not meet or equal any of the impairments in the Regulations legally erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence.
At the fourth step of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ concluded that Coleman retained "residual functional capacity for medium work activity, in a not highly polluted environment," and that she was able to do her past relevant professional singer type work.
(Admin. Tr. at 23.) As the regulations require, the ALJ properly took into account Coleman's age, education, and past work experience in deciding that she was able to return to her previous work. In light of the medical evidence Coleman presented and testimony in the record that Coleman had continued to practice singing during periods of her claimed disability, this Court does not find that the ALJ's conclusion was unsupported by substantial evidence.
Coleman also argues that the ALJ's decision should be reversed because he concluded that her testimony was not credible. The ALJ based this finding on inconsistencies between Coleman's testimony and other evidence in the record, and specifically cites Coleman's testimony concerning two alleged rape episodes as examples of her lack of credibility. Although Coleman testified to both incidents at the hearing, Coleman never reported either rape to the police and copies of criminal court papers against one of the alleged attackers make no mention of rape or sexual assault. Coleman's testimony about the identity of the attackers, as well as the location of the rapes, also contradicts the evidence in the record. In addition, Coleman's testimony concerning her psychiatric treatment was also contradictory. Coleman testified that she continued her treatment, but the record indicates that it had been terminated and her case closed at the end of June 1993. In short, as the ALJ noted, Coleman's testimony was "replete with inconsistencies." (Admin. Tr. at 20.) Based on the record, this Court does not find the ALJ's conclusion unsupported by substantial evidence.
In sum, a careful examination of the entire record shows that Coleman received a "full hearing under the Secretary's regulations and in accordance with the beneficent purposes of the act. . . . " Bluvband v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 886, 892 (2d Cir. 1984). The ALJ's decision was based on the correct legal standard and supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Secretary's determination is affirmed, Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied and Defendant's motion is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DEBORAH A. BATTS, U.S.D.J.
Dated: July 28, 1995
New York, New York