The opinion of the court was delivered by: LEONARD D. WEXLER
In March 1990, petitioner pro se Robert Carpenter ("Carpenter") and a co-defendant were tried on a three-count indictment for bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. During trial, Carpenter pleaded guilty to the second count; the first and third were dismissed. Carpenter was sentenced, on May 22, 1990, to 30 months incarceration.
On March 6, 1991, Carpenter collaterally attacked his sentence, by motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (the "§ 2255 motion"), on grounds: that the determination of his sentence was based on assumptions; that the government violated its plea agreement with Carpenter; that the Court should have ordered a severance at trial; and that there were errors in his presentence report.
On June 9, 1992, Carpenter amended the § 2255 motion to include further grounds for collateral relief.
On May 10, 1993, Carpenter moved the Court for an order granting leave to amend the § 2255 motion a second time. By order dated March 7, 1994, the Court granted the motion.
On May 3, 1994, Carpenter submitted to the Court a " 28 USC 2255 Motion recast into Writ of Coram Nobis and 42 USC 1983 action." (the "present motion"). His brief explains: "it must be noted that Carpenter's full sentence ended in January 1993 and realizing that any more action on his 2255 motion has become moot, Carpenter . . . has now recast his 2255 motion into a writ coram nobis and a 42 USC 1983 action."
Carpenter raises nine grounds in the present motion upon which he claims relief should be granted. The grounds and relief sought are as follows:
(1) Carpenter claims that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated because the Court has failed to respond to his motions. He asks the Court to set aside the judgment against him, vacate his sentence, and dismiss the indictment.
(2) Carpenter claims that he was unable to contest the statements contained in his presentence report either before or after sentencing in violation of his due process rights. He asks the Court to set aside the judgment, and vacate his sentence.
(3) Carpenter claims that the government violated his plea agreement on the ground that, even though the government promised that it would take no position as to his sentencing, it influenced the probation report and opposed Carpenter's motion to reduce the sentence, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35, after it was imposed. He asks the Court to set aside the plea agreement and vacate his sentence.
(5) Carpenter claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He asks the Court to set aside his conviction and vacate his sentence.
(6) Carpenter claims that it would have been impossible for him to receive a fair trial because the Court did not order that the claims against Carpenter be severed from those against his co-defendant at trial. He asks the Court to set aside his conviction and vacate his sentence.
(7) Carpenter claims that a private bank, a law firm, and an individual conspired with the United States government to bring criminal charges against him. He charges selective prosecution and prosecutorial misconduct and seeks $ 1 million in compensatory damages and $ 50 million in punitive damages.
(8) Carpenter claims that the actions of a private bank violated his civil rights under New York State law. He seeks from the bank $ 3 million in compensatory damages and $ 15 million in punitive damages.
(9) Carpenter claims that the United States Internal Revenue Service has violated his federal constitutional rights by assessing civil tax penalties against him.
On June 7, 1995, the Court heard oral argument on the ...