It is noteworthy that the Darrow plaintiffs do not merely seek a declaration that the Caucus and the Defense Fund have not violated the LMRDA and the IBT Constitution to date, but rather, they seek a forward-looking declaration that certain actions of the Caucus and the Defense Fund "do not violate " the LMRDA and the IBT Constitution. Thus, not only is the Election Officer currently deciding election protests that raise issues identical to those raised in the Darrow litigation, but if the requested declaration is issued, future election protests may also conflict with this declaration.
In addition, an injunction under the All Writs Act is appropriate in the instant case because the actions of the Darrow plaintiffs challenge this Court's jurisdiction. The All Writs Act empowers district courts to issue "all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). In the instant case, this Court retains jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to the administration of the Consent Decree. See Consent Decree, PP A.1, K.16. The declaratory judgment that the Darrow plaintiffs seek is a matter that pertains to the administration of the Consent Decree because it will require a court to decide issues that must also be decided by the Election Officer. By seeking to obtain this declaratory judgment in another jurisdiction, the Darrow plaintiffs have challenged this Court's jurisdiction over the administration of the Consent Decree. Therefore, the injunction that the Government requests in the instant case should issue.
Each of the arguments that the Darrow plaintiffs raise in opposition to the Government's motion is meritless. The Darrow plaintiffs assert: (1) they are willing to stipulate to the Election Officer's jurisdiction; (2) that they have not sought to challenge the Election Officer's jurisdiction; and (3) the Election Officer's jurisdiction has not been challenged because three election protests raise the same issues that have been raised in the Darrow litigation. The problem raised by the Darrow litigation is not, however, that it is a challenge to the Election Officer's jurisdiction. Rather, the problem is that the Darrow litigation may impede the functioning of the Election Officer. Although the Government and the Darrow plaintiffs agree that the Election Officer has jurisdiction to decide issues regarding the Caucus and the Defense Fund, the fact remains that the Darrow litigation may hinder the Election Officer's efforts by subjecting the Consent Decree to potentially conflicting interpretations and by subjecting the Election Officer to the possibility of extensive litigation in the District of Columbia.
3. Darrow Defendants' Claim that the Caucus and the Defense Fund May Be a Shadow Government
The Government contends that this Court should also enjoin the Darrow plaintiffs because the Darrow defendants have asserted that the Caucus and the Defense Fund may be a "'shadow government' beyond the oversight of the IBT Constitution, the Consent Decree and, ultimately, this Court." (Memorandum of Law in Support of Government's Motion for injunctive Relief, at 19-20.) The Government asserts that under the IBT Constitution, "the IBT, through its General President, General Secretary-Treasurer and the General Executive Board has the power to audit, supervise, discipline and charter subordinate entities." Id. at 20 (citing IBT Constitution Art. VII, § 7; Art X, § 10; Art. VI, § 2; Art. IX, § 1; Art. XIX, § 7; Art. IX, § 2). The Government claims that the Darrow defendants have argued that "the Caucus and/or Defense Fund may improperly evade the audit and other investigatory and supervisory powers of the IBT, because they are functionally the equivalent of subordinate bodies but formally are not subject to the dictates of the IBT Constitution." Id. at 20-21 (citations omitted).
The Government argues that the issue that the Darrow defendants raise implicates the Consent Decree for two reasons. First, this "Court's authority to administer the Decree with respect to subordinate bodies and IBT members derives from the International union's representation of the subordinate affiliates and collective membership." Id. at 21 (citing United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 931 F.2d 177, 186-87 (2d Cir. 1991)). Second, "the powers of the . . . officers [appointed pursuant to the Consent Decree] are direct delegations of the powers that the General President and the General Secretary exercise over the Teamsters membership by virtue of the union Constitution." Id. (citations omitted). The Government argues that if the Caucus and the Defense Fund are a shadow government, "this Court's ability to enforce the Decree would be . . . obstructed." Id.
The Darrow plaintiffs argue that the Darrow defendants' claim that the Caucus and the Defense Fund are a shadow government does not justify issuing an injunction for two reasons: (1) this argument was raised as a defense in the Darrow litigation; (2) the Caucus and the Defense Fund are not a shadow government. (See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Government's Motion for Injunctive Relief at 28-29.)
Because this Court has already ruled that the Darrow plaintiffs must be enjoined from pursuing the Darrow litigation in any court or forum other than this Court, this Court will not address the issue of whether the "shadow government" argument that the Darrow defendants have raised warrants issuing an injunction pursuant to the All Writs Act.
For all the foregoing reasons, the Government's motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs in Darrow v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 94 Civ. 02113 (D.D.C.) (RJ), are hereby enjoined from pursuing that action in any court or forum in any jurisdiction except this Court. Plaintiffs in Darrow v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 94 Civ. 02113 (D.D.C.) (RJ), are hereby ordered either to dismiss their action or to transfer their action to this Court.
DATED: New York, New York
August 17, 1995
David N. Edelstein
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