non-discriminatory reason was pretextual and that age was the determinative factor. See Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 57 F.3d 193, 199 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejection of employer's proffered reasons permits the fact-finder to infer discrimination) (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr., supra, U.S. at , 113 S. Ct. at 2749 n.4).
Thus, Gerardi has made a sufficient showing that her qualifications may have been superior to not only the two younger applicants who were eventually hired, but also to the ten applicants who received call-back interviews. This alone bars the granting of Hofstra's motion for summary judgment. Additionally, Gerardi has also submitted statistical evidence concerning Hofstra's history of hiring Advisement Counselors who were in their twenties, which if viewed in her favor, could lead a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that Hofstra has a pattern of discrimination against older applicants.
See Alphin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 940 F.2d 1497, 1500 (11th Cir. 1991); Conroy v. Anchor Sav. Bank, FSB, 810 F. Supp. 42, 47 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (inference of age discrimination may be shown by direct evidence, statistical evidence, or circumstantial evidence such as documentation of preference for younger workers). Furthermore, Gerardi has raised issues regarding the context in which the subject of her age was mentioned during her interview for the position of Advisement Counselor. See, e.g., Robinson, supra, 21 F.3d at 508 (statement that manager wanted to replace older employees with "young tigers" was indirect evidence of age discrimination); Promisel v. First American Artificial Flowers, Inc., 943 F.2d 251, 259 (2d Cir. 1991) (statement to plaintiff's replacement that "he was needed to replace an "older gentleman" because [defendant was] looking for 'younger blood'" supported finding of pretext for age discrimination), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1060, 117 L. Ed. 2d 110, 112 S. Ct. 939 (1992); Alphin, supra, 940 F.2d at 1500 (statement by store manager to 50-year-old sales manager that "both of us had been around too long and were too old and were making too much money" were circumstantial evidence to show discriminatory intent).
In sum, resolving all the factual disputes in Gerardi's favor, which we must do at this point, Gerardi has sustained her burden of establishing that a jury question exists whether age discrimination may have been the determinative factor in the defendant's decision not to hire her.
Accordingly, Hofstra's motion for summary judgment is denied.
Dated: Brooklyn New York
August 24, 1995
David G. Trager
United States District Judge