not learn any English when she was in Hong Kong. After she graduated from high school, she enrolled in the University of Toronto, where she received a Bachelors Degree with a double major in Economics and Actuarial Science. She testified that she frequently had difficulty understanding her professors but she was able to do well enough on the exams to pass the courses.
The defendant then reviewed exhibit 1 and was asked to read the form and identify any words she did not understand. She said she did not understand the word "waive" in conjunction with waiving her rights. In the discussion about right to counsel, she understood that this meant that she would be given an attorney. She did not understand the term "magistrate" or "court."
A waiver of Miranda rights is valid when it is the product of a knowing and voluntary choice. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573, 93 L. Ed. 2d 954, 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987). "The questions of waiver must be determined on 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [each] case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.'" North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75, 60 L. Ed. 2d 286, 99 S. Ct. 1755 (1979)(quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938)). The government has the burden of establishing waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168-69, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986); United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1991).
For a waiver to be voluntary, the waiver must have been "the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than an intimidation, coercion, or deception." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986). Resolution of this issue requires inquiry into the conduct of the government in obtaining the statement.
A waiver of Miranda rights is made knowingly and intelligently only of the defendant has "a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequence of the decision to abandon it." Connelly, supra at 167. In order to meet this test, however, the accused need not "know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the 5th amendment privilege." Spring, supra at 574. Rather, the accused need only be aware that "he may choose not to talk to law enforcement officers, and to talk only with counsel present, or to discontinue talking at any time." Id.
The existence of a limited language barrier does not necessarily preclude a finding of a knowing and intelligent waiver. United States v. Jaswal, 47 F.3d 539, 542 (2d Cir. 1995)(waiver was voluntary where defendants "were found to have a reasonably good command of the English language."); Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1020 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that although defendant spoke in broken English, and occasionally lapsed into Spanish, defendant's command of English was sufficient to understand Miranda warnings), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 949, 113 L. Ed. 2d 471, 111 S. Ct. 1419 (1991). Instead, the court must determine based on all the facts and circumstances whether the defendant was aware that the statements could be used against her, and knew of her right to remain silent and her right to obtain the assistance of counsel.
1. Was Defendant's Statement Voluntary?
Applying these standards to this case, there are two questions before the court: first, whether the defendant's statement was voluntary and, second, whether her waiver of her rights was knowing and intelligent. As to the first issue, defendant argues that her statement was coerced. Specifically, she claims that Special Agent Szrama misrepresented the sentence she was facing on the charge in that he advised her that she could go to jail for three to five years for her acts unless she cooperated. In reality, according to defense counsel, the defendant faces a maximum of six months in jail. The defendant argues that Szrama's statement was an affirmative misrepresentation of the possible jail sentence justifying suppression under United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96, 100-101 (2d Cir. 1991).
On this issue, there is a direct conflict in the testimony. According to the defendant, Agent Szrama told her that she was in serious trouble, and that she would go to jail for three to five years if she did not cooperate. According to Agent Szrama, he advised her that if convicted, the penalty would be serious but he did not recall representing that she would go to jail for three to five years. In fact, the maximum jail sentence for the offense charged is ten years imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3), (c). Accordingly, even assuming defendant's version of the facts, no misrepresentation was made to the defendant. Accordingly, United States v. Anderson, Supra does not apply.
The defendant also claims that the agent told her that they would help her if she cooperated. Agent Szrama confirms that this statement was in fact made to the defendant. However, this type of statement is not coercive and does not invalidate a confession. Numerous cases have found that after a defendant has been advised of his rights, the agents are free to discuss with the defendant the evidence against him or her and the reasons why he or she should cooperate. See, e.g., United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1138 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1044, 110 S. Ct. 1139 (1990); United States v. Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 649-50 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1021, 110 S. Ct. 1114 (1990); United States v. Pomares, 499 F.2d 1220, 1222 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032, 42 L. Ed. 2d 307, 95 S. Ct. 514 (1974).
On the basis of the evidence submitted at the hearing, I find that the government has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's waiver of her Miranda rights was voluntary.
2. Was Defendant's Waiver Knowing and Intelligent?
The second issue is whether defendant's waiver of her rights was knowing and intelligent. The record amply supports the conclusion that the defendant was properly advised of her rights in English by Special Agent Szrama. The question presented by this case, however, is whether Ho's English was sufficient for her to understand those rights and to make a knowing waiver of them. On this issue, the court must keep in mind the standard it must use in judging the government's case. The government's burden is by a preponderance of the evidence - i.e., by demonstrating that the facts asserted by the government are "more probably true than false."
I find that the government has met its burden of demonstrating that Ho's English comprehension was, at the time of the interview, sufficient to permit her to make a knowing waiver of her rights. It is clear from the evidence on both sides that the defendant is able to converse with people who speak only English. Significantly, at her initial appearance on this charge on January 10, 1995, the defendant was asked by the court if she spoke English and she replied that she did. She was further asked whether she was fluent in English and she replied that she was. Defendant did not request an interpreter nor did the court feel that one was warranted given defendant's representation about her ability to understand English. It is also noteworthy that the defendant graduated from the University of Toronto with a double major in Economics and Actuarial Science, where her courses were all in the English language.
I find these facts to be inconsistent with her testimony and demeanor at the suppression hearing. Accordingly, I do not find the defendant's testimony at the hearing to be credible.
Moreover, there was a direct conflict in the testimony between Special Agent Szrama and the defendant. Agent Szrama stated that he had no difficulty communicating with the defendant. Defendant advised him that she spoke English, and when she asked a question about what it meant to waive her rights, he gave her an explanation which she appeared to understand. In contrast, the defendant testified that she felt that she had to answer the questions the agents posed, that she believed she was under arrest, that she believed she would receive electric shocks if she did not answer the questions the agents raised and she had difficulty understanding her right to an attorney.
In light of the defendant's representations at arraignment, her college education and the inconsistencies noted above, I am persuaded that Special Agent Szrama's testimony is the more credible testimony in this case. Furthermore, I am persuaded that he took seriously his obligation to administer the Miranda rights, that he properly administered those rights in English, and that the defendant had sufficient understanding of English to make a knowing waiver of them. In this connection, I note the plethora of cases that have found that defendants who are limited in their ability to speak English can nevertheless knowingly and intelligently waive their rights under Miranda. See, e.g., United States v. Jaswal, supra; Campaneria v. Reid, supra; United States v. Ghafoor, 897 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Yian, 1995 WL 422019 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Li, 1995 WL 390094 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Mercado, 1989 WL 66666 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Bernard S., 795 F.2d 749, 752 (9th Cir. 1986).
The defendant cites United States v. Kim, 803 F. Supp. 352 (D. Haw. 1992), aff'd, 25 F.3d 1426, cert. denied, 130 L. Ed. 2d 517, 115 S. Ct. 607 (1994), for the proposition that when a defendant does not have a sufficient understanding of the English language to understand her Miranda rights, this may constitute a basis to suppress the subsequent statement. The Kim case is not inconsistent with the analysis employed in this case. The question of whether the defendant has the capacity to understand the Miranda rights is a factual question which must be made on a case by case basis. For the reasons set for above, the credibility issues in this case are resolved against the plaintiff and in favor of the government.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion should be denied.
CAROL E. HECKMAN
United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: Buffalo, New York
November 20, 1995
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), it is hereby
ORDERED, that this Report and Recommendation be filed with the Clerk of the Court.
ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of this Court within ten (10) days after receipt of a copy of this Report and Recommendation in accordance with the above statute, Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) and Local Rule 30(a)(3).
The district court will ordinarily refuse to consider on de novo review arguments, case law and/or evidentiary material which could have been, but was not, presented to the magistrate judge in the first instance. See, e.g., Paterson-Leitch Co., Inc. v. Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Co., 840 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1988).
Failure to file objections within the specified time or to request an extension of such time waives the right to appeal the District Court's Order. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S. Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985); Wesolek, et al. v. Canadair, Ltd., 838 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1988).
The parties are reminded that, pursuant to Rule 30(a)(3) of the Local Rules for the Western District of New York, "written objections shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made and the basis for such objection and shall be supported by legal authority." Failure to comply with the provisions of Rule 30(a)(3), or with the similar provisions of Rule 30(a)(2) (concerning objections to a Magistrate Judge's Decision and Order), may result in the District Court's refusal to consider the objection.
Let the Clerk send a copy of this Order and a copy of the Report and Recommendation to the attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Defendant.
CAROL E. HECKMAN
United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: Buffalo, New York
November 20, 1995
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