Based on the evidence produced at the hearing, the IRB held that it had been established by a preponderance of the evidence, see IRB Rules, P J.6, that Cammarano, "a working teamster foreman for Local 282, which has long been dominated by organized crime, has associated frequently -- at the Grand Avenue social club and elsewhere -- with individuals who are members of, or who are closely associated with, the Bonnano LCN family." IRB Opinion and Decision at 8. The IRB found the hearsay evidence it heard at Cammarano's hearing to be credible. Id. at 3, 7. It also found that Cammarano had knowingly associated with members or associates of the Bonnano LCN family during his membership in Local 282, id. at 3-6, and that "the substantial weight of the evidence concerning the duration and quality of Cammarano, Jr.'s contacts with known organized crime figures [demonstrated] that such contacts were purposeful and not incidental, fleeting, casual or inadvertent." Id. at 6 (citations omitted). The IRB further found that Cammarano's testimony was "rife with contradiction," id. at 6, because his hearing testimony conflicted with his earlier deposition testimony as well as FBI reports regarding Cammarano's visits to the Grand Avenue social club and his relationship with various members of organized crime. Id. at 6-7. Accordingly, the IRB concluded that Cammarano "has brought reproach upon the IBT and violated Article II, Section 2(a) and Article XIX, Section 7(b)(1), (2) and (9) of the IBT Constitution." Id. at 8.
Having held that the charges against Cammarano had been proven, and having considered the gravity of the charges, the IRB permanently barred Cammarano from holding membership in, or any position with, the IBT or any IBT-affiliated entity in the future. Id. The IRB further ruled that Cammarano may not hereafter obtain employment, consulting, or other work with the IBT or any IBT-affiliated entity. Id.
This Court received IRB Application XXII consisting of the IRB's Opinion and Decision concerning Cammarano together with supporting exhibits on September 26, 1995. By letter dated that same day, Chambers informed Cammarano's attorney that if he wished to object to the IRB's findings and rulings, he could submit any objections to IRB Application XXII to this Court no later than fourteen days from the date of the letter. (Letter from James C. Maroulis, Law Clerk to the Honorable David N. Edelstein, United States District Judge, to Albert A. Gaudelli, Esq., Defense Counsel (Sept. 26, 1995) (on file with Clerk of the Southern District of New York).) On September 28, 1995, Gaudelli wrote to this Court requesting an extension of time to file objections to the IRB Opinion and Decision because he "had not had the opportunity to review this recommendation and application with [his] client." (Letter from Albert A. Gaudelli, Esq., Defense Counsel, to the Honorable David N. Edelstein, United States District Judge (Sept. 28, 1995) (on file with Clerk of the Southern District of New York).) On October 5, 1995, this Court denied Gaudelli's request because it "failed to set forth an adequate reason for extending Mr. Cammarano's time to file objections to Application XXII." 88 Civ. 4486, Application XXII of the Independent Review Board (Cammarano) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1995) (Memorandum Endorsement).
On October 11, 1995, this Court received Cammarano's objections to Application XXII from Gaudelli. In the papers submitted to this Court, Cammarano detailed the specific portions of the IRB Opinion and Decision that he found objectionable. He asserted that the IRB's references to Cammarano's father and brother were "patently unfair" because "every person is entitled to normal contact with his own family. . . ." (Cammarano's Objections to the IRB Opinion and Decision Application XXII, at 2 (Oct. 10, 1995).) He challenged the IRB's findings as "vague" and unsupported by the evidence. Id. at 4-5. In addition, Cammarano asserted that several of the IRB's findings were erroneous because they "inferred criminal association . . . by hearsay and unfounded unsubstantiated opinion . . . ." Id. at 6. Specifically, Cammarano challenged the IRB's use of hearsay testimony, id. at 3, and objected to "the conclusion made by the IRB based on FBI reports and testimony which at best were double hearsay and most times triple and beyond." Id. at 3.
In response to Camarano's objections, both the IRB and the office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York submitted letters in support of the IRB Opinion and Decision. Both letters focused on Cammarano's "principal objection to the IRB decision . . . that [the] IRB relied upon hearsay evidence." (Letter from Celia A. Zahner, Special Counsel to Chief Investigator Charles M. Carberry, to the Honorable David N. Edelstein, United States District Judge 1 (Oct. 24, 1995) (on file with Clerk of Southern District of New York) ("Zahner Letter")); see (Letter from Beth E. Goldman, Assistant United States Attorney, to the Honorable David N. Edelstein, United States District Judge (Nov. 3, 1995) (on file with Clerk of Southern District of New York) ("Goldman Letter")). Citing Second Circuit case law, both letters emphasized that it is well settled that reliable hearsay is admissible at internal union disciplinary hearings under the Consent Decree. (Goldman Letter (citing United States v. IBT (Cimino), 964 F.2d 1308, 1312-13 (2d Cir. 1992))); (Zahner Letter at 1 (citing United States v. IBT (DiGirlamo), 19 F.3d 816, 823 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 119 (1994); United States v. IBT (Adelstein), 998 F.2d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. IBT (Senese), 941 F.2d 1292, 1297-98 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1091 (1992))).
In addition, the IRB addressed the issue of whether expert testimony offered at the hearing could be based on information beyond the personal knowledge of the expert witness. Citing both the Federal Rule of Evidence and case law from this Court, the IRB asserted that an "expert opinion can be predicated upon information given to [the expert] prior to the hearing and otherwise inadmissible evidence if it is 'of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions.'" (Zahner Letter at 2 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 703; Investigations Officer v. Senese, IA Decision at 23 (July 12, 1990), aff'd, United States v. IBT, 745 F. Supp. 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 941 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1091 (1992)).) Finally, both letters asserted that the evidence presented at Cammarano's hearing fully supported the IRB Opinion and Decision and that the IRB Opinion and Decision should be affirmed in all respects. (Goldman Letter); (Zahner Letter at 2).
Having carefully reviewed all of the relevant documents in the instant application, this Court finds that the IRB's decision is not arbitrary or capricious. See IRB Rules, P O ("In reviewing actions of the IRB, this Court shall apply the same standard of review applicable to review of final federal agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act."); see also May 6, 1994 Opinion & Order, slip op. at 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). This Court also has reviewed the arguments advanced by the IRB and the office of the United States Attorney in their respective responses to Cammarano's objections. This Court finds that the IRB and the office of the United States Attorney are correct in their assertions that hearsay testimony is admissible at internal union disciplinary proceedings, that expert opinion can be predicated upon information given to an expert prior to a hearing, that if expert opinion is based upon facts or data of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence, and that the IRB's Opinion and Decision is fully supported by the evidence. Finally, this Court has reviewed Camarano's objections and finds that these objections are meritless. Consequently, the decision of the IRB is affirmed in its entirety.
DATED: New York, New York
December 8, 1995
David N. Edelstein