to other locals within AFSCME (more of which appear in plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum of Law at 6-12), along with the locals' alleged lack of AFSCME or CSEA charters, has little bearing on defendant's functions or purposes.
Third, plaintiff argues that under 29 C.F.R. § 451.4(e), defendant became a "subordinate body" when it affiliated with AFSCME and as such, must comply with § 411(a)(3)(A) rather than with § 411(a)(3)(B). As the Court earlier discussed in footnote two, 29 C.F.R. § 451.4(e)-(f) indicate that parent labor organizations may exert control over a variety of "subordinates," including locals and intermediates. The mere fact that one labor organization is subordinate to another does not necessarily mean that the first organization is a local for LMRDA purposes. If it were, § 411(a)(3)(B) would apply only to national and international labor organizations and federations thereof, despite its apparent application to "labor organizations . . . other than  local" as well. Plaintiff's reading of "subordinate" in 29 C.F.R. § 451.4(e) would divide the world of labor organizations into two realms, national and local, and consign all "subordinate" labor organizations to local status. Because of their "subordinate" status, what the statute and regulations now recognize as intermediate bodies (see e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 481(d); 29 C.F.R. § 451.4(f)), would have to comply with the rules for locals set out in 411(a)(3)(A). The Court rejects plaintiff's unrealistic, unsupported, and self-serving interpretation of the C.F.R.
4. Defendant's Argument
Defendant has marshaled facts and law to demonstrate that its functions and purposes are closely aligned with those of intermediate labor organizations. (See D's Mem. Opp. P's Mtn. and Supp. D's Mtn., at 5-16; Donohue Aff. PP 8, 14-15, 41-46, 49 72-86; Weinberg Aff. P 9.) Most importantly, defendant supervises 377 subordinate private and public sector locals comprising 1,1014 units, many of which administer collective bargaining agreements and handle the initial stages of grievances. Together, defendant and its locals and units are parties to collective bargaining agreements with over 900 different employers. Unlike local labor organizations, defendant holds delegates' meetings, but does not hold membership meetings. For some or all of these reasons, among others, the Department of Labor refers to defendant as an intermediate labor organization. (See. e.g., Hoffman Aff. Ex. B., P IV.) The need to delve further into defendant's functions and purposes is obviated by plaintiff's numerous admissions that defendant functions as an intermediate labor organization. (See Am. Compl. PP 18, 19, 24; P's Supp. Mem. Supp. P's Mtn. and Opp. D's Mtn., at 5; 16-17.)
There is no real dispute that defendant functions as an intermediate labor organization and has purposes similar to those of an intermediate. Applying the Secretary of Labor's test for distinguishing between locals and intermediates, therefore, plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue with respect to the material fact of whether defendant qualifies as anything other than an intermediate labor organization for purposes of § 411(a)(3)(A). His underlying claim, to which he devotes sizeable portions of his amended complaint, affidavits, and memoranda of law, is that defendant improperly achieved its status as an intermediate labor organization. Whether defendant achieved its intermediate status, operates as an intermediate labor organization, or manages its locals in violation of AFSCME's or defendant's constitution and bylaws is not for this Court to decide. These are matters for the locals, defendant, and AFSCME to settle for themselves. Gurton, 339 F.2d at 375 (stating that "the provisions of the L.M.R.D.A. were not intended by Congress to constitute an invitation to the courts to intervene at will in the internal affairs of unions," and reflecting judicial policy of leaving administration of union affairs to elected union officials, "except in the very limited instances expressly provided by the Act"); see also Nienaber v. Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council, 652 F.2d 1284, 1286 (6th Cir. 1981) (stating that § 411's equal rights provision "was not designed to grant federal courts 'jurisdiction to enforce union constitutions and by-laws across the board'") (citing Bunz v. Moving Picture Mach. Operators' Protective Union, 186 U.S. App. D.C. 124, 567 F.2d 1117, 1121 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). If they cannot agree, then perhaps plaintiff can bring an action in state court, but as long as defendant has not violated its members' federal statutory rights, the Court has no role to play in settling the parties' dispute over internal union affairs.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT
Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's § 411(a)(1) claim Is GRANTED;
Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's § 411(a)(3) claim is GRANTED;
Plaintiff's motions for a preliminary injunction and consolidation are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated January 31, 1996
at Binghamton, New York
Thomas J. McAvoy