from the information currently before this court, however, and we decline to dismiss him from this action before plaintiff has had the opportunity to take any discovery.
We will, however, dismiss defendants Magarelli and Dunne at this time. Magarelli is TCI-Westchester's Marketing Manager, and Dunne is an administrative assistant at its office in Mamaroneck. See id., at PP 22, 23. It is clear from the nature of their positions that neither of these defendants has any decisionmaking authority with respect to channel allocation.
B. Insufficiency of Process and Service of Process
All of the defendants, except TCI-Westchester, Wicker and Sullivan, have moved to dismiss on the grounds of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process. Defendants contend that only Wicker, Sullivan and TCI-Westchester have been served with a copy of the summons and complaint, while the other defendants have received only a copy of the order to show cause that set the January 23, 1996, conference date and an incomplete copy of plaintiff's affidavit and memorandum of law in support of her motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. See Wiles Aff., at PP 3-8 & Exhibit A.
Defendants raised this issue at the conference we held on January 23. At that time, in light of plaintiff's pro se status, and her diligent, although apparently not entirely successful, attempts to effect proper service, we stated that we considered any defects in service to be remediable.
As the time limit prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) has not yet expired, plaintiff may cure any defects in service by the simple expedient of serving a copy of the summons and complaint on any remaining defendant who has not previously been properly served. In this connection, we direct plaintiff's attention to the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, and in particular to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c). We also direct plaintiff's attention to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d), under which she may opt to mail a copy of the complaint to each of the defendants, along with a request for a waiver of service of the summons. If, at the expiration of the period prescribed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), it appears that plaintiff has not properly served any defendant, that defendant may renew his motion.
C. Personal Jurisdiction
A number of individual defendants have also moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We have dismissed all of the defendants, except Marshall and Brown, to whom this argument applies on the ground that they were misjoined in this action. Hence, we need address defendants' arguments on this point only to the extent that they relate to Marshall and Brown.
Defendants contend that Marshall and Brown are not New York residents and are not subject to personal jurisdiction under New York's long-arm statute. That statute provides that individual defendants may be subject to personal jurisdiction in New York if they conducted purposeful activity in New York that bears a substantial relationship to the transaction that gave rise to the cause of action set forth in the complaint, see N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 302 (a)(1); McGowan v. Smith, 52 N.Y.2d 268, 437 N.Y.S.2d 643, 645, 419 N.E.2d 321 (N.Y. 1981), or if they do business in New York. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 301; Laufer v. Ostrow, 55 N.Y.2d 305, 449 N.Y.S.2d 456, 460-61, 434 N.E.2d 692 (N.Y. 1982); Lancaster v. Colonial Motor Freight Line, Inc., 177 A.D.2d 152, 581 N.Y.S.2d 283, 288 (App. Div. 1992) (citing ABKCO Indus., Inc. v. Lennon, 52 A.D.2d 435, 384 N.Y.S.2d 781, 783-84 (App. Div. 1976)); 1 Jack B. Weinstein et al., New York Civil Practice P 301.15, at 3-30 & n. 93 (1994).
While we doubt that Marshall and Brown are engaged in a sufficiently "continuous and systematic course of activity" that they may be deemed to be doing business in New York, see Wiles Aff., at PP 15, 19; Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1991), it is possible that one or both of them may have been involved in making the decision to reallocate Channel 8. Plaintiff is entitled to discovery to attempt to demonstrate any such involvement in the events that gave rise to her claims. If, however, discovery does not reveal a basis for personal jurisdiction over these defendants, they may renew their motion.
II. Plaintiff's Applications
Plaintiff has requested sanctions against defendants, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, for making the instant motion. As it is abundantly clear that defendants' motion was neither frivolous nor made for any improper purpose, we deny plaintiff's request.
B. Application Under Local Rule 2
Pursuant to Local Rule 2, plaintiff has requested that this court order defendants to provide her with a list of defendants' home addresses. Local Rule 2 states that:
A party shall furnish to any other party, within five (5) days after a demand, a verified statement setting forth said party's post office address and residence . . . . Upon non-compliance with the demand, the court, on ex parte application, shall order the furnishing of the statement . . . ."
Glendora's application does not state whether she has requested this information from the defendants or whether they have failed to comply with that request. Nevertheless, in the interests of efficiency and given that plaintiff is clearly entitled to the information that she seeks, we hereby order defendants to furnish to plaintiff, within 10 days of the date of this order, the post office address and residence of each of the remaining defendants.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, defendants TCI, Malone, Bob Magness, Cloustan, Thomson, Fisher, Gallivan, Kim Magness, Naify, O'Brien, Magarelli and Dunne are hereby dismissed from this action. Plaintiff's application for Rule 11 sanctions is denied, and her application under Local Rule 2 is granted with respect to those defendants not dismissed from this action by this order.
Date: February 26, 1996
White Plains, New York
William C. Conner
Senior United States District Judge