S. Ct. 1011 (1970) (hearing required before termination of welfare benefits, since termination pending resolution of controversy over eligibility could deprive eligible recipient of means to live while awaiting decision). Rather, plaintiff is simply challenging Congress's decision to make him ineligible for funds. That decision does not trigger any procedural due process rights. From a procedural standpoint, then, plaintiff has no more rights than he would if Congress eliminated the Pell Grant program altogether, which it could if it chose to do so.
Nor has plaintiff stated a substantive due process claim. The standard for analyzing this cause of action is the same as that applied to the equal-protection claim. Pace, 585 F. Supp. at 402. Accordingly, it fails for the same reasons.
In Flemming, the Supreme Court stated that "particularly when we deal with a withholding of a noncontractual benefit under a social welfare program such as this, we must recognize that the Due Process Clause can be thought to interpose a bar only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification." 363 U.S. at 611. See also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768, 45 L. Ed. 2d 522, 95 S. Ct. 2457 (1975). If the statute's goals are legitimate and the classification adopted is rationally related to achieving those goals, the classification is not arbitrary. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 769.
As explained in connection with plaintiff's equal-protection claim, the statute here meets that test. The Act is related to achieving a number of valid goals, and therefore it does not violate plaintiff's right to substantive due process. Nicholas, 874 F. Supp. at 14.
IV. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In his fourth cause of action, plaintiff asserts that the Violent Crime Control Act's denial of Pell Grants constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff contends that he has a particularly great need for education because he is socially and economically disadvantaged, and because the Parole Board will take his educational accomplishments into account in deciding whether he should be granted parole.
This claim fails for a simple reason: as already explained in the discussion of plaintiff's ex post facto argument, the denial of Pell Grant funds is not punishment at all, much less cruel and unusual punishment. See Pace, 585 F. Supp. at 402 (having determined that denial of Social Security benefits was not punishment for ex post facto purposes, court could not say that denial violated Eighth Amendment). In short, the denial of funds for education falls far short of the egregious type of conduct needed to establish an Eighth Amendment claim. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59, 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981) (delayed access to educational programs is "simply not punishment"); Termunde v. Cook, 684 F. Supp. 255, 259 (D.Utah 1988) ("Courts have not accepted the claim that an inmate has a constitutional right to any educational ... programs ...").
V. Plaintiff's Motions
Plaintiff has filed several motions, all of which are denied. His motion for oral argument of both sides' motions is denied because based on the record before me, I see no need to hear oral argument.
In light of my conclusion that plaintiff has not stated a claim in any of his causes of action, it is obvious that he is not entitled to a preliminary injunction. His motion for an injunction is therefore denied.
Plaintiff also moves to amend the complaint. Plaintiff states that he "only wishes to correct technical errors" in the complaint, however, see Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of His Motions at 6, and the proposed changes would not affect the outcome of this case. This motion is also denied.
Plaintiff requests the court to order the United States Government to release all "congressional records, in the form of minutes," pertaining to the Violent Crime Control Act's denial of Pell Grants to prisoners. Assuming that plaintiff is referring to the Congressional Record, that is a public document, and plaintiff has not shown that he has made any attempts to obtain it through administrative channels at the facility where he is incarcerated. Plaintiff has also failed to show the need for these records. As stated, the constitutionality of the statute is not dependent upon, or affected by, statements that members of Congress may have made concerning its purpose.
Lastly, plaintiff moves to certify a nationwide class composed of all prisoners who would be eligible for Pell Grants were it not for the Violent Crime Control Act. Although my dismissal of the complaint renders this motion moot, I would deny the motion in any event. In seeking to certify a class action, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the action satisfies the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 40 L. Ed. 2d 732, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974). Plaintiff has failed to do so here. His representations concerning the nature and size of the class are conclusory, and he has not demonstrated the need to maintain this case as a class action.
Moreover, the Second Circuit has held that a district court may deny a motion to certify a class where the prospective benefits of declaratory and injunctive relief would benefit all members of proposed class to such an extent that class certification would not further implementation of the judgment. Davis v. Smith, 607 F.2d 535, 540 (2d Cir. 1978). The archetype for application of this so-called "non-necessity" doctrine is an action seeking declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials on the ground that a statute or administrative practice is unconstitutional. Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936, 41 L. Ed. 2d 240, 94 S. Ct. 2652 (1974). Thus, class certification is not warranted in this action.
Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Item 18) is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
Plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction (Item 3), for class certification (Item 10), and for oral argument (Item 22) are denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DAVID G. LARIMER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Dated: Rochester, New York
March 6, 1996.