The opinion of the court was delivered by: CONNER
Plaintiff Lorraine Storr ("Storr") brings this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3 and e-5 ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215 and 626(c) (the "ADEA"), section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, and New York Executive Law § 297. Plaintiff asserts claims for sexual harassment, sex discrimination and age discrimination against her former employer, the Anderson School (the "Anderson School," or the "School"), and against William Doyle ("Doyle"), an employee of the School and a supervisor of plaintiff during times relevant to this case. The case presently is before the court on defendant Doyle's motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the ground that a supervisor cannot be found individually liable under Title VII or the ADEA. For reasons discussed below, defendant Doyle's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
Storr, a fifty-five year old woman, worked for the Anderson School, a New York State funded special educational school, for six years as a cook, and on occasion as a child care worker. Storr was employed in an Intermediate Care Facility for developmentally disabled, primarily autistic children. Storr was terminated from employment at the School in April 1994. Defendant Doyle supervised the Intermediate Care Facility at which Storr was employed at the time of her termination.
On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), we accept as true all allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974); Ortiz v. Cornetta, 867 F.2d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 1989). A complaint should not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957).
I. Title VII and the ADEA
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination based upon sex by an "employer." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Similarly, the ADEA applies to discriminatory actions based on age by an "employer." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). Under Title VII:
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such person.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
Defendant Doyle argues that the plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because individuals do not qualify as employers under this statutory definition. Plaintiff, on the other hand, urges this court to accept the "plain meaning" of the statutory language in concluding that Doyle, as an agent of the School, is an "employer" within the meaning of the Act. See Goodstein v. Bombardier Capital, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 760 (D. Vt. 1995) (Parker, J.):
Because the statute speaks with such clarity there is no need to look beyond the statutory language in an attempt to divine Congressional intent. . . . The statute means what it says. Both employers of 15 or more persons and ...