of the Union." Lofton v. United States Postal Serv., 592 F. Supp. 36, 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Article V, § 4 of the collective bargaining agreement explicitly provides that "All union claims are brought by the Union alone and no individual shall have the right to compromise or settle any claim without the written permission of the Union." Thus, Hogan lacks standing to assert a claim to vacate the arbitrator's award. Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss Hogan's request to vacate the arbitrator's award is granted.
Hogan's final allegation was that he was discharged because of his religion or ethnicity, in violation of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 et seq. Hogan does not allege that he filed a claim of discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") or the New York State Division of Human Rights, and the defendants allege without contradiction that Hogan did not. In New York, a plaintiff must file an employment discrimination claim first with the EEOC and the New York State Division of Human Rights before pursuing a claim under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); Gomes v. Avco Corp., 964 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (2d Cir. 1992); Kirkland v. Bianco, 595 F. Supp. 797, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Plaintiffs must also receive a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC to proceed with a Title VII claim in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1); Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149, 80 L. Ed. 2d 196, 104 S. Ct. 1723 (1983).
While filing with the EEOC or the state agency is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, timely filing is a "requirement that, like the statue of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling." Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 71 L. Ed. 2d 234, 102 S. Ct. 1127 (1982); Kirkland v. Bianco, 595 F. Supp. at 798-99 & n.2; Hladki v. Jeffrey's Consol. Ltd., 652 F. Supp. 388, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). Zipes does not stand for the proposition, however, that a plaintiff bringing a Title VII claim need not comply with the provision's requirements. Baldwin County Welcome Ctr., 466 U.S. at 152 n.6. In the absence of such a requirement, a plaintiff could circumvent Congress' administrative scheme which was created to facilitate efficient processing of Title VII claims. Moche v. City Univ. of New York, 781 F. Supp. 160, 167 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44, 39 L. Ed. 2d 147, 94 S. Ct. 1011 (1974)). Consequently, courts within this Circuit have been "reluctant to hear claims that were not originally filed with the EEOC." See, e.g., Moche, 781 F. Supp. at 167; Dennis v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 288, 290 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); Littman v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 709 F. Supp. 461, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); McPartland v. American Broadcasting Cos., 623 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Without providing reasons that would trigger equitable modification of the statutory requirement to file a claim with the EEOC and obtain a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, a plaintiff cannot state a Title VII claim in federal court unless the plaintiff has filed a claim with the EEOC.
Hogan has not filed a claim with the EEOC, nor received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, nor has he alleged that he is entitled to equitable modification of these requirements or presented any facts that could justify such a modification. Accordingly, Hogan's claim under Title VII is dismissed.
The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied. The defendants' cross-motions for summary judgment are granted. The clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing the complaint and closing this case.
Dated: New York, New York
March 29, 1996
John G. Koeltl
United States District Judge