adapt to her environment. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924d(h)(5). I uphold the ALJ's findings that Tammy's impairments in this domain were "less than moderate."
Finally, as noted, while there was some evidence that Tammy has a short attention span, becomes easily distracted, and needs additional time to complete certain tests, other evidence suggests that her attention and concentration are normal except with respect to her abuse experience, and that Tammy has no trouble being by herself and doing things requiring attention and concentration. See Ex. 29, Dep't of Social Services Psychologist Report. Accordingly, the evidence supports a finding that Tammy's impairment in this domain was "less than moderate." And even if this impairment were considered "moderate" as opposed to "less than moderate", that alone would be insufficient to change the outcome of the IFA. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924e(c)(2)(i), (ii).
Thus, I find the ALJ's decision that Tammy did not suffer an impairment of comparable severity to an impairment that would disable an adult, to be substantially supported by the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. 416.924(f).
(iv) Relevant Evidence
In her opposition to the Commissioner's motion, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's decision is based upon errors of law because the ALJ failed to consider Tammy's parent's testimony as medical evidence, failed to consider all the medical evidence, failed to consider Tammy's mother's testimony with respect to the IFA analysis, and failed to render his decision based upon the record as a whole.
Plaintiff's allegations are broad and conclusory. She offers no specific testimony or evidence which she believes that the ALJ overlooked and should have considered.
I find these arguments entirely without merit. The ALJ's decision is well supported with numerous references to the entire record, including medical evidence and testimony. I find no meaningful gaps in the ALJ's reasoning. Thus, I find no error of law.
v) New and Material Evidence
Finally, plaintiff asserts that this matter should be remanded so that the ALJ can consider new and material evidence. Specifically, plaintiff has attached to her complaint certain documents relative to a Family Court program known as "Persons in Need of Supervision" ("PINS"). See Family Court Act § 711, et seq. These documents indicate that on March 30, 1994, Tammy's mother sought and was granted assistance from the Family Court regarding Tammy's "incorrigibility/ungovernability." The documents indicate that the PINS Adjustment Program would run from May 1994 until the end of September 1994, during which time Tammy and her parents would apparently work together with the assistance of a case worker, toward some new behavioral goals for Tammy.
The Social Security Act provides that a court may remand a case to the Secretary to consider additional evidence, "only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Second Circuit has further refined this standard with the following guidelines. An appellant must show that the proffered evidence is (1) new and not merely cumulative of what is already in the record; that it is (2) material, that is, both relevant to the claimant's condition during the time period for which benefits were denied and probative; and (3) must demonstrate good cause for the failure to present the evidence earlier. See Jones v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
I find that the evidence submitted by plaintiff fails to meet the standards set forth in Jones. First, it does not appear relevant to Tammy's condition during the time period for which benefits were denied. The initial request for PINS assistance was made on March 30, 1994, roughly six months after the hearing on plaintiff's application for SSI benefits (which was held on September 1993).
Moreover, the information is not probative. The PINS documents appear to indicate that Tammy's relationship with her parents deteriorated considerably from the time plaintiff first applied for SSI benefits. However, these PINS documents (which contain very little information about the reasons underlying plaintiff's request) do not appear relevant to Tammy's asthma, allergies, learning disability, or even post-traumatic stress disorder. Thus, while they may indicate some area of conflict with her parents, they are not relevant to the plaintiff's 1992 application.
For all the above reasons, the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings (# 7) is hereby GRANTED. The Commisioner's decision is affirmed and plaintiff's complaint dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DAVID G. LARIMER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Dated: Rochester, New York
April 22, 1996.