The opinion of the court was delivered by: TRAGER
Plaintiffs have moved for an amendment of the judgment and for leave to amend their complaint deleting reference to the Commissione Del Fallimento/Interchange Bank and the Ufficio Di Esecuzione E Fallimenti/Interchange bank while adding each individual commissioner who worked on the liquidation of Inter Change Bank and the Canton of Ticino as defendants. Defendants oppose the motion and again request Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiff.
In January 1996, defendants brought this action against plaintiffs requesting this court to vacate a $ 125,444,300,221 default judgment entered in state court and dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and other grounds. In February 1996, this court vacated the default judgment. See Order, dated 3/28/96. In April 1996, this court granted defendant's motion to dismiss and denied plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint finding that subject matter jurisdiction against plaintiffs, both named and proposed in the amended complaint, was lacking pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA). See Memorandum and Order, dated 4/16/96. The focus of the plaintiffs' complaint was that they had allegedly deposited $ 600,000 into a trust account in 1966 which would have grown to $ 125,444,300,221. However, when the bank went bankrupt and liquidated its assets, the plaintiffs did not receive anything. Thus, "plaintiffs allege that the Commission[e] misplaced, stole, or otherwise misappropriated the trust assets." Pltff Mem. at 3. In the proposed amended complaint, plaintiffs added the six individual commissioners who served on the Commissione during the course of ICB's liquidation as well as the Canton of Ticino. See Proposed Amended Complaint. According to plaintiffs, "by stealing the trust assets, [these individuals] exceeded the scope of their authority as members of the Commission[e]." Pltff Mem. at 3.
Plaintiffs now maintain that with the deletion of the two entities, the immunity which barred the action no longer applies. Consequently, plaintiffs request the court to amend the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
In any event, the Canton would certainly be immune from suit in United States' courts pursuant to the FSIA. As discussed in the prior Memorandum and Order, the FSIA provides the sole basis for subject matter jurisdiction in the United States courts against a foreign sovereign or its agent or instrumentality. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439, 102 L. Ed. 2d 818, 109 S. Ct. 683 (1989). As no specified exemption applies to the Canton of Ticino, it could not be sued in United States courts.
The FSIA applies to individuals acting in their official capacity even if specific acts taken in that capacity are alleged to be negligent or intentional. See Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990); Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Plaintiffs have not stated with particularity any facts which support their contention that the proposed individual defendants failed to produce the trust's property when it was allegedly demanded and conspired not to do so. Moreover, plaintiffs cite two cases, Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1470 (9th Cir. 1994); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 174 (D. Mass. 1995), to support their position that individuals engaging in activities within the scope of their authority are not entitled to the FSIA immunity. These cases, however, involve persons who although they may be acting within the scope of their authority, are alleged to have committed acts of torture and murder which are violations of international norms. In these situations, courts have not only found exceptions to the FSIA, but also base jurisdiction on the Alien Tort Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350,
and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat.78, see S. Rep. No. 249, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86.
Thus, the Alien Tort Act creates a cause of action for violations of specific, universal and obligatory international human rights standards which confer fundamental rights upon all people vis-avis their own governments." Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 at 1475, citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885-87 (2d Cir. 1980). These cases have no applicability to the issues involved here. The FSIA denies jurisdiction to this court for any acts the individual commissioners undertook to meet their official duty to liquidate the bank.
Assuming, however, that the individual commissioners committed the acts alleged and, in so doing, were acting beyond the scope of their authority, there still is no reason to amend the judgment and permit the action to go forward against the individual defendants as in personam jurisdiction is lacking over these individuals. None of the actions which these individuals are alleged to have taken, whether it be the misappropriation of funds or the conspiracy, occurred in the United States. All of these acts would have occurred in Switzerland.
Thus, plaintiffs have not alleged, nor can they allege "minimum contacts" between the United States, not to mention the Eastern District of New York, and the individual commissioners. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 90 L. Ed. 95, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945). Plaintiffs' earlier brief implies that because they are domiciled in the United States and "felt" an economic loss in the United States, personal jurisdiction can be established. However, the inquiry into personal jurisdiction, as distinguished from subject matter jurisdiction, must focus on defendants' contacts with the forum and not plaintiffs' contacts. Ginter v. Swedish Match A.B., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS ...