Q. Mr. Leslie, why do you believe that your termination was because of your race?
A. Well, I feel my race had a lot to do with the termination because of previous happenings within the company.
Q. What were those previous happenings?
A. . . . the way the promotions were handled . . . and how duties were handled.
Q. Anything else?
Q. . . . I am trying to find out what about promotions and positions given out caused you to believe you were terminated because of your race?
A. [A white worker was having problems and I believe they were trying to get him in a safe spot so they could] secure a position for him and get rid of me. . . . [The white employee, Claude Sitbon, was having problems, including complaints from customers, and my supervisors attempted to get us to switch shifts] . . . . [Roy Stoeckel, the supervisor,] just asked me if I would like to work on Claude's shift.
Q. What did you say?
A. I told him yes, I would. . . .
(Pl.'s Dep. at 55-58.)
Q. [Was there anything else that made you think you were terminated based on your race?]
A. Well, I just feel I was discriminated because of how the whole situation was handled. Claude was promoted, he is being promoted, I think he is being pushed. He has worked for the company less time than I have and he has been promoted to a senior CE at a faster rate. . . . I don't think I said I was discharged because of my race, but I had said I think I was discharged because of a false drug test, that's the reason for being discharged, not solely because of my race.
Q. Well, was the false drug test manufactured because of your race?
A. Yes, I feel that way.
Q. Why, what causes you to believe that a false drug test was manufactured because of your race?
A. Because I was terminated for using drugs. I don't use drugs.
Q. Any other reason that you believe that was because of your race?
A. Well, within the company, I feel that they don't put blacks into -- blacks don't get a chance to move into senior positions in terms of being managers. I don't see a lot of that happening in the company in terms of getting senior positions.
(Pl.'s Dep. at 63-65.)
Q. [Anything else?]
A. Well, I get a feeling that -- I feel that BancTec prefers to have white people represent them or a white co-worker to be more representative of them.
(Pl.'s Dep. at 66.)
Q. Did Mr. Stoeckel say anything to you that indicated that he wanted you to move to a shift because of your race?
A. Because of my race, no, he didn't say that.
Q. Did he ever say anything to you that caused you to believe that he would want to fire you because you are black?
Q. Did anyone in management ever say anything to you that indicated they wanted to fire you or mistreat you because of your race?
(Pl.'s Dep. at 67-68.)
Q. . . . What information do you have that indicates that a false drug test was manufactured?
A. Well, the only information is that I know I don't smoke so I don't know how it could come up with a positive drug test.
Q. Other than that, do you have any other information?
(Pl.'s Dep. at 81-82.)
Although not forcefully argued by the Plaintiff, these are the only statements that could possibly support his claim that Defendant's reason for termination was based on race.
However, Plaintiff's statements are simply conclusory allegations unsupported any where in the record. There is no evidence from which the Court can draw an inference of discrimination. Plaintiff's statement are based on his feelings alone; and although they may be valid, they are insufficient to satisfy the requirement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Plaintiff has failed therefore to prove a prima facie case.
Furthermore, assuming arguendo the Plaintiff had established a prima facie case,
the Defendant argues Plaintiff was terminated pursuant to Defendant's Drug Policy, because he tested positive for marijuana on a random drug test. The Second Circuit held that summary judgment in a Title VII case is warranted where the plaintiff can supply no evidence that his employer's justification was a pretext. Smith, 853 F.2d at 154.
Plaintiff has failed to discount the Defendant's reason for firing him; he has failed to supply any evidence to support a finding that his employer's justification for terminating him is merely a pretext for discrimination. Plaintiff does not deny there was a drug test or that he was aware of the policy, (Pl.'s Dep. at 12-13); instead, Plaintiff alleges that a second confirmatory test was not done in accordance with the Defendant's policy. However, the Plaintiff is mistaken because the second gas chromatography/mass spectrometry test did occur. (MacFarlane Aff. Attachment F; Mills Aff. P 8.)
Other than this allegation, Plaintiff denies that he uses or used drugs, that in the past he tested negative on a drug test, and that there may have been problems with the way the test was conducted. (Pl.'s Dep. at 82; see Pl.'s Dep. at 32 ("Q. Is there any legitimate medical reason for you to fail the drug test that you know of? A. No, no reason to fail the drug test.") However, Plaintiff offers no evidence to support his contention. Again, these allegations are insufficient to satisfy the requirement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Furthermore, as will be shown, none of the following acts support Plaintiff's claim of discriminatory termination.
b. Defendant Harassed Plaintiff