the objections he submitted to this Court. (Simpson's Objections at 62.) Accordingly, this Court finds that the IRB is not a state actor. Without state action, Simpson's First and Fifth Amendment claims must fail.
2. Substantive Constitutional Rights.
Even if this Court were to assume arguendo that the IRB's conduct constituted state action, Simpson's constitutional claims are meritless.
a. First Amendment.
As previously discussed, Simpson maintains that the IRB Opinion and Decision violates his right to free speech and association guaranteed under the First Amendment. (Simpson's Objections at 65.) Simpson's First Amendment claims are meritless for two reasons.
First, the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2), statutorily curtails the First Amendment rights of union members in the context of union-related activities. LMRDA section 101(a)(2) guarantees members of labor organizations "the right to meet and assemble freely with other members." 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2). This right is not absolute, however, because section 101(a)(2) specifically reserves for labor unions the right to "enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibilities of every member toward the organization as an institution," and to sanction its members for "conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations." 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2); see United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters [Friedman], 838 F. Supp. 800, 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters [Senese & Talerico], 745 F. Supp. 908, 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 941 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1991).
Under the Consent Decree, "it is imperative that the IBT, as the largest trade union in the free world, be maintained democratically, with integrity and for the sole benefit of its members and without unlawful outside influence." (Consent Decree at 2.) Toward this goal, the IBT has adopted standards, rules, and procedures for investigating and sanctioning IBT members who fail to uphold their membership responsibilities. Id. at 7-27; IRB Rules Decision, 803 F. Supp. at 800-05. These standards, rules, and procedures all were established with this Court's approval. See IRB Rules Decision, 803 F. Supp. at 799-800; (Consent Decree at 28.)
In its Opinion and Decision, the IRB found that various discussions and meetings involving Simpson and Peters violated Peters's consent decree, the IBT Constitution, and Simpson's duties as an officer of Local 743. (IRB Opinion and Decision at 29, 37.) The IRB also found that Simpson repeatedly placed his own personal interests ahead of Local 743 interests. Id. at 37. In light of these findings, the IRB concluded that Simpson "interfered with the Local's legal obligations by allowing Peters to act as a representative and agent of the Local and its Funds in violation of Peters's court approved settlement agreement," and that this conduct violated Article II, section 2(a) and the Article XIX, section 7(b)(1) and (b)(5) of the IBT Constitution. Id. at 29. The IRB sanctioned Simpson accordingly. Id. at 37.
The IRB's actions in this case were undertaken in furtherance of the IBT's stated goal of maintaining its operations "with integrity and for the sole benefit of its members." (Consent Decree at 2); (IRB Rules P A(4).) They comport with the standards, rules, and procedures for investigating and sanctioning Union members that the IBT adopted and that this Court approved. See generally, (Consent Decree at 19-23); (IRB Rules.) Although the sanctions the IRB imposed on Simpson were based in part on Simpson's contact and association with Peters, the sanctions were valid because they sought to enforce Simpson's "responsibilities toward the organization as an institution," and to punish "conduct that . . . interfered with [the union's] performance of its legal or contractual obligations." 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2). As this Court has stated previously, "the IBT's sanctioning members in order to rid itself of corrupt influence conforms with [ 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(2)], and infringes no First Amendment rights." Friedman, 838 F. Supp. at 812 (quotation omitted); see also Turner v. Air Transport Lodge 1894, 590 F.2d 409, 412 (2d Cir. 1978) (Mulligan., J. concurring), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919, 61 L. Ed. 2d 286, 99 S. Ct. 2841 (1979).
Second, "it is well established that an individual's right to freedom of association may be curtailed to further significant governmental interests." Senese & Talerico, 941 F.2d at 1297; see also United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 567, 37 L. Ed. 2d 796, 93 S. Ct. 2880 (1973). The public has a compelling interest in eliminating the "public evils of crime, corruption, and racketeering" in union activity. Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 508, 82 L. Ed. 2d 373, 104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984) (internal quotations omitted). The IRB's investigation and sanction of Simpson advances the IBT's goal of maintaining the integrity of its operations, (Consent Decree at 2), by removing from the Union members who ignore Union rules. The IRB's actions also serve the public interest by curtailing the actions of Union members who perpetuate corruption in the nation's largest union. Consequently, the IRB was fully justified in sanctioning Simpson for his repeated contacts with Peters in violation of Peters's consent decree, the IBT Constitution, and Simpson's duties as an officer of Local 743. Because the sanction that the IRB imposed on Simpson comports with section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA, and serves the public interest, it is not constitutionally infirm. Accordingly, Simpson's First Amendment claims are without merit.
b. Fifth Amendment.
In addition to his First Amendment claims, Simpson contends that the IRB's actions in this case violate his right to Due Process under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. All of the bases that Simpson advances in support of this contention are meritless.
Simpson alleges that the IRB convicted him of uncharged crimes in violation of the Fifth Amendment's requirement that Simpson receive notice of the charges levelled against him. (Simpson's Objections at 68.) As previously discussed, however, the IRB did not convict Simpson of uncharged crimes. On the contrary, as this Court already has found, the IRB notified Simpson of the charges against him, held a hearing regarding these charges, and concluded that the evidence supported these charges. Accordingly, this Court finds that the findings contained in the IRB Opinion and Decision are constitutionally sound.
Simpson further maintains that the IRB unconstitutionally denied him adequate notice of the charges against him, an opportunity to prepare and present a defense to these charges, and a full and fair hearing on these charges. The United States Constitution, however, does not protect the procedural rights of union members who are subject to internal union disciplinary action. Instead, the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act prescribes the safeguards to which union members are entitled during the course of internal union disciplinary hearings. 29 U.S.C. § 411. Pursuant to the LMRDA, the charged party in an internal union disciplinary hearing has the right to be "(A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; [and] (C) afforded a full and fair hearing." Id. Because this Court finds that the process that Simpson received during the course of his IRB proceedings--which are internal union disciplinary proceedings--comports with LMRDA standards, this Court rejects each of Simpson's claims to the contrary.
First, this Court finds that Simpson was served with the written, specific charges against him, as well as the evidence underlying these charges. On October 5, 1994, the IRB forwarded to Simpson both the Proposed Charges against Simpson and a copy of the Chief Investigator's exhibits. (Tr. 7-8.) The Proposed Charges set forth the specific IBT Constitutional provisions Simpson was alleged to have violated and the time period in which the allegedly improper conduct took place. In addition, the exhibits detailed the evidence and the background information upon which the Chief Investigator relied in presenting his case to the IRB and the IBT. These documents satisfy, and actually surpass, the LMRDA's requirement that Simpson be served with specific written charges against him.
Second, this Court finds that the IRB provided with Simpson ample opportunity to prepare his defense to the charges against him. As mentioned immediately above, Simpson had over two moths time between the date he was served with the charges and evidence against him, October 4, 1994, and the first day of his disciplinary hearing, December 20, 1994. Moreover, the IRB accommodated scheduling requests from Simpson's attorneys in order to assure that the date of Simpson's hearing was convenient to all parties involved.
Third, this Court finds that the IRB afforded Simpson a full and fair hearing on the charges against him. Simpson's disciplinary hearing lasted two days, during which time Simpson had ample opportunity to introduce any evidence to rebut the charges against him. Simpson took full advantage of this opportunity--of the 504 pages of testimony generated during this hearing, 474 pages are devoted to the testimony of Simpson and his witnesses, and to statements made by Simpson's attorneys. In addition to this live-witness testimony, Simpson offered three volumes of exhibits into evidence at the hearing. Id. at 476.
Moreover, Simpson's attorneys conceded that he and his client received fair treatment from the IRB during the course of the IRB disciplinary hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Lacey asked Simpson's attorneys about the duration and the quality of the hearing. As previously noted, in response to this questioning, one of Simpson's attorneys responded as follows:
We felt no pressure. We understand the procedure and the mechanisms of conducting these hearings.
And we chose not to submit every witness live knowing that the Review Board will review all of the evidence we submit, and we are not suggesting nor do we feel that we've been curtailed in any way whatsoever.