The opinion of the court was delivered by: KOELTL
JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:
The plaintiff Orlando Perez Napoleoni brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was exposed to asbestos while performing on a work detail and that his First Amendment rights were violated when he was transferred to another correctional facility in retaliation for preparing to file this lawsuit. The defendants move for summary judgment dismissing this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. For the reasons that follow, the defendants' motion is granted.
The plaintiff Orlando Perez Napoleoni is an inmate under the custody of the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS"). Defendant Charles Scully is the former superintendent of the Green Haven Correctional Facility ("Green Haven"), and defendant Thomas Coughlin is the former DOCS commissioner. The events alleged in this action occurred while the plaintiff was incarcerated at Green Haven.
When Napoleoni was incarcerated at Green Haven, he performed recycling and maintenance duties at the facility. (Defs.' 3(g) P 2; Napoleoni Dep. at 10, 12.) On December 8, 1992, Napoleoni was on a ladder attempting to fix a roof at the Green Haven's "J School" when "fragments was [sic] hitting me. Dirt, like dust, was hitting me in my head and my hair and in my face." (Defs.' 3(g) P 3; Napoleoni Dep. at 10.) Napoleoni's civilian maintenance supervisor John ,
who was at the scene, told the plaintiff to get down from the ladder. (Defs.' 3(g) P 4; Napoleoni Dep. at 10.) The supervisor went up the ladder and "looked at something on the pipes or something up there." (Defs.' 3(g) P 5; Napoleoni Dep. at 10.) John then told Napoleoni that the substance was falling on him was asbestos. (Defs.' 3(g) P 6; Napoleoni Dep. at 10.) Napoleoni did not know it was asbestos until John told him so. (Defs.' 3(g) P 6; Napoleoni Dep. at 10, 14.) John then immediately told his own supervisor about the asbestos, and Napoleoni never worked on the ceiling tiles again. (Defs.' 3(g) P 12; Napoleoni Dep. at 16, 17.)
Before December 8, 1992, Napoleoni had fixed ceiling tiles "about ten times." (Defs.' 3(g) at 7; Napoleoni Dep. at 12-13.) The ceiling tiles were often broken by the rain and by the police checking for contraband and weapons. (Defs.' 3(g) PP 9, 10; Napoleoni Dep. at 12.) John was the plaintiff's supervisor each time the plaintiff repaired the tiles. Napoleoni claims that prior to December 8, 1992, John was aware that the ceiling tiles contained asbestos. (Napoleoni Affirmation dated Feb. 6, 1996 ("Napoleoni Aff.") P 5.)
On December 10, 1992, Napoleoni was examined at the medical clinic at Green Haven. (Napoleoni Dep. at 19.) Around January 4, 1993, Napoleoni was sent to St. Luke's Hospital for further examination. (Defs.' 3(g) P 14; Napoleoni Dep. at 20-21.) The plaintiff testified at his deposition that the results of this examination were "pretty good. . . . My lungs wasn't that bad." (Defs.' 3(g) P 15; Napoleoni Dep. at 21-22.) The plaintiff does not claim that he is currently suffering from any medical problems as a result of his exposure to asbestos, but argues that the effects of this exposure may not be known for quite some time. (Napoleoni Aff. P 6.)
There is no evidence indicating that defendants Coughlin or Scully directly assigned Napoleoni to repair ceiling tiles. (Defs.' 3(g) PP 18, 20.) Napoleoni alleges, however, that these defendants knew that Green Haven had an asbestos problem because prior to the December 8, 1992 incident, Green Haven had established a training program in which an outside civilian taught a class of inmates how to remove asbestos safely. (Defs.' 3(g) P 17; Napoleoni Dep. at 23-25.) There is no evidence, however, that any asbestos was ever removed from Green Haven prior to the plaintiff's transfer from that facility. (Napoleoni Dep. at 25.)
Napoleoni was transferred from Green Haven to the Mid-Orange Correctional Facility shortly after the December 8, 1992 incident but before he filed a complaint to commence this lawsuit. (Defs.' 3(g) P 21; Napoleoni Dep. at 27-28.) The plaintiff claims that Scully was aware that he was planning to file this lawsuit because "there was real, real little that that man didn't know." (Defs.' 3(g) P 22; Napoleoni Dep. at 30.) Napoleoni claims that the unusual timing of his transfer makes him suspect that he was transferred in retaliation for filing this complaint. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that "they packed me up on the 5th, a Sunday which is rarely heard of, and they moved me on a Monday at 5:30 in the morning to Downstate Corr. Fac. and then from there to Mid-Orange Corr. Fac." (Defs.' 3(g) P 23; Napoleoni Letter dated Nov. 15, 1995 ("Ltr.") P 11.) Napoleoni does not claim that Coughlin was at all involved in this transfer. (Defs.' 3(g) P 24; Napoleoni Dep. at 29.)
Summary judgment may not be granted unless "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. Partnership, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Antis. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176, 82 S. Ct. 993 (1962)); see also Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1223. Summary judgment is improper if there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994). "In considering the motion, the court's responsibility is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether their are factual issues to be tried." Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932, 94 L. Ed. 2d 762, 107 S. Ct. 1570 (1987). Because the plaintiff appears pro se, the complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 97 S. Ct. 285 (1976); Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 160 (2d Cir. 1984).
On a motion for summary judgment, once the moving party meets its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts to show there is a factual question that must be resolved at trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Cornett v. Sheldon, 894 F. Supp. 715, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("The plaintiff, to avoid summary judgment, must show a genuine issue by presenting evidence that would be sufficient, if all reasonable inferences were drawn in his favor, to establish the existence of that element at trial." (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23)). A plaintiff must produce evidence in the record and "may not rely simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that the affidavits ...