The opinion of the court was delivered by: PARKER
This action for violations of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq., and the New York Human Rights Law ("HRL"), N.Y.Exec.Law § 290 et seq., is before this Court on the defendants' partial motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In her complaint, plaintiff Lisa Michele Johnson alleges that defendant A.P. Products, Ltd.
employed her as a warehouse clerk in April of 1994. In mid-1995, Johnson claims she became pregnant. She alleges that, during the course of her pregnancy, she suffered complications such that she was temporarily unable to work. According to Johnson, after informing A.P. Products on several occasions that she was suffering from complications arising from her pregnancy, defendant Eleanor Osborn, A.P. Products' manager of human resources, terminated her on October 3, 1995.
Defendants now move to dismiss (1) Johnson's ADA claim on the grounds that pregnancy and related medical conditions are not disabilities under the ADA; and (2) Johnson's FMLA claim on the ground that Johnson was not entitled to the protections of the FMLA at the time she was terminated. Defendants also move to dismiss all the claims against Osborn to the extent she is sued in her individual capacity.
Because the purpose of a motion to dismiss is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof, see Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1980), a plaintiff need not come forward with proof of its allegations.
A plaintiff must, however, allege facts that taken as true constitute a claim. "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957)(footnote omitted).
The ADA provides that no employer "shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12112. Under the ADA, a "disability" is defined as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The complaint alleges that Johnson was pregnant and temporarily suffered complications during her pregnancy.
Courts have held, however, that pregnancy and related medical conditions are not disabilities under the ADA. See, e.g., Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 473 (D. Kansas 1996); Villarreal v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Tsetseranos v. Tech Prototype, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 109, 119 (D.N.H. 1995); Byerly v. Herr Foods, Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4253, *11 1993 WL 101196 (E.D.Pa. 1993).
These courts based their conclusion in part on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") regulations stating that "conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not the result of a physiological disorder are not impairment," 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(h), and that "temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities," 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j). These courts also noted that Title VII and the PDA specifically covered employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, thereby obviating the need to extend the coverage of the ADA to protect pregnancy and related medical conditions. Because Johnson's pregnancy nor its complications are a disability under the ADA, she has failed to state a claim under the ADA upon which relief can be granted. Thus, Johnson's claims against the defendants under the ADA are dismissed.
3. Family and Medical Leave Act
The FMLA provides that an eligible employee shall be entitled to 12 weeks of leave during any 12-month period when she has a "serious health condition" that makes her "unable to perform the functions of the position." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Defendants argue that because Johnson's termination on October 3, 1995, occurred after the expiration of the 12 week leave period, it did not violate the FMLA. In her complaint, however, Johnson does not allege the date that she left work. As a result, this Court cannot determine whether her termination occurred after the expiration of the 12 week leave period provided by the FMLA. Accordingly, defendants' motions to dismiss this claim and for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are denied without prejudice to later renewal.