2. American with Disabilities Act
The ADA provides that no employer "shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12112. Under the ADA, a "disability" is defined as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The complaint alleges that Johnson was pregnant and temporarily suffered complications during her pregnancy.
Courts have held, however, that pregnancy and related medical conditions are not disabilities under the ADA. See, e.g., Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 473 (D. Kansas 1996); Villarreal v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Tsetseranos v. Tech Prototype, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 109, 119 (D.N.H. 1995); Byerly v. Herr Foods, Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4253, *11 1993 WL 101196 (E.D.Pa. 1993).
These courts based their conclusion in part on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") regulations stating that "conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not the result of a physiological disorder are not impairment," 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(h), and that "temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities," 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j). These courts also noted that Title VII and the PDA specifically covered employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, thereby obviating the need to extend the coverage of the ADA to protect pregnancy and related medical conditions. Because Johnson's pregnancy nor its complications are a disability under the ADA, she has failed to state a claim under the ADA upon which relief can be granted. Thus, Johnson's claims against the defendants under the ADA are dismissed.
3. Family and Medical Leave Act
The FMLA provides that an eligible employee shall be entitled to 12 weeks of leave during any 12-month period when she has a "serious health condition" that makes her "unable to perform the functions of the position." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Defendants argue that because Johnson's termination on October 3, 1995, occurred after the expiration of the 12 week leave period, it did not violate the FMLA. In her complaint, however, Johnson does not allege the date that she left work. As a result, this Court cannot determine whether her termination occurred after the expiration of the 12 week leave period provided by the FMLA. Accordingly, defendants' motions to dismiss this claim and for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are denied without prejudice to later renewal.
4. Individual Capacity
a. Title VII
Defendants also move to dismiss all of the claims against Osborn in her individual capacity.
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., an employer's agent may not be held individually liable. See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313-17 (2d Cir. 1995). The PDA is a part of Title VII. Thus, Osborn is not subject to individual liability under the PDA.
b. Family and Medical Leave Act
Whether Osborn may be held liable individually under the FMLA is a more difficult question. The FMLA defines "employer" as
(i) any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year . . .