Corp. v. Texaco, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 918, 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Thus, for example, while the Complaint alleges, in wholly conclusory terms, that defendant "William J. Reiber, Jr. was the bookkeeper and in charge of administering the 'Ponzi' scheme and looting and siphoning" (Complaint, P199), it fails to specify a single particularized act of racketeering committed by Reiber, Jr. The same is true with respect to the other defendants. The only even arguably close case involves Ms. Schaefer, who is alleged to have mailed specific letters from Advance Payment to the Rosenhecks and others, "knowing" that the letters contained false representations that non-existent notes, mortgages and assignments did in fact exist. (See, e.g., Complaint, PP183-198). But the Complaint fails to allege any particulars from which a reasonable person could deduce that Ms. Schaefer had such actual knowledge of falsity, let alone factual circumstances giving rise to a strong inference that she had the requisite fraudulent intent. Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1990); Katzman, supra, at *4; see also, Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the RICO claims must be dismissed as to all defendants.
In these circumstances, the remaining state law claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 348-53, 98 L. Ed. 2d 720, 108 S. Ct. 614 (1988).
Nor should leave to amend be granted. Plaintiff's failure to plead the requisite particulars with respect to the named defendants stands in striking contrast to the Complaint's highly particularized allegations against the absent bankrupt parties. Taking account of this contrast, together with the great length of the Complaint and the representations made by plaintiffs' counsel at oral argument as to the time and investigation that went into the preparation of the Complaint, it is clear that no purpose would be served by granting leave to plaintiffs to amend. McCormack Int'l. Corp. v. Vohra, 858 F. Supp. 415, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Integrated Resources Real Estate Limited Partnerships Securities Litigation, 850 F. Supp. 1105, 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
On the other hand, the Court is equally convinced from the colloquy at oral argument that it cannot unequivocally conclude that the Complaint was interposed for improper purposes or that it was "patently clear that [the RICO] claim had absolutely no chance of success. . ." Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985). Accordingly, an award of Rule 11 sanctions is not warranted.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motions to dismiss are granted, plaintiffs' application for leave to amend is denied, and defendants' motion for Rule 11 sanctions is denied.
Clerk to enter judgment.
DATED: White Plains, N.Y.
August 13, 1996.
JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.